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Abstract
Dealing with security is a central activity for todays organizations. Security
breaches impact on the activities executed in organizations, preventing
them to execute their business processes and, therefore, causing millions of
dollars of losses. Security by design principles underline the importance of
considering security as early as during the design of organizations to avoid
expensive fixes during later phases of their lifecycle. However, the design of
secure business processes cannot take into account only security aspects on
the sequences of activities. Security reports in the last years demonstrate
that security breaches are more and more caused by attacks that take
advantage of social vulnerabilities. Therefore, those aspects should be
analyzed in order to design a business process robust to technical and social
attacks. Still, the mere design of business processes does not guarantee
that their correct execution, such business processes have to be correctly
implemented and performed.
We propose SEcure Business process Engineering (SEBE), a method
that considers social and organizational aspects for designing and imple-
menting secure business processes. SEBE provides an iterative and incre-
mental process and a set of verification of transformation rules, supported
by a software tool, that integrate different modeling languages used to
specify social security aspects, business processes and the implementation
code. In particular, SEBE provides a new modeling language which permits
to specify business processes with security concepts and complex security
constraints.
We evaluated the effectiveness of SEBE for engineering secure business
processes with two empirical evaluations and applications of the method
to three real scenarios.
Keywords
[Security, business processes, social/organizational security aspects, auto-
mated reasoning, automated implementation.]
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Dealing with security is an extremely important activity for today’s organi-
zations [17]. Security breaches impact on the activities and on the business
processes of such organizations and, consequently, they cause millions of
dollars of losses. But an analysis of the business processes executed in or-
ganizations is not enough for avoiding security issues. Security reports over
the past decades demonstrate that more and more breaches occur because
of trusted users, insiders [2, 77]. As such, dealing with security requires
an analysis of the social and organizational aspects of organizations, along
with a business process one. However, these analyses alone do not guar-
antee organizations to be secure, the implementation of business processes
should enforce security constraints in order to avoid security issues.
In this chapter we discuss the problem of engineering secure business
processes. Specifically, we propose a method to design secure business
processes, considering social and organizational security aspects of the or-
ganizations, and to implement such processes.
1.1 Security and business processes
Security is a central aspect for many organizations. This is demonstrated
by the interest and investments organizations put on security. According
to PricewaterhouseCoopers’s (PWC) 2014 report [1], 36,25% of the orga-
nizations examined invested between 50.000 and 1 million of dollars and
1
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another 31% invested more than 1 million of dollars.
Such investments are justified by the impact of security breaches in the
activities and the business processes, i.e., sequences of activities, executed
by organizations to deliver their products or services. Although huge in-
vestments are made to deal with security, still during 2014 40.73% of the
organizations, which reported security issues, lost between 50.000 and 1
million dollars, with another 31.61% reporting losses of more than 1 mil-
lion dollars.
The consequences of security leaks are not limited to monetary losses
due to inability of organizations to execute their business processes. Other
negative impacts include: (i) loss of customers: since the loss of money
or sensitive data may convince customers to move to other systems; (ii)
legal consequences: some organizations must guarantee a level of security
prescribed by the local legislation; otherwise in case of a security breach,
offended parties might sue the organizations; (iii) loss of reputation: when-
ever there is a security leak the organization will lose the appealing for new
users or customers.
For example, in 2008 Heartland Payment Systems (Heartland), a com-
pany with over 250,000 clients that process more that $4.2 billion trans-
actions annually, reported a security breach that was very costly for the
company. It lost 50% of its market capitalization and it spent more than
$32 million on legal fees and other related settlement costs [25].
Security by design principles strongly encourage to consider security
as early as possible [36] during the design of organizations, to minimize
the costs of modifications that, otherwise, would be order of magnitudes
more expensive [80]. Therefore, security shall be taken into account as
early as during the design of business processes, instead of during their
implementation.
Specifically, in order to avoid security issues and their consequences,
business processes should be designed to be compliant with security re-
quirements, which specify security needs and constraints, defined by stake-
holders of organizations. Even if only one business process allows a com-
2
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bination of execution of actions that violates one or more security require-
ments, the overall organization may become vulnerable to attacks. For
example, Heartland, as an organization who manages sensitive data of
its customers, must protect the data stored and not disclose them. If a
business process executes a routine that publishes all the sensitive data
collected, then such single execution will lead to the infringement of laws,
with penal consequences and monetary losses. These consequences will
prevent the execution of other business processes of the company, causing
additional monetary losses and other consequences.
Multiple research work considered the design of business processes com-
pliant with security requirements an extremely relevant problem [81]. One
of the most promising research directions consists of representing secu-
rity concepts with modeling languages based on business process. How-
ever, such modeling languages are focused on specific application areas
since the interpretation of security concepts highly depends on the context
where the business processes are executed. Examples of these languages
are SecureBPMN [24] that extends Business Process Management and No-
tation (BPMN) [86] with concepts that permit to specify access controls
constraints; and UMLSec [57] that extends activity diagrams [38] to repre-
sent security concepts. Unfortunately, no modeling language covers enough
security concepts to be used as a general tool for designing secure business
processes of organizations. Moreover, most of the languages have a complex
syntax that generates diagrams difficult to understand when real scenar-
ios, which are composed by tens of business processes with hundreds of
activities, are modeled.
Social and organizational security requirements define complex con-
straints that cannot be expressed with atomic security concepts in business
processes, instead, they correspond to patterns and security constraints on
such processes, from now on security policies. Such security policies have
to be defined and verified against business processes to avoid security vio-
lations. In the Heartland example, the security issue was caused by a SQL
injection that may be prevented if a security policy, which constraints the
3
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authentication process to be executed every time employees access cus-
tomers’ information, would have been specified and verified.
The verification of security policies is a time consuming and error-prone
operation because organizations’ security policies may be complex, with
many interdependent constraints, that have to be verified against huge
business processes with hundreds of elements. Therefore, the verification
should be automated in order to avoid error, while checking very complex
business processes.
Some approaches have been proposed for the representation and verifi-
cation of security policies against business processes. For example, BPMN-
Query (BPMN-Q) [9] is an intuitive modeling language for graphically ex-
pressing policies, but it has a limited expressiveness and it is not focused
on security. Other works use a formal approach to formulate policies using
logical and/or formal languages, such as the approach proposed by Liu et
al. [68] or FPSPARQL [16]. Those approaches permit to specify a wide
range of policies, however, the complexity of the languages prevents their
application in real scenarios. There is no modeling language which is ex-
pressive enough to specify security policies of real scenarios that are easily
understandable in such complex cases.
The design approaches we examined consider security concepts in busi-
ness processes, such as confidentiality, availability and integrity, from a
technical perspective, i.e., as security concepts related to security mecha-
nisms, for example, the cryptographic protocol used to encrypt messages
exchanged between two services of the organization, or the key length set
for the hash calculated for a document. Those approaches do not consider
the social context in which business processes are executed.
Organizations are composed of people and organizational units, aside
from technical components, that interact and collaborate as autonomous
actors to achieve common objectives. This forms what in the last years
has been defined as socio-technical systems [30, 117]. For example, a pay-
ment system, as Heartland, is considered a socio-technical system because
customers, banks and parts of the system which perform the payment
4
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collaborate and exchange information, for the shared goal of transferring
values.
In socio-technical systems part of business processes are executed by
social actors, such as employees, or other organizational units. Therefore,
a technical analysis is not enough to avoid security breaches: an analysis
of the organization, which considers how executors of business processes
relate with each other, and the social aspects, which takes into account
why they interact with each other, plays a fundamental role in the design
of business processes.
For what concerns security, the design of business processes compliant
with social and organizational security requirements, from now on secure
business processes, requires an analysis of the relations and objectives of
actors within a organization. Referring to PWC report on Cybersecurity
of 2015 [2], during last year 64% of all security risks are attributed to
organizations employees (34% from current employees and 30% from former
employees).
Most importantly the social and organizational (social/organizational
from now on) analysis should be done as early as during the requirement
engineering phase [37] to avoid expensive fixes and conflicts with existing
business processes executed in the organization. In other words, first a
social/organizational analysis should be conducted to identify stakeholders’
security requirements of the organization, then business processes shall be
designed.
The business processes, therefore, should fulfill the social/organizational
security requirements, otherwise security problems will arise when they are
implemented and then executed. The verification of security requirements
against business processes requires the transformation of social/organiza-
tional concepts in business process terms. For example, the objectives of
actors of organizations, specified in social/organizational analyses, are not
considered in business processes, therefore, security requirements on ob-
jectives have to be transformed in security policies that can be verified in
business processes.
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Only few, preliminary, research approaches face the transformation of
social/organizational security concepts to business process concepts. Argy-
ropoulos et al. [4,5] proposed a method for deriving business processes from
social/organizational models, however the security concepts in the source
and target languages missed precise definition of the abstract syntax of
security concepts.
The social/organizational perspective can be used to design secure busi-
ness processes, however, if such processes are not correctly implemented,
the organization will not benefit of the security analysis conducted. This
may happen for multiple reasons. Developers, who will implement the au-
tomated part of business processes, might misunderstand the specifications
or, in some cases, deliberately deviate from the blueprint. These deviations
results in unexpected behaviors that may lead to security vulnerabilities.
For these reasons business process designers, i.e., the business process
experts in charge of defining business processes of organizations, should
guide the implementation of the business processes, and check if the be-
havior of the implementation deviated from what is expected.
One promising research direction consists in generating the software
code from business processes, as proposed by Kim et al. in [58]. Francesco-
marino et al. [46] analyze the logs of the system, and check if they are
consisted with the specified business processes. Brucker and Hang [23]
proposed a framework to statically check source code of the implementa-
tion against constraints defined in a procedural modeling language focused
on security. However, all research work we analyzed are limited on the type
of checks they verify against business processes or they are too complex to
be used in real case scenarios.
Concluding, business process designers deal with many challenges when
engineering secure business processes, the most relevant being:
• define business processes which take in consideration security con-
cepts;
• use social/organizational perspective of the system, to design business
6
1.2. A METHOD TO ENGINEER SECURE BUSINESS PROCESSES
processes;
• verify that the business process fulfill security requirements;
• generate an unambiguous specification for the implementation of se-
cure business processes.
No approach assists business process designers for the design of secure
business process, using the outcome of social/organizational analysis, until
their deployment.
1.2 A method to engineer secure business processes
In order to tackle the aforementioned problems, this thesis proposes SEBE
(SEcure Business process Engineering), a method to engineer secure busi-
ness processes that supports business processes designers in designing se-
cure business processes and ensuring their correct development.
SEBE uses a social/organizational analysis to consider the organiza-
tional structure of the organization, the rationale behind its actors and
their interactions. Such analysis of the organization supports stakehold-
ers to specify the security requirements a secure business process should
enforce. For example, in a complex systems such as Heartland, with thou-
sands of customers, that was created with the acquisition of smaller orga-
nizations, hundreds of business processes are executed. This complexity
caused an erroneous analysis of security requirements that led to monetary
losses and penal consequences. A social/organizational analysis would have
helped to specify relations between components, to highlight inconsisten-
cies on security requirements and it would have led to a correct specifica-
tion of the security requirements and, therefore, to a secure design of the
Heartland system.
SEBE provides an expressive modeling language to specify secure busi-
ness processes and security policies. The modeling language permits to
specify an exhaustive range of security concepts, is not limited to specific
7
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contexts, as many of the current approaches are. It is graphical, easy to
use and scalable with the size of real case scenarios.
Moreover, the method is provided with a software tool, which permits
an automated verification of the security policies against secure business
processes. This allows business process designers to easily check whether
business processes are compliant with procedural and security constraints
specified in security policies.
In order to guarantee the enforcement of security requirements, SEBE
generates specifications for the developers of the part of secure business
processes that have to be implemented. Specifically, the method gener-
ates part of the the implementation of the automated task of the business
processes, which already enforces the security specification defined in the
processes. The implementation will then be completed by the developers
on the missing parts.
Concluding, the thesis proposes SEBE: a comprehensive method that
supports business process engineers in engineering secure business process.
The method exploit a social/organizational analysis to design secure busi-
ness processes and it generates part of the implementation of the secure
business processes.
1.3 Research questions and success criteria
In the following we specify the research questions of this thesis, the success
criteria we consider for each of them and the evaluation method we used
to check the achievement of success criteria.
1.3.1 Research questions
On the whole, our objective is that of helping business process designers in
engineering secure business processes. We, therefore, define the following
Research Questions (RQs).
RQ1. How to represent secure business processes?
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RQ1 consists in finding an appropriate graphical modeling language for
business processes with security concepts. This includes the specification
of the sequences of actions and security concepts.
RQ2. How to represent security policies?
RQ2 consists in finding a representation of security policies which should
be expressive enough to be used by business process designers to specify
security constraints on secure business processes.
RQ3. How to verify security policies against secure business pro-
cesses?
RQ3 requires an approach that permits to verify constraints specified in
security policies against secure business processes. The verification should
be automated to increase the scalability and to allow to analyze real, fre-
quently complex, scenarios.
RQ4. How the social/organizational perspective can be used to
design secure business processes?
RQ4 is about the connection between social/organizational perspective se-
cure business processes. The answers of this research question covers: (i)
how social/organizational concepts are mapped to business process con-
cepts; (ii) how social/organizational security requirements are enforced in
secure business process models.
RQ5. How to generate an implementation that enforces security
concepts specified in secure business processes?
RQ5 covers the generation of implementation of secure business processes.
Specifically, it covers how the business process concepts are mapped to
implementation concepts, and how security concepts of secure business
process are enforced in the implementation.
RQ6. How can we guide business process designers in the cre-
ation of secure business processes and their implementation?
RQ6 asks for a process that guides the business process designers for engi-
neering secure business processes. From our experience, business process
designers needs rules and best practices in order to effectively use the re-
sults produced for the previous research questions.
9
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1.3.2 Success criteria
We defined Success Criteria (SC) to determine when a research question
can be considered achieved. Table 1.1 lists the success criteria associated
to each research question.
Research question Success criteria
RQ1 SC1 Have a modeling approach that can be used to:
SC1.1 represent business processes
SC1.2 represent security concepts of business processes
SC1.3 formalize business processes and security concepts
RQ2 SC2 Have a modeling approach that can be used to:
SC2.1 represent security policies
SC2.2 formalize security policies.
RQ3 SC3 Have an analysis approach that:
SC3.1 verifies procedural patterns against business processes
SC3.2 verifies security constraints
SC3.3 automates analysis
RQ4 SC4 Have a systematic approach that:
SC4.1 helps deriving business process from organizational concepts
SC4.2 checks the enforcement of security requirements
RQ5 SC5 Have a systematic approach that:
SC5.1 provides transformation rules to generate implementation
SC5.2 automatically generate implementation
RQ6 SC6 Have a systematic approach that:
SC6.1 provides a process to be followed by the user of the method
SC6.2 provides a software tool that supports the process
Table 1.1: Success criteria
SC1 specifies that SEBE should include a modeling approach which per-
mits business process designers to graphically represent business processes
(SC1.1) in order to specify secure business process models, represent secu-
rity concepts of business processes (SC1.2) in order to specify such concepts
in the graphical representation of secure business process models, and for-
malize business processes and security concepts (SC1.3) in order to detect
inconsistencies and conflicts in secure business process models.
SC2 specifies that method should include a modeling approach that
10
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SUCCESS CRITERIA
represents security policies (SC2.1) in order to permit business process
designers to specify constraints on the flow of activities and security aspects
in terms of business process concepts. Moreover, the approach should
permit to formalize security policies (SC2.1) in order to detect conflicts
and inconsistencies.
SC3 indicates that SEBE should help business process designers to
analyze various aspects of the business processes. Specifically, it should
allow to verify procedural patterns agains business processes (SC3.1), i.e.,
it should help designers to check if the constraints on the flow of activities
specified in the security policies are respected in the business processes
analyzed. The method should permit to verify security constraints (SC3.2):
it should help to verify that security constraints specified in the security
policies are satisfied in the business processes analyzed. Moreover, it should
automate analysis (SC3.3), which consist in providing a software tool which
permits to execute the analysis and, therefore, permits to examine complex
models as the one that can be frequently found in real scenarios.
SC4 points out that SEBE should include a systematic approach that
uses social/organizational perspective for the design of secure business pro-
cesses. Specifically it should help business process designers in deriving
business process from organizational concepts (SC4.1), in order to facil-
itate the creation of secure business processes and give business process
designers a starting point, i.e., initial business process models, that can be
enriched. Moreover, it should check the enforcement of security require-
ments in business processes (SC4.2): SEBE should verify if the security
requirements of stakeholders, specified at a social/organizational perspec-
tive, are implemented in the secure business processes enriched by the
business process designers.
SC5 indicates that the method should provide a systematic approach
that generates at least part of the implementation of the socio-technical
system as the one of organizations. Precisely, the method should provide
transformation rules to generate implementation (SC5.1) that allows the
creation of part of the implementation, and it should provide a software
11
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toolset which implements those rules to automatically generate the imple-
mentation (SC5.2).
SC6 specifies that the method should include a systematic approach
that guides business process designers with rules and best practices to
engineer secure business processes. Specifically, it should provide a process
that help business process designers in using the theoretical and software
tool provided for the research questions described above. Furthermore, the
method should provide a comprehensive software tool that supports all the
steps of the process in oder to facilitate the application of the methods.
1.3.3 Evaluation
In order to assess if the success criteria are met by SEBE, we examined the
outcomes of two empirical studies, three case studies and the formal defi-
nition of the abstract syntax of the modeling languages provided with the
method. Table 1.2 lists the evaluations we used to decide the achievement
of the success criteria.
We conducted two empirical experiments, one consisted in a controlled
experiment, in which subjects used the method to perform exercises and
then answered questionnaires, the other empirical experiment consisted in
a online survey. In particular, we evaluated how secure business process
and security policies are graphically represented (SC1.1, SC1.2 and SC2.1);
the generation of business processes and the verification of security policies
(SC4.1 and SC4.2); the process and the tool which support the process
proposed in this thesis (SC6.1 and SC6.2).
The method we proposed, provides a modeling language for secure busi-
ness process and security policies with the abstract syntax formally speci-
fied. This provides answers to SC1.3 and SC2.2.
We used three case studies, one of a hospital, one of a ministry and
one of a municipality, to evaluate SEBE as a whole. We strictly collab-
orated with domain experts of the three case studies and we collected
information of how they used the method and we examined the diagrams
12
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generated. In particular we evaluated how secure business process and se-
curity policies are represented (SC1.1, SC1.2 and SC2.1). We use the case
studies to check if security policies are correctly verified against business
processes, this includes the verification of the control flow (SC3.1), the
verification of security part (SC3.2) and the automated software support
(SC3.3). The same type of evaluation was used for checking if the method
helps business process designers in designing business process staring from
social/organizational information and in verifying the enforcement of secu-
rity requirements (SC4.2). Moreover, the evaluation was used to check if
the transformation rules used for generating the implementation are correct
(SC5.1) and if they are correctly implemented (SC5.2).
Empirical study Formal syntax Case study
SC 1.1 X X
SC 1.2 X X
SC 1.3 X
SC 2.1 X X
SC 2.2 X
SC 3.1 X
SC 3.2 X
SC 3.3 X
SC 4.1 X X
SC 4.2 X X
SC 5.1 X
SC 5.2 X
SC 6.1 X
SC 6.2 X
Table 1.2: Evaluation of success criteria
1.4 Research contribution
This thesis proposes SEBE, a method to engineering secure business pro-
cesses using a socio-technical approach. It helps business process designers
13
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in designing secure business processes, considering social and organiza-
tional perspectives, and in generating an implementation of such processes.
Figure 1.1 shows the components of the method. The method builds on
existing components highlighted in yellow, i.e., STS-ml and RDL, while it
extends the STS-Tool which is marked in light yellow. STS-ml [89] is a goal-
based modeling language we used to analyze social/organizational security
aspects of organizations, whereas RDL [109] is a script language we chose
as implementation language for secure business processes. STS-Tool [106]
is a software toolset, written in Java, which supports the specification of
STS-ml diagrams.
The first contribution of this thesis is SecBPMN2, a modeling language
we propose to specify secure business processes and security policies. The
modeling language extends Business Process Management and Notation
2.0 (BPMN 2.0), the standard for modeling business processes, and it is
provided with a formal definition of its syntax.
The second contribution consists in a set of transformation rules that
permit to use the social/organizational perspective to design secure busi-
ness processes and to generate part of the implementation of the socio-
technical system of organizations from secure business processes.
The third contribution of this thesis is a process, which guides business
process designers in engineering of secure business processes. The process
is iterative and incremental and is used to direct method users from the
social/organizational analysis of security, through the design of business
processes, until their implementation.
The fourth contribution is an extension of STS-Tool that implements
the transformation and verification rules, and verifies procedural security
policies against business processes. The software extension provides full
support to the method, including the process, the specification and analysis
of SecBPMN2 and STS-ml diagrams and the coding of RDL applications.
The last contribution of this thesis consists in the evaluation of the
success criteria with two empirical experiments and three case studies.
14
1.5. RUNNING EXAMPLE
Process
STS-ml SecBPMN2 RDL
Transformation 
rules
Transformation 
rules
Veriﬁcation 
rules
STS-Tool
Figure 1.1: Components of SEBE.
1.5 Running example
SAP Payment Engine (PE) [108] is a software system created to perform
payments for e-commerce shops or, more in general, for services that allow
users to pay with electronic methods. Usually, to support the electronic
payments, the e-shops implement interfaces to communicate with all the
banks they intend to use as source/destination of the payments. But each
bank requires a different set of protocols and security measures. Therefore
the e-shops are forced to put a noticeable amount of effort to implement
different interfaces, and for medium/small organizations it is not acceptable
investing large quantity of time and money just to allow people to pay the
goods/services they offer.
The PE minimizes such effort: it contains a set of pre-built interfaces
with the most known banks in the world that can be used out of the
shelf. E-shop programmers only have to create one interface to transmit
the required data to the PE system.
Such system highly relies on security since the consequences of a security
breach might be severe. Therefore, it is essential that each actor in such
system maintains the level of security it committed, since a security breach
in only one actor may compromise the entire system. For example, if
a bank of the PA system transmits payment order with a channel not
enough protected, all sensitive information in the transmitted documents
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might be disclosed; moreover, the payment orders themselves might be
modified. This will lead to catastrophic consequences for the PE system
and the organization who runs it: customers will sue the organization, the
organization will reimburse the modified transactions and the credibility
of the system, and consequently of the organization, will drop.
We chose PE as a running example since is a real case study of a complex
socio-technical system in which many autonomous actors interact, execut-
ing business processes, to achieve common objectives. The engineering
of such system calls for a socio-technical approach, where social/organiza-
tional perspective is considered for the design and implementation of secure
business processes executed to perform payment and handle sensitive data
of customers and organizations.
1.6 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 describes the related work. We review the methodologies for
business process engineering in Section 2.1, while we describe modeling lan-
guages for social/organizational security aspects in Section 2.2. Section 2.3
describes the most known modeling languages for secure business processes
and security policies, while Section 2.4 reports the research approaches used
to transform social/organizational models to business process models and
the latter in implementation.
Chapter 3 presents the research work and the technologies on which
SEBE is built. Section 3.1 provides a description of STS-ml, a model-
ing language for social/organizational security aspects. Section 3.2 intro-
duces BPMN-Q, a query language for business processes, while Section 3.3
presents RMIAS: a reference model for security. Section 3.4 delineates
RDL a script language for business artifacts and their business logic.
Chapter 4 presents the process provided with SEBE, specifically Sec-
tion 4.1 describes all its phases.
Chapter 5 describes SecBPMN2 the modeling language for secure busi-
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ness processes and security policies, provided with SEBE. Section 5.1
delineates its principles. Section 5.2 presents BPMN 2.0 the standard
for representing business processes on which SecBPMN2 is based, while
Section 5.3 describes the security concepts that are used in SecBPMN2.
We describe the part of the modeling language for business processes in
Section 5.4 and the part for modeling security policies in Section 5.5. Sec-
tion 5.6 formally specifies how a security policies is satisfied in SecBPMN2
business processes.
Chapter 6 presents the transformation rules which permit to design
SecBPMN2 business processes starting from a social/organizational mod-
eling language (Section 6.1), and to generate part of the implementation
from SecBPMN2 business processes (Section 6.2).
Chapter 7 describes STS-Tool, the software we created to support the
users of SEBE. In particular, the chapter describes how the consistency
of models is verified automatically (Section 7.1), how SecBPMN2 business
processes are generated (Section 7.2) and how security policies are verified
(Section 7.3). Moreover, Section 7.4 describes how part of the implemen-
tation is automatically generated, while Section 7.5 provides a description
of the architecture of the software tool.
Chapter 8 provides a description of the empirical evaluations we con-
ducted. Section 8.1 describes the empirical evaluation on SecBPMN while
Section 8.2 reports the evaluation of the SEBE method as a whole.
Chapter 9 presents the application of SEBE to three case studies. Sec-
tion 9.1 presents the settings of the case studies, while sections 9.2, 9.3
and 9.4 present the case studies and the results of the application of the
method. Section 9.5 describes the results of the application of the three
methods.
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis. Section 10.1 describe how the SC are
fulfilled, while Section 10.2 highlights the limitations of the SEBE method.
Section 10.3 delineates the ongoing work and Section 10.4 presents the
future work.
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Related work
The literature offers many approaches that share part of the objectives
with this thesis. This chapter analyzes the most relevant and prominent
works.
Criteria and methods
We used a simple but effective method for describing the related work of
SEBE. Initially we defined inclusion criteria as list of questions which
covers the main aspects of SEBE. Then we classified the included papers
in areas of interest.
Inclusion criteria
1. Does the approach cover security?
2. Does the approach cover business process engineering?
3. Does the approach cover the modeling of social/organizational con-
cepts?
4. Does the approach cover the modeling of business processes?
5. Does the approach cover enforcement of requirements?
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6. Does the approach cover the transformation of social/organizational
concepts in business processes or the latter in the implementation
code?
The first question allows to include approaches on security, we consider
this question as a necessary but not sufficient condition, it applies with
second, third, fourth and fifth questions. This means that it is not sufficient
that an approach is about security to be considered a related work.
The second question includes approaches that propose methods to help
the design, implementation and deployment of business processes.
The third question permits to include research work that propose or
extend a modeling language which permits to specify social/organizational
aspects.
The fourth question covers research work which proposed or extends a
modeling language that permits to specify business processes.
The fifth question covers all research work which are focused on the
implementation of requirements.
The sixth questions includes approaches that permit to transform mod-
els containing social/organizational aspects in models that contains busi-
ness processes, or they permit to create at least part of the implementation
of the system to be.
Areas of interest
We classified the papers we considered in areas of interest that we defined
taking in consideration the inclusion criteria specified before. The areas of
interest are:
1. approaches for engineering business processes;
2. approaches for modeling security concepts in social/organizational
models;
3. approaches for modeling security concepts in business process models;
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4. approaches for transforming social/organizational models in business
process models or the latter in implementation code, and approaches
for enforcing social/organizational security requirements or business
process security specifications.
The first area of interest includes research work focused on providing
methods and/or guidelines for helping the design, implementation and de-
ployment of secure business processes. This area of interest is derived from
inclusion criteria 1 and 2.
The second area of interest comprehends research work focused on mod-
eling security concepts in social/organizational models, i.e., that match
inclusion criteria 1 and 3.
The third area of interest includes all research work that are concerned
about the modeling of security concepts in business process models, i.e.,
that match inclusion criteria 1 and 4.
The fourth area consists of approaches that transform social/organiza-
tional models in business process models or that they transform business
process models in the implementation code. Specifically, this area com-
prehends research work focused on the realization of constraint of security
concepts, i.e. research work that allow to actualize abstract security re-
quirements. It includes approaches that enforce social/organizational secu-
rity requirements in business process models, and business process security
concepts in the implementation code. This area of interest is derived from
inclusion criteria 5 and 6.
Selection criteria
The selection criteria consists in selecting approaches which permit a cer-
tain degree of scalability. This led to exclude non-graphical approaches for
the specification of social/organizational and business processes. For ex-
ample, textual approaches such as Based Requirements Analysis Method
(GBRAM) [3], cannot be used in real scenarios where there are tens of
actors, tens of social/organizational relations and hundreds of business
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process. The language would lead to errors in the specification of such
complex models, moreover, the specifications would be too difficult to read
in these complex scenarios.
The rest of the chapter describes the research works we examined, or-
ganized by area of interest.
2.1 Approaches for business process engineering
In this section we describe the most known approaches for engineering
business processes with a focus on research works on security.
The most know field is Business Process Management (BPM) [121].
This research area covers all the life cycle of a business process, which is
split in four phases: design, implement/configure, run and adjust. The
first phase consists in creating the business processes, the second phase in
create a system which follow the specification of the business processes,
the third phase consists in deploying the system and, therefore, executing
the actions specified by the business process, the last phase consists in
modifying the business processes to adapt in to new exigencies or changes
in the environment.
In BPM area many approaches were proposed. One of the most known
is Architecture of Integrated Information Systems (ARIS) [111,112] an ap-
proach to enterprise modeling [61]. The main objective of ARIS consists in
implement business processes in information system. It is based on Event-
Process Chain (EPC) [125] modeling language for business process. This
method use an approach similar to the one proposed in this thesis: it di-
vides the information used for the design of business process in separate
perspectives: organizational, data, control and function. The organiza-
tional perspective is used to specify the organizational hierarchy of entities
and the relations between them. The data perspectives includes the data
object definition with the function used to manipulate them. The function
perspectives is used to specify the processes executed in the organization
analyzed. The control perspectives is used to connects the other perspec-
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tives. ARIS is similar to our approach but it miss the security part in all
perspectives, moreover, it considers only the organization hierarchy of ac-
tors leaving out the social part, i.e., the rationale behind actors processes
and their interactions.
Business process design is a phase of BPM and consists in the definition
of business processes. Numerous research work focus in business process
design.
Bleistein et al. [19], for example, proposed a method to design busi-
ness process starting from goal models. Their idea is based on problem
frames [55], which separates in two moods the design of a system: indica-
tive, which indicates the status of the world as it is, and optative, which
indicates how to change the world. Bleistein et al. used a goal-based model-
ing language for the indicative mood and Role Activity Diagram (RDA), a
business process language, for the optative mood. This approach is focused
on the design of business process using social/organizational information
(defined in the goal modeling language), but it is not focused on security
and it miss the generation of a specification for the developers who will
implement the defined business processes.
Backes at al. [11] present an approach for integrating security require-
ments to the development of business processes. Their proposal is focused
on the connection between the business processes and the cryptography so-
lution that can be used in the implementation. Even if the propose guide-
lines for the implementation of many security requirements, the approach
is focused on cryptography. Moreover, it does not take into consideration
the social/organizational information but only high-level of abstraction se-
curity requirements.
Gruhn and Laue [49] propose a heuristic approach for finding common
design errors in business process models, represented using EPC [125].
They defined a set of rules to check if a business process is not sound or
it matches some bad design patterns. Security experts could adopt this
approach to verify the compliance of the business process model against a
fixed set of rules. However, using a fix set of rules is a major limitation
25
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
when dealing with security policies, as it forces security experts to adopt
an interpretation of security policies which may not fit the original policy.
Blanc et al. [18] propose an incremental inconsistency checker. Such
framework is based on the hypothesis that the definition of a business
process is an incremental task, and, thus, inconsistency checking shall be
done incrementally. They offer a software tool, based on Prolog [27], which
checks if a fixed set of well-formedness rules are satisfied by a business
process model. The framework can be applied to any modeling language
that can be translated in Prolog. The fixed set of queries is a major
limitation, as it inhibits custom security policies.
BPM is an evolution of a research area called business process re-
engineering, focused on the enhancement, and maintenance of already ex-
isting business processes. In this filed few approaches of security where
proposed but, mostly, they do not take into consideration social/organi-
zational information, since their starting point is already existing business
processes.
Herrmann and Herrmann [50] propose Modeling Security Semantics of
Business Processes (MoSSBP) a method which guides security experts
in reengineering businesses processes through graph rewriting techniques.
The method allow to refine high-level of abstraction business processes
through 4 levels where, at each level, more information are added. In the
last level the implementation code is generated. The method takes into ac-
count procedural security policies and help the business process designer in
checking if, in each level, the security policies are enforced correctly. This
method lacks in the specification of the social/organizational information.
Even if they authors claim that high level business process can capture
organizational information, they still miss to model the social part of the
system.
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2.2 Social/organizational approaches
In this section we describe the most prominent approaches for modeling
social and organizational aspects of socio-technical systems. We analyze
modeling languages that capture security along organizational aspects such
as business objectives, business strategies, social dependencies and organi-
zational structures.
This perspective hides most of the technical details of socio-technical
systems but offers an executive dashboard which permits to immediately
identify conceptual errors or misbehaviors. From the security point of
view this perspective is central since permits to specify abstract security
requirements that can be understood by not-technical people [118].
McDermott and Fox [75] extend use cases modeling language with abuse
cases. Their modeling language, called Abuse Case, allows to specify in-
teractions between one or more malicious actors and the system where the
results of the interactions are harmful to the system, one or more actors
or the stakeholders of the system. However, the interactions are not well
defined and they are more oriented to describe a sequence of high-level
malicious activities. Moreover, this language is not focused on security,
therefore, is not possible to specify security requirements.
Similarly, Sindre and Opdahl [116] extend use cases with misuse case,
i.e., use case whose execution threat a use case, and two relations, threats
and mitigates. The relations connect a misuse case to a use case; the former
specifies that the use case is hindered by the misuse case, while the latter
relation specifies that a use case is a countermeasure to a misuse case. The
approach proposed by the authors is systematic and permits to specify
misuse cases graphically and then with a table, to define more details.
However, the authors did not focus on security aspects and, therefore, is
not possible to specify security concepts.
UMLsec [57] extends Unified Modeling Language (UML) [20] with secu-
rity requirements focusing mostly on authenticity, secrecy, and integrity. It
permits to express security information within UML diagrams, and to ver-
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ify if the security concepts are coherent with the UML design of the system.
Security issues are analyzed by representing the behavior of potential at-
tackers, and modeling specific types of attackers. While the expressiveness
of UML permits to define a large amount of details of the system analyzed,
the set of security requirements that can be expressed with UMLSec are
limited to technical aspects of the systems and therefore, they cannot be
used for security requirements on social/organizational aspects.
Goal-based modeling languages allow to specify the rationale behind the
actions and interactions between actors of the systems, i.e., they permit
to specify what are the objectives of the actors and why they interact.
The expressiveness of these languages, focused of on the objectives of ac-
tors, permits to easily specify social/organizational concepts of the systems
analyzed.
Lamsweerde [122] proposes a method for elaborating security require-
ments by building two models: (i) a goal model of the system-to-be, which
covers both the software and its environment and inter-relates their goals,
agents, and requirements; (ii) an anti-model, derived from the goal model,
that that describe goals of attackers. Both models are specified using an ex-
tension of Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification (KAOS) [33],
a goal based modeling language. However, this approach is not focused on
the security requirements but rather on the objectives of a possible mali-
cious person therefore, it uses a limited set of security requirements that
are formally specified but too limited for a real case scenario.
SI* [48] is a goal-based modeling language for the acquisition of security
requirements for systems where actors socially depends on each other. It
extends i* [129], a goal based modeling language, adding the possibility of
specifying different type social relations between actors, such as delegation
of goals, transmission of authorizations and trust relations. With SI* is not
possible to specify security requirements directly but only using ownership
of goals, delegation of goals and permissions on delegations, therefore, it is
not possible to specify well-known security concepts such as confidentiality
or integrity.
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Elahi et al. [40] propose an extension of i* with with vulnerability, at-
tacker and countermeasure concepts, for security tradeoff analysis. They
based their approach on the idea that security requirement may not be
fully satisfied but the can be partially satisfied and business process de-
signers have to balance the satisfaction of such goal with other, contrasting
goal, such as usability goal, costs, etc. The authors focused on creating a
modeling language highly expressive, which can be used to specify many
concepts. The resulting diagrams are very complex and difficult to read,
therefore, the modeling language will be hardly usable in real scenarios.
Moreover, security requirements are specified a set of goals with a textual
description of few words for each goals, this may leads to misinterpretation
and confusion.
Secure Tropos [79] is an extension of Tropos [22] method which enable to
model security concerns throughout the whole development process. The
modeling language used for Secure Tropos, which share the name with the
method, extends i* with security constraints over goal dependencies and
with security capabilities of actors of the system. The language permits
to specify security aspects in social/organizational perspective using a tex-
tual description; this choice prevent any limitation on the set of security
requirements that can be detailed but, on the other hand, it may generate
confusion and misunderstanding when the diagrams are read by different
people.
STS-ml [31] is a goal-based modeling language for the specification of so-
cial/organizational security requirements in socio-technical systems. STS-
ml uses three views to hide details of the model and, therefore, it permits to
define richer models maintaining their readability higher than other similar
approaches. It extends Secure Tropos with the possibility of defining secu-
rity requirements as social commitments between actors and authorizations
relations between actors.
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2.3 Approaches for secure business processes
This section describes the most relevant approaches for modeling business
processes with security concepts and for modeling security policies.
During last years a relevant number of modeling languages for secure
business processes were proposed. But most of these languages are focused
on only specific areas and so they fail to provide adequate coverage of the
security domain [72].
As far as we known only few approaches were proposed in the last years
for modeling security policies and none of them are graphical. The second
part of this section analyzes query languages: graphical modeling languages
for the specification of patterns (constraints) of business processes that are
not focused on security.
2.3.1 Business process modeling languages with security con-
cepts
A natural solution to represent the security concepts of business process
is to create or extend a modeling language. Such languages are easy to
learn and to use [78], thereby requiring a moderately low effort for security
designers to specify a secure business process.
Menzel et al. [76] propose security extension of BPMN that enables
generating security specifications for Service-oriented Architecture (SoA).
The modeling language proposed by the authors specify security concepts
as patterns defined in business process terms. However this approach limits
the definition of security concepts in terms of business processes. Moreover,
it is focused on a specific technical domain, i.e., SoA.
Rodriguez et al. [95] extend a subset of BPMN to express a predefined
set of security requirement types. However, this approach permits to define
a limited set of security concepts (non repudiation, attack harm detection,
integrity, privacy and access control), and it does not take into account the
flow of messages between business processes.
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Saleem et al. [98] extend BPMN with security concepts for SoA appli-
cations. They include a set of security concepts in BPMN: confidentiality,
integrity, availability, traceability, and auditing. The language permits to
model a limited set of security concepts, moreover, their work is specific
for the SoA domain.
Wolter and Schaad [128] propose an extension of BPMN for specifying
task-based authorization constraints. Their approach includes a graphical
extension of BPMN as well as a formalization of task-based authorization
constraints. Their approach permits to specify dynamic resource alloca-
tion such as dynamic separation of duty and role-based resource alloca-
tion. Their approach is focused on authorization constraints of executors
of tasks, and it is not possible to use it to specify other security concepts,
such as availability or integrity.
SecureBPMN [24] extends BPMN with access control and information
flow constraints. It uses the hierarchic structure of the organization, in
which the business process will be executed, to help security designers to
define security properties such as, for example, binding of duty [67] and
separation of duty [67,115]. However, SecureBPMN is limited in that it is
not possible to specify other central security concepts such as, for instance,
confidentiality or availability.
UMLSec [57], as described above, is a security-oriented extension of
the UML [85]. In particular, for want concerns business processes, the
extensions of UML activity diagrams, sequence diagrams and communica-
tion diagrams can be used to define business process with security choices.
However, this part of UMLsec has a limited expressiveness in term of busi-
ness process concepts that can be specified, moreover, the usage of three
different modeling languages (diagrams) makes the specification of business
process difficult since details are divided in three different diagrams.
Atluri and Warner [7] suggested a list of security concepts that shall be
taken into consideration, and therefore specified, when modeling workflows.
Their proposal is limited to the taxonomy, they did not propose a modeling
language to specify such security concepts with business processes.
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Other research works [6, 92] use extensions of Petri nets to define busi-
ness processes with security concepts. Petri net modeling language is sim-
ple and easy to use but it does not include all the graphical constructs of
BPMN. This influence negatively the understandability of models about
medium-size or large business processes, limiting the applicability to only
small-size business processes.
2.3.2 Query languages
Security policies can be seen as patterns, and the their verification against
business processes corresponds to the problem of checking if a pattern
holds in a business process. Query languages and their software tooling
can be used to solve this type of problems, as they allow the creation of
queries (patterns), and compliance verification against a business process
model [100].
Dolman et al. [34] propose a pattern matching approach for concep-
tual models. Such approach consists in algorithms for solving the relaxed
graph isomorphism problem, i.e., verifying if the nodes of a labeled graph
match with a given pattern (isomorphism problem), and the existence of a
path among the graph nodes as indicated in the pattern (homeomorphism
problem). They created a tool that implements their algorithms to verify
the compliance of a graph with a pattern. The approach is not specific to
any modeling language, being rooted in labeled graph theory. However,
such approach has to be extended to support the verification of security
concepts in a business process.
Beeri et al. [15] propose Business Process Query Language (BP-QL),
a pattern-based graphical query language for business processes. They
also provide software tooling to determine the compliance of a business
process—defined using WS-BPEL [83]—with a pattern. The decision of
using Web Service - Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL),
a machine-readable standard, hinders the readability of the business pro-
cess, especially with real case scenarios, where business process easily reach
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hundreds of elements.
A Process model Query Language (APQL), proposed by Hofstede at
al. [51], is a textual query language, based on 20 predicates that can be
composed to create complex queries. This approach suffers of scalability
issues: the definition of complex queries is a challenging task that will
lead to errors due to the complexity of the task. Moreover, as far as our
knowledge goes, this approach is not supported by a software framework.
Visual Model Query Language (VMQL) [119] is a graphical query lan-
guage based on UML activity diagrams [38]. It permits to define custom
properties, which are evaluated when the compliance of a query is veri-
fied against a business process. But VMQL was not created for security
purposes: even if the custom properties can be used to represent security
concepts, the VMQL software engine can not interpret them limiting their
usage only as a representation of security concepts.
Business Process Query Language (BPQL) [35] permits to graphically
define both queries and business process models using the same language.
Unfortunately, BPQL is not based on BPMN, hence the learning process
is likely to be slower than that with by BPMN-Q. Moreover, BPQL does
not include security concepts.
Ribeiro and Guedes [93] presented an analyzer for automatically veri-
fying the consistency between workflow specifications and organizational
security policies. But the language they provided for expressing security
policies can be used for expressing separation of duty, information flow and
access control constraints. This limits considerably the expressiveness of
the language that cannot be used to specify well-known security concepts
such as confidentiality, availability or integrity.
Wolter et al. [127] propose a modeling language for business processes
and business security concepts, to be used to graphically define security
specifications. They also develop a framework which transforms security
goals in security policies specified in eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [84] and Rampart [120]. The framework automati-
cally extracts specifications of security mechanisms which enforce the se-
33
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
curity goals, but it does not permit security experts to compose security
goals and, therefore, to create complex security policies.
Schmidt et al. [113] propose two ontologies for defining quality con-
straints and for defining service processes, respectively. Such ontologies
are used to check if a service process complies with the imposed quality
constraints. The main drawback of this approach consists in the fixed set
of constraints that can be specified and checked.
Folder-Path Protocol and RDF Query Language (FPSPARQL) [16] is
a query language which permits to define queries using a formal textual
language. The proposal focuses on analyzing business process generated
from action logs, hence is not possible to directly define a process, and
moreover is not focused on security.
Sadiq et al. [97] propose to use a Formal Contract Language (FCL)
to express normative specifications. Their approach includes a modeling
language to visualize business processes as well as normative constraints.
They also define a compliance distance, which denotes the extent to which
the process model has to be changed to become compliant with the de-
clared constraints. The limitation of this approach is the complexity of
the language, despite the provision of a tool to graphical represent nor-
mative requirements and business processes. In future work, it would be
interesting to compare the usability of the SecBPMN2 framework with the
FCL-based approach.
Liu et al. [68] propose a language and a framework which statically
verifies a business process against a formally expressed regulatory require-
ments. The framework accepts as input a business process specified in
WS-BPEL [83] and a set of regulatory requirements, expressed with a
temporal logic language called “Business Process Specification Language”.
While powerful, this approach is hardly usable for large scenarios, due to
the complexity of expressing regulatory requirements.
Ghose and Koliadis [47] enrich BPMN with annotations, and calculate
how much a business process deviates from another business process. Dif-
ferently from our approach, theirs focuses only on the structural difference
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between processes with no consideration of security requirements.
2.4 Transformation approaches
This section describe the most known research approaches that permit
to transform social/organizational approaches in business processes and
business processes in part of the implementation.
The focus of this thesis is on business processes, but other research work
focused on the generation of the implementation specification directly from
a social/organizational perspective. Still, we believe that for nowadays’
organizations, where tasks are executed by both technical component and
people, business processes are central and the specification of the code in
not enough to avoid security breaches.
For example, Alexei et al. in [62] propose a systematic method to gen-
erate executable business processes directly from a social/organizational
model of the system, which is represented with a goal-based modeling
language. Since their approach does not use any intermediate language
between the social/organizational representation and the implementation,
such as SecBPMN2 for our approach, the goal-base language they proposed
is used to specify both social/organizational information and information
on the execution of business processes. This syntax of this language is com-
plex and we believe it will not scale well on real, huge, scenarios. Moreover,
the approach does not take into account security concepts.
Mouratidis and Jurjens [80] propose a method to engineer the design
of a system, using UMLsec, starting from social/organizational security
requirements, using Secure Tropos. The guidelines defined for transform-
ing Secure Tropos concepts in UMLsec concepts are not formally specified
and the part on the transformation of security concepts consists in only
one rule, therefore, a lot of freedom, and effort, is left to the user of the
method. Moreover, the choice of UMLsec permitted the authors to in-
clude in the design also business processes, using sequence diagrams. But
UMLsec sequence diagrams defined with the method are meant to be exe-
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cuted by software and not by people. This limit the scope of the method
only to technical system or, however, systems where the human part is not
central and cannot compromise the security of the system.
Brandozzi and Perry [21] proposed a method to transform goal models in
architecture. They based the transformation on a formal framework which
minimizes the number of revisions of the goal model and the architectural
model. They used KAOS [33] as goal-based modeling language and APL
(Architecture Prescription Language) [21] as modeling language for the
architecture. Both modeling languages does not take into account security
perspectives, therefore, the proposed approach misses the transformation
of security concepts.
2.4.1 From social/organizational to business process models
We surveyed the most cited papers on transformation of goal-based mod-
eling language [52, 53], and even if the research field is active, i.e., many
papers are published on the topic, only few of them are centered in the
transformation of such modeling language in business processes with a fo-
cus on security aspects.
Lopez et al. [71] proposed a method to re-engineer business processes
using SI*. Their proposal consists in creating an SI* diagram from an old,
secure business process, create a new business process and verify if the
new business process is compatible with what have been modeled in the
SI* diagram. They used traces for the comparison: they create a trace
from the two business model and a set of trace from the SI* model. If
the two traces of the business process are compatible with the set of trace
of the goal model, then the business process are goal-equivalent, i.e., the
achieve the same goals. The approach is comparable to what is proposed
in this thesis but the Lopez et al. used plain BPMN, i.e. without security
concepts. This limit the approach since security concepts are limited to an
a social/organizational perspective.
Knorr and Roehrig in [59] presented a framework for enforcing security
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objectives in e-business processes, i.e., business processes which use infor-
mation and communication technologies in support of all the activities of
business. They focused on four main security objectives: confidentiality,
availability integrity and accountability; but they claim their proposal can
be easily extended to other security objectives. This proposal is focused
to specific type of business processes, and offers solutions that are not eas-
ily generalizable to other scenarios, for example they integrate four fixed
phases each business process analyzed shall execute: information, negoti-
ation, payment, delivery. Even if this approach does not include directly
social/organizational aspects we included it in this section because it of-
fer a method to enforce high-level of abstraction security objectives (i.e.
security requirements) in business processes.
2.4.2 From business process models to implementation
In the area of mapping or translating business process specifications to
implementation code the number of existing proposals is surprisingly small.
Ouyang at al. [88] propose an approach to automatically transform
BPMN 1.0 business processes in WS-BPEL [83] (Business Process Execu-
tion Language) code. The algorithm, and the software which implements
the algorithm, proved that is possible to generate BPEL code from BPMN
models and that, under certain conditions, the generated code is readable.
This powerful approach was tested against four collections of real busi-
ness processes that prove its reliability. But this approach used BPMN 1.0
witch has a very limited expressiveness, if compared to BPMN 2.0, more-
over, it is focused on a subset of BPMN elements they called core elements.
Therefore, many concepts, such as the ones that represents the executors
of the task, are excluded from the transformation.
Backes at al. [11] propose a guideline for integrating security require-
ments in the development of business processes. The paper is focused on
providing a formal trust model that shall be integrated in a formal speci-
fication of business processes to express arbitrary security goals. This will
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provide concrete guidelines how a secure implementation can be achieved
from secure specification. This approach does not use a model driven ap-
proach and, therefore, it will not be easily usable in real scenarios, where,
frequently, there are tens of business processes with hundreds of activities.
Moreover, the approach does not propose a formalization of the business
process model to use.
Menzel et al. [76] propose security extension of BPMN that enables
generating security specifications for SoA. Their proposed transformation
rules generate machine-readable specification of such security properties in
Rampart [120].
Wolter et al. [127], as described in a previous section, propose a model-
ing language for business processes and business security concepts. They
also develop a framework which transforms security concepts in security
policies specified in XACML [84] and Rampart [120]. The framework au-
tomatically extracts specifications of security mechanisms which enforce
the security concepts, but it does not permit security experts to compose
security concepts and, therefore, to create complex and custom security
policies.
Other approaches focus on integrating security mechanism (e.g., access
control infrastructures) into business process execution engines [24,128].
Lohmann et al. [69,70] discuss the integration of compliance aspects into
artifact centric business processes. They integrate role-based access con-
trol, separation of duty and binding of duty properties in artifact-centric
business processes. Similarly, they propose to use a petri-net based for-
malization to ensure the compliance to high-level separation of duty and
binding of duty compliance requirements. This approach is related to other
BPMN based process models, e.g., [29].
Kim et al. in [58] presented a framework for generating role-driven
access security from business process models. Their work is based on in-
formation control net method, and permits to model business process, with
an ad-hoc language provide with a formal definition of the semantic, and
automatically derive a set of access control, that can be implemented with
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any Role Based Access Control (RBAC) system. This proposal completely
automate the generation of specifications, that can be implemented by the
developer or directly in constraints for RBAC systems. But it is focused
on a small part of security, which is the enforcement of authorizations,
ignoring all other security concepts such as integrity or availability.
Damasceno et al. in [32] proposed SSC4Cloud, a framework which per-
mits to model business processes in a shared environment, in order to allow
the collaboration of different experts in the same model. The same frame-
work provides an execution environment where the business processes cre-
ated can be executed without waiting their implementations to be ready.
The framework uses an ad-hoc language for the specification of business
processes with security concepts that is used to generate the implementa-
tion code (WS-BPEL [83]) and a set of configurations, used for enforcing
the security concepts. The implementation code generated can be executed
only inside the execution environment provided with the framework, i.e.,
in a controlled environment where the security configuration are always
applied correctly.
Other approaches focused on the verification of the implementation
code. For example, Rushby [96] proposes a language and a framework
which checks if the code of a software system diverges from specified be-
haviors. Software code can be considered as a specification of the behavior
executed by a program, while the behaviors can be considered as the poli-
cies. This proposal suggests a new perspective on how to specify and check
behaviors of software systems. But it can not be used on complex informa-
tion systems because the transformation of business process to software is
time consuming and it does not take in consideration the human perspec-
tive: one of the salient characteristic of business processes.
2.5 Chapter summary
This chapter describes the research work related to SEBE. While many
approaches focused on part of the secure business engineering problem,
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no approach offered an integrated method that supports business process
designers in designing secure business processes, considering social/organi-
zational information, and in generating the implementation code.
Many approaches are focused on narrow aspects of security, loosing gen-
eralization and becoming too specified to be used as a general approach
for security of business processes in organizations. Other approaches, in-
stead, cannot be applied in real case scenarios because the complexity of
the languages or operations to be executed prevents their execution/usage
in complex, real, scenarios.
Currently, there is no method that permits to engineer secure busi-
ness processes from a socio-technical perspective, that is applicable in real
scenarios, with hundreds of processes executed by tens of actors that are
involved in many (tens or even hundreds) of social relationships.
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3.1 Representing social/organizational aspects with
STS-ml
Social/organizational aspects of organizations define why components in-
teract with each other and how they are related. Security requirements
about such aspects, therefore, outline the security constraints they require
to be met in each interaction. The rationale behind interaction is the first
detail that should be determined when designing business processes, in or-
der to understand the objective of actors and the results they expect from
the interactions.
For this, we use the STS-ml [31, 89] modeling language. STS-ml is an
actor and goal-oriented security requirements modeling language for socio-
technical systems. It was chosen because: (1) it is specifically thought for
socio-technical systems of organizations, relating security to interaction,
(2) it supports a rich set of security requirements, while providing a clearer
ontological foundation than existing approaches [48,79].
3.1.1 Multi views approach
In STS-ml, requirements models are created through three views: (i) the
social view—represents the main stakeholders (in terms of actors) together
with their objectives (via goals) and the interactions they enter in the
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socio-technical system; (ii) the information view—represents stakeholders’
informational assets and their representation via documents; and (iii) the
authorization view—represents the authorizations that actors grant to oth-
ers over their information. Figure 3.1 shows a partial STS-ml model of the
motivating example.
Social view. Actors in STS-ml are modeled in terms of (i) agents—
concrete entities that are already known at design-time (e.g., Payment
Engine), and (ii) roles—abstract entities representing a class of participants
(e.g., Bank dst). An actor’s rationale captures actors’ goals, and how
they are achieved via and/or goal decompositions (e.g., the root goal of
the Payment Engine is Value transferred that is and-decomposed in two
subgoals Transfer authorized and ID banks received). Moreover, to achieve
their goals, actors might need to read or modify documents, as well as create
(produce) new documents (e.g., Payment engine reads document Transfer
order to achieve goal Value transferred). Most importantly, the social
view captures actors’ social interactions via two social relationships: goal
delegation and document transmission. STS-ml allows actors to express
their concerns about security (security needs) over the interactions they
enter to then derive security requirements with respect to confidentiality,
integrity, availability, accountability, reliability, and authenticity.
Information view. Information is a first class citizen in STS-ml, since
most security issues are concerned with the protection of information. In-
formation owners are the ones concerned with the protection of informa-
tion. Therefore, STS-ml allows specifying information ownership via the
relationship own that relates an actor to the information it owns. Infor-
mation may be available in various forms, and thus, STS-ml distinguishes
information from its representation in form of documents. Documents be-
come relevant from a security point of view because of the information they
represent. Thus, the purpose of the information view, apart from repre-
senting information entities and their respective owners, is to link together
the documents actors use and exchange in the social view with their in-
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formational content. This link is drawn through Tangible by relationships.
In Figure 3.1, information e-transfer details is made tangible by document
Transfer order.
Authorization view. An adequate representation of permissions and
prohibitions is crucial to establishing whether information is used and ex-
changed in compliance with security requirements. The authorization view
allows specifying the permissions and/or prohibitions on information that
actors grant one to another. An authorization relationship details: (i)
the permissions/prohibitions on the operations actors can perform over
information (Read, Modify, Produce, Transmit) while manipulating docu-
ments for the achievement of their goals; (ii) information entities for which
permissions/prohibitions are specified; (iii) the scope of authorization, re-
ferring to the goal(s) for the fulfillment of which permission/prohibition is
specified; and finally, (iv) transferability, specifying whether permissions
can be further granted to others (not applicable to prohibitions). In Fig-
ure 3.1, the Payment Engine authorizes the Bank dst to read e-transfer
details in the scope of goal Dst transfer authorized, granting a transferable
authorization. Security requirements are generated from authorizations
whenever prohibitions are specified. For example, from the authorization
to Bank dst, three security requirements are generated, one for each opera-
tion that is not authorized, namely: (i) non-modification, non-production
and non-disclosure (i.e. not transmission) of information e-transfer details,
as shown in Figure 3.1.
3.2 Querying business processes with BPMN-Q
While BPMN is adequate for expressing the interactions among the com-
ponents in a complex socio-technical system, it does not natively support
the verification of compliance with certain security properties that should
hold in the model. For example, when modeling the landing procedure in
ATM, one may want to verify that in the process it is always the case that
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Figure 3.1: STS-ml diagram representing social/organizational model of PE.
pilots will confirm the landing trajectory of the plane.
Visual analysis of BPMN models works only for small scenarios, but it
becomes ineffective when many models exist, or when they are as large
as hundreds of elements. Moreover, when safety and security properties
are at stake, relying on an informal analysis is not an option, due to the
harmful effects of adopting a model that violates them.
BPMN-Q is a diagrammatic query language which partially overcomes
this limitation, by expressing properties concerning business process mod-
els through graphical queries that can be checked against a BPMN model [10].
These queries can be seen as patterns that a given BPMN model should
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comply with. BPMN-Q introduces relations that are functional to define
the queries, i.e., the concepts of walk, negative walk and negative flow.
Figure 3.2 shows an example of a BPMN-Q query, on a security policy
used in an airport [42]. The query enables checking whether the flight
plan (Reference Business Trajectory or simply RBT) is approved and if
the landing documents are checked at least once. The query will match
against any business process model which: (i) contains an task labeled
“Plane RBT generation service” and such task generates the data object
“RBT [Proposed]” (the text within brackets denotes the state of the data
object); (ii) contains a walk, i.e., a sequence of BPMN elements connected
through a control flow, that connects the first task to a parallel gateway;
(iii) contains a walk that connects the gateway to “Control Tower commu-
nication service” that generates the data object “RBT [Accepted]”; (iv)
contains another walk that connects the gateways to a task with any label
(“@Y”) that reads the data object “Landing documents [Approved]”.
Plane RBT 
generation 
service
@Y
RBT
[Proposed]
Control Tower 
communication 
service
RBT
[Accepted]
Landing 
documents
[Approved]
//
//
//
Figure 3.2: Example of BPMN-Q query
BPMN-Q enables expressing generic properties over BPMN elements,
but does not provide any explicit modeling primitive for specifying secu-
rity properties. We intend to overcome this limitation by defining security
annotations that adhere with a state-of-the-art reference model for infor-
mation security.
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3.3 A reference model for security concepts
The Reference Model on Information Assurance and Security (RMIAS) [26],
which was assembled through an analysis and classification of security con-
cepts proposed by the most known reference models on information assur-
ance and security. As far as our knowledge goes, RMIAS proposes the
most comprehensive set of security concepts, for it aggregates and clas-
sifies security concepts proposed in the most known reference models on
security and information assurance, such as the Confidentiality-Integrity-
Availability (CIA) triad and BMIS [54]. The security concepts proposed
in RMIAS are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Security concepts covered by the RMIAS reference model [26]
Name Definition
Accountability
An ability of a system to hold users responsible for their actions
(e.g. misuse of information).
Auditability
An ability of a system to conduct persistent, non-by passable
monitoring of all actions performed by humans or machines
within the system.
Authenticity
An ability of a system to verify identity and establish trust in
a third party and in information it provides.
Availability
A system should ensure that all system’s components are avail-
able and operational when they are required by authorized
users.
Confidentiality
A system should ensure that only authorized users access in-
formation.
Integrity
A system should ensure completeness, accuracy and absence of
unauthorized modifications in all its components.
Non-
Repudiation
The ability of a system to prove (with legal validity)
occurrence/non-occurrence of an event or participation/non-
participation of a party in an event.
Privacy
A system should obey privacy legislation and it should enable
individuals to control, where feasible, their personal informa-
tion (user-involvement).
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3.4 Representing business artifacts with River Defi-
nition Language
Well known business-process or workflow modeling languages such as BPMN
2.0 or WS-BPEL are based on task flows: data that is processed within
the processes is often an afterthought. In contrast, artifact-centric business
process modeling [28,82] puts the business artifacts (e.g., data, documents)
into the center of the process modeling.
We chose RDL [109] as the implementation language. RDL is an exe-
cutable specification language that allows specifying declaratively: (i) the
artifacts (e.g., entities); (ii) the relationships between them (e.g., associ-
ations); (iii) the business logic (e.g., actions) on the artifacts. RDL im-
plementations generated with the transformation rules we provide, can be
directly deployed.
Figure 3.3: The SAP RDL Platform
Figure 3.3 shows an high-level overview of SAP RDL: SAP HANA pro-
vides the persistency layer as well as the container in which the enterprise
applications are executed. Clients as well as back end systems or external
services can communicate with the RDL platform using standard protocols.
The business artifacts (i.e., the data model) and their behavior (i.e., the
business logic) as well as the access control are specified in the RDL [109].
Listing 3.1 illustrates an example of a RDL application, which allows to
specify entities (e.g., customerAccount), their attributes (e.g., dateofBirth),
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1 type LocalDate { date : TimeStamp ; s t a t e : String ; }
2 application PaymentEngine{
3 role Consultant ;
4 export entity customerAccount accessible by Consultant {
5 key element ID : String ;
6 element dateOfBirth : LocalDate ;
7 action updateInformation ( ) { [ . . ] } } }
Listing 3.1: An RDL application derived from the business process model in Figure 5.1
and custom types of the attributes (e.g. LocalDate). Besides this pure data
modeling, i.e., definition of the data structure used to store information,
RDL also supports the specification of the actions (e.g., updateInformation)
in a declarative style. Finally, RDL supports the specification of role-based
access control restrictions: the actions of the entity customerAccount are
only accessible by members of the role Consultant.
By default, artifacts in RDL are private. To enable access outside of
their scope, they need to explicitly marked with the export keyword. More-
over, the annotation @OData enables remote access using the OData pro-
tocol (www.odata.org). Such a remote access is controlled by the same
access control restrictions of internal access.
3.5 Chapter summary
In this chapter we introduced the technologies and research approaches on
which SEBE is based. STS-ml is used for the specification of social/or-
ganizational security aspects and security requirements. BPMN-Q is used
to specify security policies, while RMIAS is used as reference for the secu-
rity concepts that SEBE supports. RDL is our choice as implementation
language for thex implementation of business processes.
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A process for secure business process
engineering
SEBE aims at helping business process designers to design secure business
processes, using a social/organizational analysis of socio-technical systems
of organizations, and to create part of the implementations of these socio-
technical systems, which enforce security concepts specified in such secure
business processes. The wide scope of the method calls for a flexible process
that will guide the users of the method on its application,
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the process provided with the SEBE
method. The process receives as input a description of the social/orga-
nizational aspects of the socio-technical system of the organization an-
alyzed, and it produces part of the implementation. The process con-
sists in three main activities: (i) the definition of the social/organiza-
tional model and business process models (Modeling in the figure); (ii)
transition from the social organizational model to business process model
(Transformation/analysis in the figure); (iii) generation of the code (Code
generation in the figure). The first and the second activities are repeated
until the users consider the social/organizational models and the business
process models complete.
Given the complexity and size of socio-technical systems, the first and
the second activities, i.e., the definition and analysis of social/organiza-
tional and the business process models are repeated to create the models
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iteratively and incrementally. The modeling activity is alternated with a
transformation and analysis activity which helps in defining the models
and gaining knowledge on the domain analyzed. When business process
designers define business processes using information of the the social/or-
ganizational model, they gain more knowledge on the domain, therefore, if
the new the social/organizational aspects are discovered, the related model
will be updated.
This iteration can be used for the security aspects as well. If new re-
quirements are found after the business processes are define, they are added
in the social/organizational model and, then, a new iteration is needed. In
other cases social/organizational security requirements may be to strict
and, therefore, it is impossible to specify a business process which satisfy
them and they have to be relaxed. Those interactions will lead to the cre-
ation of secure business processes that, once complete can be transformed
in part of the implementation.
Modeling
Transformation/
analysis
Code 
generation
Figure 4.1: Overview of the SEBE process.
Roles. SEBE is meant to be used by business process designers, a role that
encapsulates the expertise of a requirements analyst and a security engineer
or expert. Such role requires a remarkable set of skills in modeling and
security, therefore we suggest to execute the process by a team of experts.
Ideally, such team should be supported by at least a domain expert, since
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the creation of diagrams required by SEBE need deep knowledge of the
socio-technical system analyzed.
Inputs/outputs. The method receives as input the requirements doc-
ument (the result of elicitation activities), with a focus on security re-
quirements. This document is the result of elicitation activities, including
stakeholders’ needs and information from regulatory rules, laws, and other
related documents. Such document can be used as a starting point, whose
information can be enriched by the domain experts involved in the pro-
cess. The final output of the process is part of the implementation code of
the technical systems (of the socio-technical system) that enforces security
requirements.
The method can be adopted in the context of broader methods for
system engineering and for software engineering. Broadly, the adoption
of the method is appropriate for open and large-scale systems, for the
social/organizational analysis is justifiable for socio-technical systems, and
not for software systems (e.g., compilers) that do not include external
autonomous actors.
4.1 Phases
Figure 4.2 shows the process provided with SEBE. In the following, we
describe each phase, highlighting its importance.
4.1.1 Phase 1
In phase 1 STS-ml is used to model the social/organizational aspects of
the socio-technical systems under consideration. Most importantly, the
models capture security requirements of stakeholders. This phase results
in: (i) the creation of a diagram representing the social/organizational
model (STS-ml diagram, Figure 4.2); (ii) a list of social/organizational
security requirements (STS-ml security requirements, Figure 4.2).
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Model social/
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Figure 4.2: The process proposed with SEBE.
4.1.2 Phase 2
Phase 2 deals with the transformation of social/organizational models to
business process ones, receiving as input a social/organizational diagram
and generating a business process diagram specified using SecBPMN2, a
modeling language for business processes with security concepts provided
with SEBE (SecBPMN2 diagram, Figure 4.2).
4.1.3 Phase 3
Social/organizational models do not contain the information required to
generate complete business process models. Therefore, phase 3 is executed
to enrich the business process models generated by phase 2 with details such
as the temporal aspects and security choices on the executed processes.
Phases 1-3 are repeated until business process designers decide they have
captured all important (security) details and the social/organizational and
business process models are complete and accurate.
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4.1.4 Phase 4
Phase 4 specifies security policies. It generates security policies from so-
cial/organizational security requirements. The generation requires the list
of social/organizational security requirements (STS-ml security require-
ments, Figure 4.2) and generates procedural security policies (SecBPMN2
security policy, Figure 4.2). It permits to translate security requirements,
defined in terms of social/organizational concepts, in more operational con-
straints, as the ones specified in procedural security policies.
Optionally, users can specify procedural security policies using SecBPMN2
modeling language. This permits to define custom security policies that
are not linked to any social/organizational security requirement.
4.1.5 Phase 5
Phase 5 deals with the verification of procedural security policies, gen-
erated in phase 4, against the business process model, enriched in phase
3. This phase validates the business process models by verifying, using
automated reasoning tools such as DLV [39], if they enforce the security
requirements specified in the social/organizational model. If all security
policies are enforced, then the business process designers have the proof
that the business process model meets the security requirements. If the
business process model does not satisfy all procedural security policies,
the business process designers will start the process from the beginning,
refining the social/organizational or the business process models.
4.1.6 Phase 6
Phase 6 consists in generating part of the implementation from the enriched
and verified business process model. The resulting application will enforce
the social/organizational security requirements, because social/organiza-
tional security requirements define the security policies that are verified
against the business process model. Therefore, because the transformation
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enforces all the security concepts defined in the business process model, the
implementation attends all security requirements as specified in social/or-
ganizational model.
4.2 Chapter summary
In this chapter describes the process provided with SEBE method. It is
composed by 6 phases which forms an iterative and incremental process
that supports business process designers in applying the method and use
it efficaciously. The process meets SC6.1, which requires a process to be
followed by the users of the SEBE.
54
Chapter 5
SecBPMN2
This chapter describes SecBPMN2 the modeling language for business pro-
cesses with security concepts and procedural security policies. We designed
it with the objective of creating a modeling language that can be used to
specify business processes, with hundreds or thousands of elements, used
in real scenarios. SecBPMN2 is expressive enough to be applied in most
of the scenarios and with a formal definition of the abstract syntax that
can be used for checking conflicts, incoherences and for the verification of
security policies against secure business processes.
5.1 SecBPMN2: principles
SecBPMN2 sits on two main objectives: (i) the modeling language should
be expressive enough to be used to define business processes with security
concepts and security policies; (ii) however it should be as easy as possi-
ble to be understood even when business process experts deal with real,
complex, scenarios.
Given those objectives we decided to extend BPMN 2.0 [87], a well
known standard for modeling business process, with: (i) security concepts,
in order to allow the specification of security concepts that are necessary
for designing secure business processes; (ii) a query language, to specify
security policies as constraints on the sequences of activities and on the
security concepts.
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The outcome of this research work is SecBPMN2, a modeling language
composed in two parts: SecBPMN2-ml, a graphical modeling language for
business processes with security concepts, and SecBPMN2-Q, a graphical
query language for specifying security policies in terms of SecBPMN2-ml
elements.
We extend BPMN 2.0 with security annotations to cover security con-
cepts derived mainly from RMIAS reference model. Every annotation has
a graphical syntax and has to be linked with an existing element of a
BPMN 2.0 model: a task, a data object, a message flow or a pool.
We limited SecBPMN2-ml to the subset of BPMN 2.0 that serves for
specifying processes and collaborations, i.e., the current version of the lan-
guage does not support conversations and choreographies. This decision is
a consequence of the objective of creating a language as simple as possible.
Still, SecBPMN2-ml is not less expressive than BPMN 2.0 because con-
versations and choreographies are generalization collaborations, that are
meant to be used for specify an overview of the system analyzed. More-
over, from our experience, conversations and choreographies models are far
less used than process and collaboration models.
Other modeling languages have been proposed for specifying business
processes and security concepts, such as those proposed by Menzel et
al. [76], Rodriguez et al. [95] and Saleem et al. [98]. However, such model-
ing languages are either not designed to express security policies, e.g., the
approach proposed by Menzel et. al [76], or they permit to specify only a
subset of the security aspects that can be expressed with SecBPMN2, e.g.,
the approaches of Rodriguez et al. [95] and Saleem et al. [98].
5.2 BPMN 2.0
Figure 5.1 shows an example of a SecBPMN2-ml diagram. If we exclude the
security annotations (the orange circles) the rest of the diagram is a legal
BPMN 2.0 coordination model. We introduce briefly BPMN 2.0 using an
example, since is a well known modeling language and on-line there are
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plenty of resources such as tutorials and guides.
Figure 5.1 represents two business processes delimited by a start event
and an end event. Each business process is executed by a participant,
namely Customer and PE, and contains at least one task, e.g., Generate
Payment order. BPMN 2.0 specifies 16 types of activities, but for the pur-
poses of this thesis we introduce only two of them, the general task, which
represent an atomic execution of a set of activities, for example Convert
values, and Call Activities, which represent another business process that is
called when the task is executed. For example, Perform payment is a call
activity which refers to another business process that, its execution consist
in the execution of another business process. When the linked business
process ends, the call activity is considered concluded and the execution of
the main process can continue.
Each participant may own one or more data objects that represent phys-
ical entities in which information is stored. For example, PE owns data
object Payment order. Data objects are read/written by one or more activ-
ities. The arrow from Payment order data object to task Perform payment
specifies that the task reads the data object when it is executed. A arrow
in the opposite direction, i.e., from an task to a data object, specifies that
the task writes the data object during its execution.
Communications between two participants are represented with message
flows (thick dashed arrows), while the contents of the communications are
represented by the message elements. For example, the execution of the
task Ask transfer creates a communication channel from the Customer to
the PE where the Transfer Req. message is sent.
The order of execution of activities is represented with the control flow
relation that links two SecBPMN2 elements and specifies that the source
element is executed before the target element. Call activities, e.g., Store
failure report, are special type of activities that are linked to an external
business process. The execution of such task consists in the execution of
the linked business process.
Gateways represent branches in the control flow, for example, the di-
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amond shape with an “X” symbol is an exclusive gateway. The gateway
executed after the task Analyze transfer order in Figure 5.1 specifies that
the control flow can take two different paths, based on the evaluation of
the condition Transfer order correct?. The exclusive gateway on the right
merges the two branches of the control flow.
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Figure 5.1: Example of SecBPMN2 model.
BPMN 2.0 standard does not provide any formal definition of its ab-
stract syntax, actually, the standard is, in some parts, ambiguous. For
example, it is not clearly defined the difference between swimlanes and
pools, and there are contradictions in the instantiation of call activities [60].
We, therefore, provide a formal specification of the abstract syntax of
BPMN 2.0 needed for the specification of SecBPMN2, and the specification
of how the security policies are verified against secure business processes.
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We define a BPMN 2.0 business process as tuple that contains the se-
quence of elements that can be executed, data objects, participants and
association between them.
Definition 1 (BPMN 2.0 Business Process). A BPMN 2.0 business pro-
cess is a tuple (A, E ,G,D,P , controlFlow, dataAssociation, executor) where:
(a) A is a finite set of activities,
(b) E ⊆ Es ∪ Ee ∪ E i is a finite set of events, Es ∩ Ee ∩ E i = ∅,
(c) G is a finite set of gateways,
(d) D is a finite set of data objects,
(e) P ⊆ Ppool∪Pswimlane is a finite set of participants,Ppool∩Pswimlane = ∅,
(f) controlFlow ⊆ (A ∪ G ∪ E \ Es) × (A ∪ G ∪ E \ Ee) is the control flow
association,
(g) dataAssociation ⊆ D ×A× {input, output} is the data association,
(h) executor ⊆ P × (A ∪ E ∪ G) is the executor association.
Definition 1 formalizes the definition of the abstract syntax of BPMN 2.0
business processes. The tuple is composed by: (a) a set of activities A; (b)
a set of events E that contains: a set of start events Es, that specifies where
the business processes start; a set of end events Ee, that indicates when
the business processes finish; a set of intermediate events E i, that specifies
when the business processes wait events to happen. The set G, point (c),
contains the gateways, i.e., elements used to create variants in the sequence
of activities executed. The setD, point (d), contains the set of data objects,
i.e., the documents needed as input or outputted by activities, while the
set P , point (e), contains the participants, i.e., the actors who execute
the activities. Participants are divided in pools Ppool, i.e., independent
actors, and swimlanes Pswimlane, i.e., sub-division of pools. The controlFlow
association, point (f), connects executable elements, i.e., A, E and G; from
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now on AEG = A ∪ E ∪ G. The association dataAssociation, point (g)
connects data objects with activities, and specifies if the data objects are
used as input or are outputted by the activities. The association executor
connects executable elements to the participant who executes them.
Following Definition 1, the business process executed by the participant
PE in Figure 5.1 is defined as a tuple with A={Examine target, Exam-
ine source, . . . }, Es={Start1}, EI= {Wait request, . . . }, Ee = {End1}, G=
{ok?}. D ={Payment order} and Ppool = {PE} Pswimlane={IO manger, Pro-
cessor}. In Figure 5.1 controlFlow connects, for example, Generate payment
order with Convert values; dataAssociation connects Payment order with task
Convert values and the value output. Association executor correlates, for ex-
ample, IO manager with Examine target task, meaning that the IO manager
executes the task Examine target.
Definition 2 specifies the conditions for a well-formed business process.
Definition 2 (Well-formed business process). A BPMN 2.0 business pro-
cess
(A, E ,G,D,P , controlFlow, dataAssociation, executor) is well-formed iff:
(a) |Es| = 1,
(b) |Ppool| = 1, and
(c) ∀x.x ∈ AEG → ∃! p ∈ Ppool.(x, p) ∈ executor.
Definition 2 specifies that a business process is well-formed when: (a)
it has one start event; (b) it has one pool; (c) all executable elements
are executed by only one pool. For example, the business processes in
Figure 5.1 are well formed because they have 1 start event each, 1 pool
each, and all activities are associated to a single pool.
Collaboration models are the core part of BPMN 2.0, they permit to
model the communications between business processes. In such models
communications are represented with message flows (thick dashed arrows),
while the contents of the communications are represented by the message
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elements. For example, the execution of Ask transfer creates a communica-
tion channel from the Customer to the PE where the Transfer Req. message
is sent.
Definition 3 formally specifies a collaboration model: a set of business
processes that exchange messages through message flows.
Definition 3 (BPMN 2.0 collaboration model). A BPMN 2.0 collabora-
tion model is a tuple (BP ,M,MF) where:
(a) BP = {bp1...bpn} is a finite set of business processes in which
bpi = (Ai, Ei,Gi,Di,Pi, controlFlowi, dataAssociationi, executori) is the
i-th bp in BP and 1 ≤ i ≤ n = |BP|,
(b) M is a finite set of messages,
(c) MF ⊆ (Ai∪Ppooli )×(Aj∪Ppoolj ∪Ej)×(M) is the message flow relation,
where i 6= j and 1 ≤ i ≤ |BP| and 1 ≤ j ≤ |BP|, and
(d) L ⊆ AEG ∪ D ∪ P ∪M× l is a labeling relation.
Definition 3 specifies a collaboration model as tuple composed of: (a) a
set of business processes; (b) a set of messages; (c) a message flow relation
that represents the communications between business processes. A mes-
sage flow links a pool or a task of a business process to a pool, a task or
an event of another business process, to a message that is exchanged. In
the collaboration model a labeling relation, (d), associates a string to ex-
ecutable elements, data objects, messages and participants. In Figure 5.1
two business processes are connected with four message flows that transmit
the messages Transfer Req., Authorization Req., Authorization and Confirm.
5.3 Security annotations
BPMN 2.0 is an expressive, well known standard for modeling business
processes, but it is not focused on security and, therefore, it lacks on the
security concepts that are needed for specifying secure business processes.
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Given that, we extends BPMN 2.0 with security annotations: graphical an-
notations that specify constraints on the execution of the business process
and their activities.
Before choosing the security concepts to introduce in BPMN 2.0 we
carefully examined the available reference models on security, i.e., security-
specific ontology that clearly defined security concepts that are produced
by experts.
A prominent family of reference models relies on the Confidentiality In-
tegrity Availability (CIA) triad [90]. However, their adequacy has been
questioned for they characterize a too limited set of properties of a sys-
tem [91]. Richer models exist, such as McCumber’s cube [74], which con-
ceives system security from three perspectives: information states, critical
information characteristics, and security measures. The Business Model for
Information Security (BMIS) [54] addresses four interconnected elements:
organization design and strategy, people, process, and technology.
We choose to extend BPMN 2.0 with the concepts proposed in the Ref-
erence Model on Information Assurance and Security (RMIAS) [26]. As
far as our knowledge goes, RMIAS proposes the most comprehensive set
of security concepts, for it aggregates and classifies security concepts pro-
posed in the most known reference models on security and information
assurance, such as the CIA triad and BMIS [54]. Still, during the itera-
tion with security experts, we realized that RMIAS has some limitations:
some security concepts, required by the experts to model common scenar-
ios, were missing. We, therefore, extended the reference model with three
security concepts. The final list of security concepts are listed in Table 3.1,
the first eight are defined in RMIAS the last three are our extension of the
reference model.
We designed the graphical syntax of the primitives following Moody’s
guidelines for increasing the usability and comprehensibility of modeling
languages [78]. Moody classifies the visual differences between graphical el-
ements of modeling languages in 8 visual variables: horizontal and vertical
position, shape, size, color, brightness, orientation and texture. Graphical
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elements that represent similar concepts should share as many variables
as possible, while they should be easily distinguishable among themselves,
i.e., they have at least one visual variable not in common. For example,
the BPMN 2.0 start and end graphical elements in Figure 5.1 have a vi-
sual distance of 3. They share the same shape, i.e., a circle, the same
size, brightness, orientation and texture, but they have different colors,
i.e., start events are green while end events are red, and different vertical
and horizontal positions
Security annotations share three common visual variables: they all have
an orange fill color, a solid texture, and a circular shape; they differ for
the icon in the middle of the circle. Every security annotation has a visual
distance of 3 from non-security annotations, i.e., they can be easily recog-
nized from other elements of the modeling language, and a visual distance
of 1 (the texture, i.e., the icon) from other security annotations.
We decided to use icons instead of abstract symbols because icons are
deemed as easier to remember and faster to recognize [78]. For example,
the icon for the availability security annotation is a clock face, which should
recall the concept of “time” and, therefore, should be easily linked to the
definition of availability security concepts (see Table 3.1). Leitner et al.
[63–65] conducted empirical studies to propose guidelines for representing
a set of security concepts. We did not apply these suggestions because they
conflict with the recommendation by the security experts that helped us
define the security annotations and, moreover, the set of security concepts
Leitner et al. took into account covers only partially the security concepts
proposed in RMIAS.
Security annotations can be linked to activities, data objects, message
flows and pools, but cannot be linked to events, which represent changes
in the environment of a socio-technical system. Moreover, security anno-
tations have attributes that are used to specify detailed information on
the security mechanisms1 that enforce the policy. Attributes are optional
1The low level (software and hardware) functions that implement the controls imposed by the pol-
icy [107]
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except for the one linking the annotation with a BPMN 2.0 element.
In the rest of the section all security annotation are defined. Each of
them is formalized in terms of one or more predicates, one for every type
of BPMN 2.0 element that the annotation can be linked with.
AccountabilityAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, monitored: {Users})
AuditabilityAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, frequency: Time)
AuditabilityDO (do: DataObject, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, frequency: Time)
AuditabilityMF (mf: MessageFlow, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, frequency: Time)
AuthenticityAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, ident: Bool, auth: Bool,
trustValue: Float)
AuthenticityDO (do: DataObject, enfBy: {SecMechanisms})
AvailabilityAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, level: Float)
AvailabilityDO (do: DataObject, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, authUsers: {Users},
level: Float)
AvailabilityMF (mf: MessageFlow, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, level: Float)
ConfidentialityDO (do: DataObject, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, readers: {Users},
writers: {Users})
ConfidentialityMF (mf: MessageFlow, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, readers: {Users},
writers: {Users})
IntegrityAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, personnel: Bool,
hardware: Bool, software: Bool)
IntegrityDO (do: DataObject, enfBy: {SecMechanisms})
IntegrityMF (mf: MessageFlow, enfBy: {SecMechanisms})
NonRepudAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, execution: Bool)
NonRepudMF (mf: MessageFlow, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, execution: Bool
PrivacyAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, sensitiveInfo: {Info})
PrivacyDO (do: DataObject, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, sensitiveInfo: {Info})
SoDPool (p1: Pool, p2: Pool, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, dynamic: Bool)
BoDPool (p1: Pool, p2: Pool, enfBy: {SecMechanisms}, dynamic: Bool)
NonDelegationAct (a: task, enfBy: {SecMechanisms})
Table 5.1: Security annotations in SecBPMN2: predicates and their graphical syntax
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Accountability. It applies only to activities—thus, only one correspond-
ing predicate called AccountabilityAct exists—, and expresses the need of
monitoring a set of users when executing the task. The predicate has three
parameters: the task a that is being monitored, a set of security mecha-
nisms enfBy used to enforce accountability for the task, and the set of users
monitored which are monitored.
If the task is executed by a user that is not in monitored, the security
property is satisfied without using the enforcement mechanism. This sit-
uation would typically occur with trusted users that do not need to be
monitored. Security designers can specify the keyword ALL in monitored,
to indicate that all users are held for their actions.
Consider, for example, the predicate AccountabilityAct(“Generate pay-
ment order”, {RBAC}, {Processor}). The first attribute details the task
linked with the security annotation, the second one indicates that RBAC
(Role-Based Access Control) [43] will be used to enforce accountability,
while the third one specifies that only Processor have to be monitored
while executing that task.
Auditability. This security annotation comes in three variants, expressing
different types of auditability in a business process: (i) AuditabilityAct indi-
cates that it should be possible to keep track of all the actions performed by
the executor of the task a when trying to execute that task; (ii) Auditabil-
ityDO indicates that it should be possible to keep track of all the actions
(e.g., write, read, store) concerning a data object do; (iii) AuditabilityMF
indicates that it should be possible to keep track of all the actions executed
to handle the communication (send/receive actions) within a message flow
mf.
The predicates share two parameters: enfBy to express the set of security
mechanisms to be used, and frequency to specify how often the security
checks are performed. If frequency is set to zero, continuous verification is
required.
For instance, consider the predicate AuditabilityAct(“Perform payment”,
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{}, 10d). It applies to task Perform payment, it does not require a specific
technology for checking auditability, and requires audits to be performed
every 10 days.
Authenticity. It comes in two versions, depending on which BPMN ele-
ments the annotation applies to. AuthenticityAct imposes that the identity
and/or authenticity of the users of task a are verified. The attribute enfBy
is the set of security mechanisms to be used, while trustValue is the min-
imum level of trust [56] the executor of task a must have. If attribute
ident is true, anonymous users should not take part in the execution of the
task, while if auth is set to true, the identity of users should be verified.
AuthenticityDo indicates that it should be possible to prove the data object
do is genuine: the fact that do was not modified by unauthorized parties,
and it contained proofs of the identity of the entities who generated and/or
modified it.
For example, consider the predicate AuthenticityDO (“Payment order”,
{TLS, X.509}). The predicate specifies that the authenticity of Payment
order data object should be guaranteed using Transport Security Layer
(TLS) and X.509 security mechanisms.
Availability. It applies to three BPMN elements, hence we defined three
different versions: (i) AvailabilityAct specifies that the task a should be
ready for execution whenever the task is encountered in the control flow
of the business process; (ii) AvailabilityDO specifies that the data object do
should be available when required by the authorized users specified in the
attribute authUsers; (iii) AvaliabilityMF specifies that it should always be
possible to communicate through the message flow mf.
The predicates share two parameters: enfBy, described above, and level,
i.e., the minimum time percentage that the resource (i.e., task, data object
or message flow, depending on the variant of availability annotation) should
be available. In AvailabilityDO, security designers can specify that all users
are authorized to request the data object, simply specifying the keyword
ALL in the attribute authUsers.
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For instance, the predicate AvailabilityAct(“Examine source”, {SAVE},
99.5) specifies that Examine source has to process at least 99.5% of the
total requests, using the Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE) [66]
protocol to prevent denial of service attacks.
Confidentiality. It has two variants: ConfidentialityDO specifies that the
data object do can be accessed only by authorized users, and Confiden-
tialityMF specifies that only authorized users can use (i.e., send or receive
through) the message flow mf. Both predicates share three parameters:
enfBy, already described; readers, i.e., the set of users that are authorized
to read the data object (or receive from the message flow); writers, i.e.,
the set of users that are authorized to write the data object do (or send
through the message flow). The attributes readers and writers allow the
usage of the keyword ALL to specify that all the users are authorized.
For example, consider the predicate ConfidentialityMF (mf(“Ask trans-
fer”, “Wait request”), {TLS, RBAC}, {IO manager, Processor, PE}, {Customer,
Bank}), which details one of the confidentiality annotations in Figure 5.1.
It specifies that only the users IO manager, Processor and PE can receive
from the message flow between Ask transfer and Wait request, and only
Customer and Bank can send messages through that channel. This security
annotation must be enforced using both TLS and RBAC security mecha-
nisms.
Integrity. It comes in three variants: (i) IntegrityAct specifies that the
functionalities of task a should be protected from intentional corruption.
Attributes personnel, hardware and software determine which entities—involved
in the execution of the a—are protected from intentional corruption [45];
(ii) IntegrityDO specifies that the data object do should be protected from
intentional corruption; (iii) IntegrityMF specifies that every message ex-
changed through mf should be protected from intentional corruption. All
the predicates share the attribute enfBy.
For instance, the predicate IntegrityAct(“Convert values”, {} , false, true,
true) indicates that software and hardware used to execute Convert values
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will be protected from intentional corruption, e.g., unauthorized modifica-
tions of the software or hardware robbery.
Non-Repudiation. It comes in two variants, depending on the element
it applies to: NonRepudiationAct and NonRepudiationMF. The former indi-
cates that the execution (or non-execution) of task a should be provable,
while the latter specifies that the usage (or non-usage) of the message flow
mf should be verifiable. Both predicates share two attributes: enfBy, al-
ready described before, and execution. The latter specifies that: (i) a proof
of execution of task a or a proof of usage of the communication channel
mf shall be provided, if set to true; (ii) a proof of non-execution for a or a
proof of non-usage for mf shall be provided, if set to false.
For example, the predicate NonRepudiationAct(“Send confirmation”, {},
false) defines one of the non-repudiation annotations in Figure 5.1. It
specifies that it should be possible to prove that Send confirmation has
never been executed. There are no constraints on the security mechanisms
that have to be implemented because the parameter is an empty set.
Privacy. It has two variants: (i) privacyACT specifies that task a should
be compliant with privacy legislation, and it should let users to control
their own data; (ii) privacyDO is similar to the former one, but is targeted
to a specific data object do. Both predicates share two parameters: enfBy,
already described, and sensitiveInfo, i.e., the set of sensitive information to
protect.
For example, consider the predicate PrivacyDO(“Payment order”, {} ,
{name, surname, CreditCardNumber}) specifies that, if the content of Pay-
ment order is published, name, surname and credit card number informa-
tion shall be anonymized as required by law, e.g., only partial information
can be published.
Separation of duties is a security principle used to formulate multi-
person control policies, requiring that two or more different people be re-
sponsible for the completion of a task or set of related activities [115]. If
the set of people changes during the execution of the system, separation of
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duties is dynamic, otherwise, separation of duties is static.
It can be linked to two pools and it is defined by one predicate SoDPool,
which specifies that p1 and p2 cannot be the same person at the same type.
The parameter enfBy specifies the security mechanisms, while if dynamic
is true, it specifies that p1 and p2 can played by different people, if it is
false the pool identifies one person for the entire execution of the business
process.
For example, the predicate SoD(“PE”,“Customer”, {RBAC}, false) de-
fines a separation of duties security annotation linked to PE and Customer
and specifies that a person cannot execute simultaneously the activities of
Customer and PE. In this case separation of duties is not dynamic because,
PE does not change and Customer is the same for all the execution of the
business process.
Binding of duties requires the same person to be responsible for the
completion of a set of related activities [123]. Binding of duties can be
either static or dynamic. Such security concept is represented by the Bind
of duties security annotation and it shares the same security property of
separation of duties security annotation.
Similarly to Separation of duties annotation, it can be linked to two
pools and it is defined by one predicate BoDPool, which specifies that p1
and p2 must be the same person. The two parameters enfBy and dynamic
share the same semantic of the ones specified for separation of duties.
Non-delegation requires that a set of actions shall be executed only by
the users assigned.
It is specified using the NonDelegationAct predicate which specifies that
is not possible to delegate part or the whole task a to any other participant.
The parameter enfBy specified the list of security mechanisms used for
enforcing the security annotation.
For example, NonDelegation(“Generate payment order”,{}) specifies the
Non-delegation annotation in Figure 5.1: it is linked to Generate payment
order, the task will be executed only by the Processor, and no one else.
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5.4 SecBPMN2-ml
The integration of the security annotations, that we specified before with
BPMN 2.0 creates SecBPMN2-ml [102,103]. Figure 5.1 shows an example
of a SecBPMN2-ml diagram.
Please note that the modeling language does not permit to graphically
specify the parameters of the security annotations. This is because we
wanted to maximize the readability of the language in case of huge di-
agrams for real scenarios. However, STS-Tool, the software tool which
permits to create SecBPMN2 diagrams, allows to specify those properties.
In the following we formally specify the abstract syntax of SecBPMN2-ml.
Definition 4 specifies a SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model as an extension
of a BPMN 2.0 collaboration model with security annotations.
Definition 4 (SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model). A SecBPMN2-ml col-
laboration model is a tuple (CM,SA, SecAss, SAType) where:
(a) CM is a collaboration model,
(b) SA is a finite set of security annotations,
(c) SecAss ⊆ (SA)× (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai ∪
|BP|⋃
i=1
Di ∪
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ppooli ∪M∪MF) , and
(d) SAType ⊆ SA× { Accountability, Auditability, Authenticity, Availability,
Confidentiality, Integrity, NonRepudiation, Privacy, BindOfDuties, Sepa-
rationOfDuties, NonDelegation } is a relation that associates a type to
each security annotation.
Definition 4 defines a SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model as a tuple
containing: (a) a BPMN 2.0 collaboration model; (b) a set of security
annotations; (c) a security association relation that connects each security
association with an element among activities, data objects, pools, message
flows and messages; (d) an association which is used to determine the type
of the security association. For example, in Figure 5.1, SA is composed
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of three security annotations and SecAss contains the link between the
security associations and the elements of the collaboration, i.e., the links
between the non-delegation association and Generate payment order task,
between the confidentiality security annotation and the message flows that
transmits Transfer Req. message, and between the non-repudiation security
annotation and the Send confirmation task.
We consider a SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model well-formed when all
BPMN 2.0 business processes in the model are well-formed, see Defini-
tion 2, and all security annotations are correctly associated to BPMN 2.0
elements.
Definition 5 (Well-formed SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model). A
SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model (CM,SA, SecAss) is well-formed iff:
(a) ∀bp.bp ∈ BP → bp is well formed,
(b) ∀(sa, t1).((sa, t1) ∈ SecAss ∧ SAType(sa) 6= BindOfDuties ∧
SAType(sa) 6= SeparationOfDuties) →6 ∃(sa, t2).(sa, t2) ∈
SecAss.t1 = t2, and
(c) ∀(sa, t).(sa, t) ∈ SecAss→
(i) if SAType(sa) = Accountability then t ∈
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai,
(ii) if SAType(sa) = Auditability then t ∈ (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai ∪
|BP|⋃
i=1
Di ∪MF),
(iii) if SAType(sa) = Authenticity then t ∈ (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai ∪
|BP|⋃
i=1
Di ∪M),
(iv) if SAType(sa) = Availability then t ∈ (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai ∪
|BP|⋃
i=1
Di ∪MF),
(v) if SAType(sa) = Confidentiality then t ∈ (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Di ∪MF),
(vi) if SAType(sa) = Integrity then t ∈ (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai ∪
|BP|⋃
i=1
Di ∪MF),
71
CHAPTER 5. SECBPMN2
(vii) if SAType(sa) = NonRepudiation then t ∈ (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai ∪MF),
(viii) if SAType(sa) = Privacy then t ∈ (
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai ∪
|BP|⋃
i=1
Di),
(ix) if SAType(sa) = BindOfDuties then t ∈
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ppooli ,
(x) if SAType(sa) = SeparationOfDuties then t ∈
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ppooli , and
(xi) if SAType(sa) = NonDelegation then t ∈
|BP|⋃
i=1
Ai.
Definition 5 specifies that a SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model is well-
formed if: (a) all the business processes in the SecBPMN2 collaboration
model are well formed; (b) each security annotation, that is not bind of
duties or separation of duties, is linked to one and only one element of
the business processes; (c) if the security annotations are associated to a
subset of BPMN 2.0 elements. Specifically, point (c) specifies that:
(i) accountability annotation can be linked only to activities;
(ii) auditability annotation can be linked only to activities and data ob-
jects;
(iii) authenticity annotation can be linked only to activities and data ob-
jects;
(iv) availability annotation can be linked only to activities, data objects
and message flows;
(v) confidentiality annotation can be linked only to data objects and mes-
sage flows;
(vi) integrity annotation can be linked only to activities, data objects and
message flows;
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(vii) non-repudiation annotation can be linked only to activities and mes-
sage flows;
(viii) privacy annotation can be linked only to activities and data objects;
(ix) bind of duties annotation can be linked only to pools;
(x) separation of duty annotation can be linked only to pools;
(xi) non-delegation annotation can be linked only to activities.
5.5 SecBPMN2-Q
SecBPMN2-Q is a modeling language expressly thought for the specifi-
cation of security policies. It extends SecBPMN2-ml with BPMN-Q [9],
a query language for business processes, based on BPMN. Specifically,
BPMN-Q allows to graphically specify queries: sets of constraints on se-
quence of activities that can be checked against BPMN business processes.
We extended BPMN-Q for BPMN 2.0 models and then we integrated it in
SecBPMN2-ml. We called the SecBPMN2-Q queries can be used to specify
security constraints on business processes, we, therefore, call them security
policies.
SecBPMN2-Q extends SecBPMN2-ml with three relations: negative con-
trol flow, walk and negative walk. All of them connect two SecBPMN2-ml
elements among activities, events or gateways.
Negative control flow relation matches all business processes in which the
target element is never executed right after the source element.
Walk relation matches all business process in which the target element
is executed after the source element.
Negative walk relation is the negation of walk relation, i.e., it matches all
the business processes in which the target element is never executed after
the source element.
SecBPMN2-Q, similarly to BPMN-Q, assigns a specific semantic to the
label “@” of BPMN 2.0 elements: when an element in a security policy has
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“@” in its label, it will match all elements of the same type irrespective of
the label.
Definition 6 specifies a SecBPMN2-Q security policy as SecBPMN2-ml
collaboration model with negative control flow, walk and negative walk
relations.
Definition 6 (SecBPMN2-Q security policy). A SecBPMN2-Q security
policy is a tuple (SecCM,NCF,Walk,NWalk) where:
(a) SecCM is a SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model,
(b) NCF ⊆ (AEGi)× (AEGi) with 1 < i < |BP|,
(c) Walk ⊆ (AEGi)× (AEGi) with 1 < i < |BP|, and
(d) NWalk ⊆ (AEGi)× (AEGi) with 1 < i < |BP| .
Definition 6 specifies a SecBPMN2-Q security policy as a tuple which
contains: (a) a SecBPMN2 collaboration model; (b) a Negative Control
Flow (NCF) relation; (c) a walk relation; (d) a negative walk (NWalk)
relation. Negative control flow, walk and negative walk relations connect
two elements of the same business process, this is indicated with the same
variable in the subscript of the elements of the ordered couples. A security
policy may contain all SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model elements and 0
or more walk, negative walk and negative control flow relations.
Figure 5.2 shows two examples of a SecBPMN2-Q procedural security
policy. Security policy in Figure 5.2(a) has a green continued border that
specifies the policies is a pattern, i.e., it must be verified in all business
processes of the system. The arrow with two heads between Wait request
and Request authorization is a Walk which matches all the SecBPMN2-ml
models where the first and the second activities are connected through an
arbitrary long list of elements. The “@” wildcard, followed by any string, is
used to match any SecBPMN2-ml elements of the same type. For example,
the business process model of Figure 5.1 matches the procedural security
policy of Figure 5.2, because the task Ask transfer (matches by the “@X”
74
5.6. VERIFYING SECURITY POLICIES
task in the security policy) sends the message Transfer Req. to the event
Wait request, which is connected with Request authorization through three
gateways and three activities.
Security policy in Figure 5.2(b) has a red dashed border that specifies
the policies is a anti-pattern, i.e., it must not be verified in all business pro-
cesses of the system. It is composed of two activities connected with a Walk
relation which matches all the business processes where the source task is
connected to the second task through a walk. Since no pools are speci-
fied, no constraints are put on the participants who execute the process.
business process model shown in Figure 5.1 does not satisfy the security
policies. Since there is a walk between Convert values and Send confirma-
tion that has a non-repudiation security annotation linked, and since the
security policy is an anti-pattern, it is not satisfied.
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Figure 5.2: Examples of SecBPMN2-Q security policies
5.6 Verifying security policies
In the following, we formally specify the verification of SecBPMN2-Q se-
curity policy against a SecBPMN2-ml business process.
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Definition 7 specifies the correspond function, which checks if two el-
ements of SecBPMN2 have compatible labels and they are of the same
type.
Definition 7 (Label correspondence check).
correspond : (AEG ∪D ∪M∪P)× (AEG ∪D ∪M∪P)→ {true, false}
elempol, elemcoll 7→ true iff:
(a) (elempol and elemcoll) are elements of the same type, and
(b) [L(elempol) = L(elemcoll)] ∨ [L(elempol) starts with “@” ].
Definition 7 checks if: (a) two elements are of the same type; (b) if the
labels of the two elements are identical or if the label of the security policy
starts with a “@” and, therefore, it matches every elements.
The oneWalk function in Definition 8 checks if there exists at least one
walk between two elements in a collaboration model.
Definition 8 (Check walk existence).
oneWalk : Walk × SecBPMN2−ml→ {true, false}
(s, t), coll 7→ true iff:
(a) ∃x.x ∈ AEGcoll.correspond(x, s),
(b) ∃y.y ∈ AEGcoll.correspond(y, t) ∧ x 6= y, and
(c) exists a walk from x to y in coll.
Definition 8 specifies oneWalk function, which returns true if: (a), (b)
there exists two distinct, correspondent elements in the SecBPMN2 collab-
oration model; (c) the elements are connected by at least a walk. The walk
concept is not specified since is a well-known concept in graph theory [124].
Definition 9 defines a function that verifies if the security annotations
of the policy specify stricter constraints than the security annotations of
the business process.
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Definition 9 (Security annotation enforcement verification).
enforces : SecBPMN2−Q× SecBPMN2−ml→ {true, false}
pol, coll 7→ true iff:
∀(sapol, elempol).(sapol, elempol) ∈ SecAsspol →
∃(sacoll, elemcoll).(sacoll, elemcoll) ∈ SecAsscoll.
correspond(elempol, elemcoll) ∧ SAType(sapol) = SAType(sacoll) ∧
enfBy(sapol) ⊆ enfBy(sacoll)∧
(a) SAType(sapol) = Accountability→ monitored(sapol) ⊆ monitored(sacoll)
(b) SAType(sapol) = Auditability→ frequency(sapol) ≤ frequency(sacoll)
(c) SAType(sapol) = Authenticity→
(i) identity(sapol)→ identity(sacoll)
(ii) authenticity(sapol)→ authenticity(sacoll)
(iii) trustV alue(sapol) ≤ trustV alue(sacoll)
(d) SAType(sapol) = Availability→
(i) level(sapol) ≤ level(sacoll)
(ii) authUsers(sapol) ⊇ authUsers(sacoll)
(e) SAType(sapol) = Confidentiality→
(i) readers(sapol) ⊇ readers(sacoll)
(ii) writers(sapol) ⊇ writers(sacoll)
(f) SAType(sapol) = Integrity→
(i) personnel(sapol)→ personnel(sacoll)
(ii) hardware(sapol)→ hardware(sacoll)
(iii) software(sapol)→ software(sacoll)
(g) SAType(sapol) = NonRepudiation→ execution(sapol)↔ execution(sacoll)
(h) SAType(sapol) = Privacy→ sensitiveInfo(sapol) ⊆ sensitiveInfo(sacoll)
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(i) SAType(sapol) = BindOfDuties∨SAType(sapol) = SeparationOfDuties→
(i) dynamic(sapol)↔ dynamic(sacoll), and
(ii) sapol and sacoll are connected to the same elements;
Definition 9 specifies that all security annotations in a security policy
are enforced if, for all of them, there exists at least one security annotation
in the SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model that is connected to a corre-
spondent element, see Definition 7, and has stricter security properties. In
the definition we used a set of functions which returns the value of the
attribute with the same in the corespondent security annotation, specified
in Table 5.1. Specifically enfBy, frequency, level, readers, writers, execu-
tion, sensitiveInfo, dynamic return the value specified in the correspondent
attributes and:
• identity returns the value specified in ident, false if it is not defined
• authorization returns the value specified in auth, false if it is not defined
• trustValue returns the value specified, 0 otherwise
• authUser returns the value specified, empty set otherwise
• personnel returns the value specified, false if it is not defined
• hardware returns the value specified, false if it is not defined
• software returns the value specified, false if it is not defined
Points (a-i) use these functions to specify, for each security annotation
type, how the attributes of the security policy are more restrictive of the
attributes of the security annotation of the collaboration model.
• Accountability (a): are all the monitored users specified in the policy
also monitored by the business process?
• Auditability (b): is the frequency of the checks specified in the busi-
ness process higher than or equal to the one specified in the business
process?
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• Authenticity (c): if the attribute ident is true in the security annota-
tion specified in the security policy (every user has to be identified),
then is the same attribute specified in the business process also true?
The same criteria is used also for attribute auth. The trustValue de-
fined in the security annotation of the security policy has to be less or
equal that the value defined in the one specified in the business pro-
cess, since the security annotation is satisfied when the trust provided
by the executor of the task is higher than that required by the policy.
• Availability (d): is the value specified in the business process higher
than the value specified in the policy?
• Confidentiality (e): is the set of authorized users specified in the busi-
ness process a subset of the set of authorized users of the security
annotation of the security policy?
• Integrity (f): if the personnel attribute (of IntegrityAct) is true in the
security policy, is it also true in the business process? The same
criteria applies for hardware and software. The other two variants of
integrity do not need special criteria because they are characterized
only by the attribute enfBy, that is already checked in the first two
lines of the algorithm.
• Non-repudiation (g): is the attribute execution set to the same value
in both security annotations?
• Privacy (h): is the set of sensitive information specified in the security
policy included in the set specified in the business process?
• Bind of duty/separation of duty (i): is the attribute dynamic set to the
same value in both security annotations? Are the security annotations
connected to the same elements?
Definition 10 specifies a function that verifies a SecBPMN2-Q security
policy against a SecBPMN2-ml collaboration model.
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Definition 10 (Verify security policy).
verifySecurityPolicy : SecBPMN2−Q×SecBPMN2−ml→ {true, false}
pol, coll 7→ true iff:
(a) ∀x.x ∈ AEGpol∪(D)pol∪(M)pol∪(P )pol∃y ∈ AEGcoll∪(D)coll∪(M)coll∪
(P )coll.correspond(x, y),
(b) ∀(x, y).(x, y) ∈ controlFlowpol → (x, y) ∈ controlFlowcoll,
(c) enforces(pol, coll),
(d) ∀walk.walk ∈ Walkpol → oneWalk(walk, pol, coll),
(e) ∀nWalk.nWalk ∈ NWalkpol → oneWalk(nWalk, coll) = false, and
(f) ∀(x, y).(x, y) ∈ NCFpol →6 ∃(x1, y1).(x1, y1) ∈ controlFlowcoll.correspond(x, x1)
∧ correspond(y, y1) .
A SecBPMN2-Q security policy is verified in a SecBPMN2-ml collabo-
ration model if: (a) for all the elements of the security policy there exists
at least one element with a correspondent label; (b) for all control flow re-
lations in the security policy there exists a control flow in the collaboration
model between two correspondent elements; (c) all security annotations of
the security policy are enforced; (d) for each walk relation of the security
policy there exists a walk in the collaboration model; (e) for each nega-
tive walk relation of the policy no walk connects the two elements; (f) for
each negative control flow there is no correspondent control flow in the
collaboration model.
5.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter we proposed SecBPMN2 a modeling language for business
process with security concepts and for security policies.
SecBPMN2-ml meets SC1, it is used in SEBE to specify business pro-
cesses (SC1.1) and security concepts in business processes (SC1.2). More-
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over, the definition of its abstract syntax is formally specified and this
permit to specify business process and security concepts precisely (SC1.2).
SecBPMN2-Q meets SC2, it is used in SEBE to represent security poli-
cies (SC2.1) with a precise syntax, formally defined (SC2.2).
Moreover, the formal specification of how the security policies are satis-
fied against business processes, specified in section 5.6, meets SC3.1, which
requires an analysis that permits to verify procedural patterns against busi-
ness processes, and SC3.2, which requires an analysis that permits to verify
security constraints against business processes.
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Chapter 6
Connecting multiple perspectives
with SEBE
This chapter describes how the social/organizational business process and
implementation perspective are integrated by the SEBE method. This key
feature of the method is the central contribution and what it distinguishes
SEBE from other security methods, which cover only partially security
when engineering secure business processes. To integrate those perspectives
we defined a set of transformation and verification rules to permit the
transition from STS-ml to SecBPMN2 models and from SecBPMN2 to
RDL, the implementation language we chose.
6.1 Designing secure business processes
The design of secure business process is one of the distinguish features of
the SEBE method. The design consists in deriving secure business pro-
cesses from the social/organizational model and verifying if the security
requirements specified in the social/organizational model are satisfied by
the business processes.
The derivation of secure business processes is semi-automated: an initial
business process is generated using a set of transformation rules and then it
is modified by business process experts. The complete automation, as far
as our knowledge goes, cannot be achieve because the information present
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in the social/organizational model are not enough. For example, in STS-ml
the concept of sequence of actions is missing, but it is central is SecBPMN2.
The verification of security requirements plays a central role in this
context [94,105], because business process designers will enrich the models
generated, and this modifications may lead to business process that does
not satisfy the social/organizational security requirements.
6.1.1 Mapping STS-ml concepts to SecBPMN2 concepts
The design of secure business processes is a complex operation, especially
in real-world socio-technical systems, which are frequently large and com-
plex, with tens of actors and social interactions and hundreds of objectives
to achieve [104]. An analysis of the social/organizational perspective can
be used to ease the specification of the business processes by specifying
security requirements from a high-level of abstraction point of view and by
organizing the knowledge of domain experts and business process design-
ers. Still, social/organizational models of real scenarios may be complex
and the derivation of business processes can be a difficult operation. To fa-
cilitate this derivation, we propose a set of transformation rules to generate
SecBPMN2 business processes that are coherent with the STS-ml models.
The transformation is based on the mapping shown in Figure 6.1(a,b).
Social/organizational concepts (Figure 6.1(a)), represented by STS-ml’s
concepts, are linked to business process concepts (Figure 6.1(b)), repre-
sented by SecBPMN2’s.
In particular, STS-ml concepts of role and agent are mapped to the
SecBPMN2 concepts of lane and pool. Roles and agents represent au-
tonomous active entities; similarly pools and lanes represent autonomous
participants that execute processes.
The concept of document in STS-ml is mapped to the concepts of data
object and messages because documents, data objects and messages repre-
sent physical objects in which information is stored.
The STS-ml concept of goal is linked to the concept of process, because
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the execution of a process can achieve one or more goals.
Read, modify and produce relations are linked to process because they
can be modeled as a process that reads and/or writes a data object, that
is, in turn, linked to a document.
And-decomposition and or-decompositions (And-dec. and Or-dec in the
figure), are mapped to process, because a decomposition can be seen as a
process which calls the sub-processes that are the decomposed goals. For
example, the and-decomposition in Figure 3.1 of Value received goal, can
be mapped to a business process which calls the processes mapped to Value
accredited and Dst transfer authorized.
The transmission of a document is linked to process because it can be
modeled as a process that transmits a message, that is in turn is linked to
the STS-ml document.
Delegation represents transfer of a responsibility of a goal between ac-
tors. In STS-ml a delegation always corresponds to a commitment of the
delegatee to achieve the goal, i.e., the delegatee cannot reject the delega-
tion. We opted for a more realistic specification in SecBPMN2, therefore
a delegation can be modeled as a business process used, to negotiate the
terms of the delegation and possibly, reject it. For example, the delegation
of Dst transfer authorized in Figure 3.1, can be mapped to a process that
is executed to negotiate the quality of the service or the amount of money
requested to achieve the goal. In a delegation relation the goal delegated
is a secondary element, that is linked to a call activity. This permits to
insert a call to the process, linked to the delegated goal, in the process for
the delegation.
6.1.2 Transforming STS-ml models into SecBPMN2 models
Such mapping permits to define complex transformation rules that allow
transforming parts of STS-ml models to SecBPMN2-ml business process
models. Unfortunately, there is not a commonly shared definition of how
social/organizational concepts can be transformed in business processes.
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Role
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Production
And-dec.
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Figure 6.1: Mapping of STS-ml, SecBPMN2 and RDL concepts.
Such transformation rules change with respect to contexts, stakeholders,
and business process designers. For these reasons, we defined a language
that permits to specify custom transformation rules. However, we defined
a generic transformation rule for each mapping, which can be found in
Appendix A, in order to help unexperienced users.
Figure 6.2(a) exemplifies transformation rule. The upper part of the
figure shows part of an STS-ml model, namely a transmission, that will be
transformed. Each element’s label starts with the keyword $ followed by a
unique string to identify the element. The rest of the figure contains the
SecBPMN2-ml model that will be generated and a list of mapping relations
that links the STS-ml elements with the SecBPMN2 elements. The name
of the elements in the SecBPMN2 part may contain references to STS-ml
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elements, identified with a string between ${ and }, that will be substituted
with the name of the STS-ml elements, when the transformation rule is
instantiated. For example, the message ${D} will take the name of the
document ${D}.
The transformation rule generates two business processes, where the
task of the upper one sends a message to the task of the lower one. The
execution of the processes transmits the message from participant ${B},
that is mapped to agent $B, to participant $ {A}, which is mapped to role
$A. The STS-ml document transmitted is mapped to the message ${D},
while the two processes are mapped to the transmission relation.
Figure 6.2(b) shows an example of the application of this transformation
rule. The upper part shows the transmission of document Transfer order
from the Payment Engine to the Bank src. The middle part of the figure
shows the generated business process model with Payment engine instead
of ${B}, Bank src instead of ${A} and Transfer order instead of ${D}. The
instance of the mapping, i.e., the bind between STS-ml and SecBPMN2
elements, is shown in the lower part of the figure and it will be stored to
be used in the fifth activity of the process in Figure 4.2.
Multiple transformation rules can be defined for the same STS-ml ele-
ment. In SEBE we define a set of default transformation rules that covers
most of the STS-ml elements. Transformation rules can be applied only to
the social view of STS-ml diagrams, because they contain STS-ml elements
that can be transformed to one or more SecBPMN2-ml models. Instead,
the concepts used in the authorization and information views are used to
specify security requirements.
Table 6.1 shows the relevant default transformation rules provided in
SEBE, the complete list can be found in the appendix. Each transforma-
tion rule contains a STS-ml element or relation, a SecBPMN2-ml diagram
and a mapping, which links STS-ml elements with SecBPMN2-ml elements.
Agent element is transformed into a business process where the partici-
pant, who executes the business process (represented by a pool), is mapped
to the agent. The name of the participant is the string ${A} which is the
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Role     $B : Swimlane  ${B}
Doc.     $D : Message  ${D}
Delegation : Business proc.  ${A}
Delegation : Business proc.   ${B}
Agent        PE          : Swimlane  PE
Role          Bank src : Swimlane  Bank src
Doc. Transfer order : Message Transfer order
Delegation               : Business proc. PE
Delegation               : Business proc. Bank src
Figure 6.2: Example of a transformation rule and its application.
variable that refers to the name of the agent, therefore, when the transfor-
mation rule is used to generate a business process, the participant takes
the name of the agent. We define a similar transformation rule for role
element.
The goal element is transformed into a business process where the actor,
who achieves the goal, is mapped to the participant that executes the
process. The process is mapped to the goal. Goals are always assigned to
one actor therefore this transformation can always be applied.
The read relation is transformed into a business process with a data
object that is used as input by the task of the process. The document is
mapped to the data object, the goal is mapped to the process, while the
actor is mapped to the participant that executes the process.
We defined similar transformation rules for modify and produce rela-
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tions. The difference consists in the data associations between the activi-
ties and the data objects. For the produce relation the data object is used
only as output of the task, since to produce a data only the write operation
is performed. For the modify relation the data object is used both as input
and output, because modification consists in both reading and producing
(writing) operations.
We consider a delegation as a negotiation that, if successfully executed,
leads the delegatee (i.e., the actor who receives the delegation) to achieve
the delegated goal. In business process terms, a set of business process
are executed to negotiate the terms of the delegation. If the negotiation is
successful, it will leads the delegatee to execute the process mapped to the
delegated goal.
We, therefore, defined a transformation rule for the delegation where
it is transformed in two business processes one executed by a performer
mapped to the delegator (i.e., the actor that initially owns the goal) and
one executed by the performer mapped to the delegatee. The delegator,
sends a request to the delegatee through a message flows. As soon as the
delegatee receives the message, it will execute the process mapped to the
goal. We use a call activity element to represent the call to such business
process.
AND-decompositions are used to create a hierarchy of business processes.
The semantic of an AND-decomposition consists in specifying that all the
subgoals have to be achieved, in order to consider the decomposed goal
achieved. Since goals are mapped to processes, whenever a goal is AND-
decomposed we insert in the associated process a call to each process that
achieves a subgoal. For example, in Figure 3.1 the goal Value transferred is
AND-decomposed in ID bank received and Transfer authorized. Such goals
are transformed in three processes, one for each goal, and in the process
associated to the decomposed goal, i.e., Value transferred, two call activities
are inserted and linked to the processes linked to the subgoals, i.e., ID
bank received and Transfer authorized. The user then specify the business
process interpretation of an AND-decomposition, e.g., as parallel calls to
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Name STS-ml ele-
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SecBPMN2-ml business pro-
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Mapping
Agent/
Role
A ${
A
}
Task Agent/Role : Pool
Goal
$
{A
}
Task
Actor : Pool,
Goal : Process
Delegation
A
G
B
$
{A
}
$
{B
}
${G} process
Request for 
${G}
Actor A: Part. ${A},
Actor B: Part. ${B},
Delegation : Proc.
Table 6.1: Default SecBPMN2-ml transformation rules provided in SEBE
the processes linked to the subgoals, or as sequential calls.
We use the same approach for OR-decompositions. The user will specify
their business process interpretation, e.g., using exclusive gateways to call
a subset of processes linked to the subgoals.
We defined generic business process transformation rules because they
highly depend on the context in which they are used. However, the users
of SEBE can modify them, or create a completely new ones, using the
modeling language for the transformation rule definition described above
in this section.
6.1.3 Security policies generation
We provide default transformation rules for all the social/organizational se-
curity requirements, making this transformation transparent to the users
of SEBE. The STS-ml PE model in Figure 3.1 specifies 12 security require-
ments, 4 specified in the social view, and 8 specified in the authorization
view. Each security requirement can be transformed in one procedural
security policies, using the default transformation rules or a customized
one.
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Table 6.2 shows three examples of security policy transformation rules
we provide with SEBE. For the complete list of the transformation rules
is shown in Appendix B. Fall-back multi-actor redundancy security require-
ments requires the executor to adopt a primary strategy to fulfill the goal,
while other strategies are maintained as backup, and are used only if the
primary strategy fails; the strategies must have been executed by differ-
ent actors [89]. We consider such security requirements enforced in a
SecBPMN2 process if (i) the goal targeted by the security requirements
is linked to two call activities executed by different actors and (ii) the
two call activities are linked and executed sequentially. We verify these
properties by creating a security policy in which: (i) two call activities
are mapped to the process that will be executed to achieve the goal, and
are executed by two different participants. We used a separation of duty
security annotation to specify that the participants cannot be the same
entity.
Availability requires the transmission to be accessible whenever is re-
quired [101]. We consider such security requirement enforced in a SecBPMN2
process if the channel used to send the messages linked to the document
delivers all messages. We verify this property with a security policy in
which two pools exchange a message through a message flow, which linked
to an availability security annotation. The source pool and the destina-
tion pool are mapped to the source agent and the destination agent, while
the document is mapped to the message. The availability security require-
ment can be relaxed by specifying the percentage of delivered messages as
a property. Similar property can be specified in the availability security
annotation. In this case we consider the security requirement enforced if
the percentage specified in the security annotation is higher that the one
specified in the security requirement. For more information please refer
to [101].
We transform the lack of authority to modify an information, which we
interpreted as the security requirement of not modifying that information,
in a security policy. But the STS-ml concept of information is not linked to
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any SecBPMN2 concept, instead it is linked, via the made-tangible-by re-
lation, to the document concept that, in turn is mapped to the SecBPMN2
concept of data object. Therefore, we consider the security requirement
enforced in a SecBPMN2 model when the data objects mapped to the doc-
uments, that make tangible the information of the security requirement,
are never modified. We verify this property with an anti-pattern (red
dashed border) security policy where a data object, mapped to one of the
documents that make tangible the information targeted by the security re-
quirements, is modified (the data association that goes to the data object)
by any task that is executed by a pool mapped to the actor targeted by
the security requirement.
6.2 Implementing secure business processes
The generation of the implementation of a socio-technical system is one of
the main objectives of SEBE. But generating a complete implementation of
a system from a SecBPMN2 model is not possible, because the information
contained in the models is not sufficient. Each task in the business process
diagrams is identified with a short string whose interpretation changes
with respect to the context and the reader of the diagram. As far as our
knowledge goes, it is not possible to generate executable code from such
short strings. For example, the task Store failure report in Figure 5.1 can
be interpreted as the action of saving the report in a data base, or creating
a backup in a different storage unit, etc.
For such reasons, we chose to generate part of the implementation that
is still central for most socio technical systems, but minimally relies on
the functional part: the business artifacts, i.e., entities, data and docu-
ments [99].
We chose River Definition Language (RDL) [109] as the implementation
language. RDL is an executable specification language that allows spec-
ifying declaratively: (i) the artifacts (e.g., entities); (ii) the relationships
between them (e.g., associations); (iii) the business logic (e.g., actions) on
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Table 6.2: Default SecBPMN2-Q transformation rules provided in SEBE
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the artifacts. We opted for RDL because it is focused on the business ar-
tifacts, it includes an authorization system as first class citizen, and it is
based on SAP HANA1, a well known and widely used relational database
management system. RDL implementations generated with the transfor-
mation rules we provide, can be directly deployed. For further details
please refer to [99].
6.2.1 Mapping SecBPMN2 concepts to RDL concepts
Figure 6.1(b,c) shows the mapping between SecBPMN2 concepts and RDL
concepts, which we used to define the transformation rules to generate RDL
applications from SecBPMN2 models.
A Data object, which represents a set of information, is mapped to RDL
Type, which represents the structure of the information of an element in
entity. A Message, that represents a set of information sent between pools,
is linked to Type, which in this case represents the structure of a message
sent in RDL.
A Pool, which defines a organization or an actor such as a buyer or a
manufacturer, is linked to an Application, that represents a set of business
artifacts, which can be accessed only using the APIs, and their business
logic. Both pools and a RDL applications are used to identify organizations
or well-defined parts of them.
An Task represents an operation performed by a participant; similarly,
an Action represents the business logic linked to a data structure, i.e., they
are the operations executed to set/maintain some properties of the business
objects.
A Lane represents a participant, i.e., a person, a service or a set of them
and it is mapped to Role, which represents any entity that can receive an
authorization.
A Sub-process is a task that encapsulates a business process, which con-
tains a set of SecBPMN2 elements. It is linked to a Call that is a reference
1https://hana.sap.com
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to another RDL application, which, in turn, contains a set of business
artifacts.
6.2.2 Transforming SecBPMN2 models into RDL scripts
We defined in [99] a set of transformation rules, based on the mapping
described above, to generate RDL applications that enforce the security
choices specified in business process models. If the business process mod-
els verify security policies generated from social/organizational security
requirements, the generated applications meet the initial security require-
ments.
The creation of RDL implementation is based on generation rules that
follow the mapping relations defined above. Events and gateways elements
are, however, not part of the model transformation since they are used to
define the control flow. The main generation rule specifies that a RDL
entity and a RDL type are generated for each data object and for each
message in the SecBPMN2 model. Each entity contains one element of
the type generated together with the entity. Each task linked to the data
object is transformed in an action, that is placed in an ad-hoc namespace,
created for the data object.
Figure 6.3 shows an example of generation. The name of the application
reflects the name of the pool and two roles, which correspond to the lanes
in the business process, are specified. From the data object VCNUM are
generated: (i) a type VCNUM that contains the structure of the data that
makes tangible the information; (ii) an entity VCNUMEntity that contains
the actual information; (iii) a namescape VCNUMnamespace that contains
all the actions derived from the SecBPMN2 activities linked to the VCNUM
data object. The structure of VCNUM is retrieved from the SAP repository,
indeed VCNUM is a transformation rule for the information related to credit
cards.
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1 application paymentEngine
2 {
3 role c o n t r o l l e r ;
4 role va l i d a t o r ;
5 type VCNUM {
6 element Cl ient IDs : In t eg e r ;
7 element PaymentCardType : String ;
8 element CardNumber : String ;
9 [ . . ] }
10 export entity VCNUMEntity {
11 key element id : I n t eg e r ;
12 element VCNUMData: VCNUMType; }
13 export namespace VCNUMnamespace accessible by sap . hana . Al l {
14 export action Val idateCreditCard ( ) {}
15 export action F i l t e r S e n s i t i v e I n f o rma t i o n ( ) {} } }
Figure 6.3: A SecBPMN2 model representing part of a PE business process
6.2.3 Enforcing SecBPMN2 security specifications
In this section, we present a set of rules that are used to enforce the se-
curity choices of SecBPMN2 into RDL applications. For each SecBPMN2
security annotation, we briefly describe in the following its meaning and
the corresponding Enforcement Rule (ER).
ER1: Integrity. It requires a system to ensure completeness, accuracy
and absence of unauthorized modifications in all its components [101]. It
can be linked to one task, data object or message flow. Although, it can
be partially enforced by filtering the users who can access the RDL en-
tities (i.e. using authentication and access control), backup mechanisms
should be used to avoid loosing potentially precious information (when
linked to a data object), or loosing functionalities offered by the system
(when linked to the message flow or to a task). Since, such configurations
cannot be specified in a RDL application, they are enlisted in the security
specification document.
ER2: Authenticity. It is defined as the ability of a system to verify
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identity and to establish trust in a third party and in information it pro-
vides [101]. It can be connected to one task or data object. When it is
linked to #Task, it can be enforced with an authenticity security mecha-
nism that verifies the identities of users who execute the action generated
from #Task. When it is linked to #DO, an element which contains the
hash of the type generated from the #DO will be included in the type
itself.
ER3: Accountability. It is defined as the ability of a system to hold
users responsible for their actions (e.g., misuse of information) [101]. It can
be linked to a task. It is enforced using the signature security mechanism,
which stores the private key of the user who performs the action generated
from to #Task. We used private key to unequivocally identify users that
performed the action.
Listing 6.1 shows part of the RDL transformation rule used to generate
the RDL code for the signature security mechanism. A RDL transforma-
tion rule is a piece of RDL application with placeholders, marked with a
#, that are substituted with an appropriate string. For example, in List-
ing 6.1, #Pool will be substituted with the name of the pool in SecBPMN2.
The entity in lines 2–4 contains the private keys associated to the users,
while the entity defined in lines 5–8 stores the link to the signature of the
user who executed the action, the date in which the action is performed
and the link to the entity that contains the action performed. Lines 10–15
show how the signature security mechanism is implemented in each action
generated from #Task: a new entry is inserted in the entity SignatureLogs.
ER4: Non-repudiation. It is defined as the ability of a system to prove
(with legal validity) occurrence/non-occurrence of an event or participation/non-
participation of a party in an event [101]. It can be connected to one task
or one message flow. We use the signature security mechanism to enforce
the non-repudiation security choice. If the security annotation is linked
to a message flow, every time send and receive actions are executed, the
information about the execution is inserted in the signature entity. If the
97
CHAPTER 6. CONNECTING MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES WITH SEBE
1 application #Pool {
2 entity r epo s i t o r yS i gna tu r e s {
3 s i gna tu r e : String ;
4 user : String ; }
5 export entity SignatureLogs {
6 element s i gna tu r e : As soc i a t i on to r epo s i t o r yS i gna tu r e s ;
7 element date : UTCTimestamp ;
8 element #DO : Assoc i a t i on to #DO; }
9 export namespace #DOnamespace accessible by sap . hana . Al l {
10 export action #Task ( ) {
11 l e t newSignatureLogs : S ignatureLogs = SignatureLogs {
12 date : sap . hana . u t i l s . dateTime . currentUTCTimestamp ( ) ,
13 s i gna tu r e : SELECT ONE repo s i t o r yS i gna tu r e s FROM
repo s i t o r yS i gna tu r e s
14 WHERE user = sap . hana . s e r v i c e s . s e s s i o n . getUserName ( ) , #
DO : t h i s } ;
15 Add newSignatureLogs to SignatureLogs ; } } }
Listing 6.1: Enforcement of accountability, implementing signature security mechanism
security annotation is linked to #Task, the information is inserted when-
ever the action, generated from #Task, is executed.
ER5: Auditability. It is defined as the ability of a system to conduct
persistent, non-by-passable monitoring of all actions performed by humans
or machines within the system [101]. It can be linked to one task, data
object or message flow. It is enforced with the logging security mechanism,
which stores information of the actions performed. If the security anno-
tation is linked to #DO, all actions in the entity that contains the type
generated from #DO are logged; if it is linked to #Task, only the calls
to the action that is generated from #Task are stored; if it is linked to a
message flow only the actions send/receive, generated from the message
flow, are stored.
Listing 6.2 shows part of the RDL transformation rule for the logging
security mechanism. The type ActionType (line 2) defines the type of ac-
tions. The entity in lines 3–6 contains: type of the action, date of execution
and user who performed the action. Lines 9–13 show how the information
about the execution of an action is stored in the entity actionLog#DO. If
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1 application #Pool {
2 type ActionType : enum { READ; WRITTEN; SENT; RECEIVED; }
3 export entity ActionLogs#DO {
4 element date : UTCTimestamp ;
5 element actionType : ActionType ;
6 element user : String ; } [ . . ]
7 export namespace #DOnamespace accessible by sap . hana . Al l {
8 export action get#DO( idEnt i ty : I n t eg e r ) : #Pool .#DOType { [ . . ]
9 l e t l og : ActionLogs#DO = ActionLogs#DO{
10 user : sap . hana . s e r v i c e s . s e s s i o n . getUserName ( ) ,
11 actionType : ActionType .READ,
12 date : sap . hana . u t i l s . dateTime . currentUTCTimestamp ( ) } ;
13 l og . save ( ) ; }
14 export action #Task ( ) { [ . . ] } } }
Listing 6.2: Enforcement of auditability, implementing logging security mechanism
the security annotation is linked to #DO, information about the execution
is inserted in actionLog#DO every time an action, defined in an entity that
contains the type generated from #DO, is performed; if the security an-
notation is linked to #Task then the information is stored every time the
action, generated from #Task, is performed; if the security annotation is
linked to the message flow, then the information is stored every time the
send and receive actions, generated from the message flow, are executed.
ER6: Confidentiality. It requires a system to ensure that only au-
thorized users access information [101]. It is a security annotation that is
linked to one message flow or one data object. We enforced it using authen-
tication, access control and implementing encryption security mechanism.
Listing 6.3 shows part of the RDL transformation rule for the encryp-
tion security mechanism. In lines 5 and 6 the encryption and decryption
functions are defined. For the sake of brevity, the algorithms used to
encrypt and decrypt data are not shown. Lines 8–11 show how the func-
tions are used to enforce confidentiality: the content of the entity/message
is decrypted when retrieved/received and encrypted when is stored/sent.
Therefore, the content of entity/message will be visible only in the RDL ap-
plication. The encryption/decryption functions are inserted in the send/re-
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1 application #Pool {
2 type #DO { [ . . ] }
3 export entity #DOEntity {
4 [ . . ]
5 action encrypt ( data :#DO) : #DO { [ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM] }
6 action decrypt ( data :#DO) : #DO { [DECRYPT ALGORITHM] } }
7 export namespace #DOnamespace accessible by sap . hana . Al l {
8 export action get#DO( idEnt : I n t eg e r ) : #DOEntity {
9 l e t #DOInst : #DOEntity = SELECT ∗ FROM #DOEntity WHERE id ==
idEnt ;
10 #DOInst.#DOData = #DOInst . decrypt(#DOInst.#DOData) ;
11 re turn #DOInst.#DOData ; } } }
Listing 6.3: Enforcement of confidentiality, implementing encryption security mechanism
ceive actions when the security annotation is linked to a message flow,
while are inserted in getters and setters of the entity which contains the
type generated from #DO.
ER7: Privacy. It requires a system to obey privacy legislation and it
should enable individuals to control, where feasible, their personal infor-
mation (user-involvement) [101]. It is linked to one message flow or one
data object. With authentication and access control, we restrict the access
to authorized users. We further enforce it, encrypting the content of the
entity that contains the type generated from #DO (when the security an-
notation is connected to #DO), or encrypting the entities sent and received
(when the security annotation is linked to a message flow).
ER8: Binding of duties. It requires the same person to be responsible
for the completion of a set of activities [123]. It is linked to two pools. It
is enforced using authentication and access-control, ad-hoc security mech-
anisms. Listing 6.4 shows the transformation rule for the enforcement of
binding of duties. Element BoDUser in line 3 contains the first user who
accesses the entity and, therefore, the only one that is authorized to ac-
cess the entity(s) contained in the RDL applications generated from #Pool
and #Pool2. In lines 4–14 the function CheckBoD is defined: it checks if
the variable BoDUser is set locally and in the application generated from
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1 application #Pool{ [ . . ]
2 export entity #DOEntity {
3 element BoDUser : String ;
4 action checkBoD ( ) : Boolean {
5 i f ( BodUser i s nu l l && getBodUser ( ’#poolURL ’ , id ) i s nu l l ) {
6 BodUser = sap . hana . s e r v i c e s . s e s s i o n . getUserName ( ) ;
7 setBodUser ( ’#poolURL ’ , id , sap . hana . s e r v i c e s . s e s s i o n . getUserName ( ) )
;
8 re turn true ; }
9 e l s e
10 i f ( BodUser == sap . hana . s e r v i c e s . s e s s i o n . getUserName ( ) &&
11 getBodUser ( ’#poolURL ’ , id ) == sap . hana . s e r v i c e s . s e s s i o n .
getUserName ( ) )
12 re turn f a l s e ;
13 e l s e
14 re turn true ; } }
15 export namespace #DOnamespace accessible by sap . hana . Al l {
16 export action get#DO( idEnt : I n t eg e r ) : #DOEntity {
17 l e t #DOInst : #DOEntity = SELECT ∗ FROM #DOEntity WHERE id == idEnt ;
18 i f (!#DOInst . checkBoD ( ) ) re turn nu l l ;
19 re turn #DOInst.#DOData ; }
20 export action setBoDUser ( ur lPoo l : String , idEnt : String , BodUser :
String ) { [ . . ] }
21 export action getBoDUser ( ur lPoo l : String , idEnt : String ) : String { [ . . ] }
} }
Listing 6.4: Implementation of dynamic binding of duties
#Pool2. If the variable is not set, it sets the variable both local and re-
motely, otherwise it checks if the user who is executing the action in which
the CheckBoD method is called, is the same as the one memorized in the
variable. The CheckBoD method will be called in any action of the enti-
ties contained in the applications generated from #Pool and #Pool2 (lines
16–19).
ER9: Separation of duties. It requires two or more different people to
be responsible for the completion of a set of activities [115]. It is linked to
two pools. Static separation of duties [44] is enforced using authentication
and access control, while dynamic separation of duties [44] is enforced
with authentication, access control and ad-hoc security mechanisms. The
transformation rule for enforcing dynamic separation of duty is similar to
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the one for binding of duty Listing (6.4).
ER10: Availability. It requires a system to ensure that all its compo-
nents are available and operational when they are required by authorized
users [101]. It cannot be enforced in a RDL application because it requires
configuration of the system (e.g., the configuration of the data-base man-
agement system), so the specification of using backup mechanism for #DO
will be added to the security specification document.
ER11: Non-delegation. It requires the system to ensure that the actions
are performed only by indicated actor(s). It can be linked to one task. It is
enforced using access control: when #Activity is transformed in an action
in RDL, it is executed by the roles authorized to access the tenancy/server
where the RDL application is deployed. Once the action is implemented,
it will not be anymore delegated to a third party.
6.3 Chapter summary
This chapter integrates three different perspectives of organizations: the
social/organizational perspective, the business process perspective and the
implementation.
It meets SC4 since SC4.1 requires a systematic approach to derive busi-
ness processes from social/organizational concepts, and SC4.2 requires a
systematic approach that permits to verify the enforcement of security re-
quirements. In particular, SC4.2. requires the contribution of this chapter
and Chapter 5 because the transformation of security requirements in se-
curity policies alone is not sufficient, the latter have to be verified and this
is possible thanks to the verification specified in Chapter 5.
Moreover, this chapter meets SC5.1 which asks for systematic approach
that provides transformation rules to generate the implementation code.
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Software support for SEBE
SEBE is provided with STS-Tool [106], a software tool1 that fully supports
the method.
STS-Tool constitutes a fundamental part of SEBE, since business pro-
cess designers will use it through all the phases of the SEBE process. In
particular the tool will help with the usage of the modeling languages, the
application of transformation and verification rules and generation of the
implementation.
STS-Tool was developed to be as easy as possible: it is provided with
manuals and tutorials, and application of transformation and verification
rules are transparent to the users. Still, STS-Tool permits a complete
customization of all the transformation rules used to generate business
processes and of the mapping between STS-ml and SecBPMN2 elements
in order to allow expert users for a detailed control of the transformations.
STS-Tool builds on a previous version of the same software which per-
mits to model STS-ml diagrams. We extended the tool with a plug-in sys-
tem, and we created two plugins: (i) one plugin supports the creation of
SecBPMN2 diagrams, the transformation of STS-ml in SecBPMN2-ml se-
cure business processes, of STS-ml security requirements in SecBPMN2-Q
security policies and the verification of security policies against secure busi-
ness processes; (ii) another plugin supports the creation of RDL applica-
tions and their modification. The extension of STS-Tool was developed by
1STS-Tool can be downloaded from www.sts-tool.eu
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Mauro Poggianella following the design specified by Mattia Salnitri (the
author of this thesis), with the help of Elda Paja and Paolo Giorgini.
Specifically STS-Tool offers the following features.
• Graphical editor for STS-ml and SecBPMN2 modeling languages, and
a textual editor for RDL.
• Consistency verification of STS-ml and SecBPMN2 models.
• Automated generation of SecBPMN2-ml business processes from STS-
ml elements.
• Automated generation of SecBPMN2-Q security policies using default
transformation rules.
• Integration of STS-ml and SecBPMN2:
– the tool permits to easily change between STS-ml and SecBPMN2
diagrams;
– element highlights: the tool permits to highlight which STS-ml
elements are linked to SecBPMN2 business processes;
– mapping visualization: the tool visualizes the mapping between
STS-ml and SecBPMN2 elements;
– security policy generation wizard: the tool offers the possibility
to use a wizard to generate ad-hoc security policies.
• Automated verification of security policies: the tool enables the auto-
mated verification of SecBPMN2-Q security policies against SecBPMN2-
ml business processes
• Automated generation of security reports: STS-Tool generates a secu-
rity report which contains information about all STS-ml and SecBPMN2
models and RDL applications.
Figure 7.1 shows three screenshots of STS-Tool.
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STS-ml editor SecBPMN2 editor
RDL editor
Figure 7.1: Screenshots of STS-Tool.
7.1 Consistency verification
Consistency verification comprehend the verification of the syntax of the
model and the verification of social/organizational security requirements
against the social/organizational model. If security requirements are not
verified, the business process models derived from the social/organizational
models will inherit security inconsistencies leading to an implementation
that, as a consequence, will not enforce the security requirements.
Consistency verifications may be executed online and oﬄine. The latter
consists in verification explicitly executed by users of STS-Tool or when
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some execution trigger the analysis, for example, before the generation
of secure business process the social/organizational model consistency is
verified. The former is executed every time the users modify a diagram, in
order to highlight immediately the errors committed.
The online consistency verification is preferable when the verification
algorithm is lightweight and the result does not prevent the users to con-
tinue drawing the diagram. Otherwise, the oﬄine verification is preferable
in case of heavy verification algorithms or when the interpretation of the
results is not immediate and requires the users to stop modeling to analyze
them.
The execution of verification algorithms of the syntax of STS-ml dia-
grams and the security requirements against social/organizational models
with medium size models takes, on average, few seconds we, therefore, de-
cided for an oﬄine verification. Such algorithms and their implementation
are not part of this thesis and were provided in the previous version of
STS-Tool. Instead, the verification of the syntax of SecBPMN2 models is
lightweight and we implemented it as an online verification.
With respect to the SEBE process, phases 2, 4, and 6, are executed only
if the diagrams they receive in input are consistent, in order to generate
respectively consistent business process models, security policies, and the
implementation.
7.2 Automated generation of secure business processes
and security policies
The STS-Tool automates the generation of business process models, secu-
rity policies and the implementations, i.e., phases 2 and 4 of the process
provided with the SEBE method proposed in this thesis. The implementa-
tion is based on the transformation rules described in Section 6, for phases
2 and 4.
The software fully supports the transformations and it permits to modify
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the transformation rules used for the generation of business processes and
security policies. Still, the tool is provided with default transformation
rules, listed in Appendix B, that are used transparently by not-expert
users.
7.3 Procedural security policy verification
For the purposes of SEBE secure business process models should satisfy
security policies, derived from the social/organizational security require-
ments. STS-Tool includes a verification engine which permit to easily
perform such verification and visualize the results.
Few verification software engines for business process models are avail-
able in literature, e.g., [6,92]. But such approaches specify and verify only
the control flow of processes. STS-Tool verifies STS-ml security policies,
which can be used to specify constraints on both control flows and the
message flows.
For this, we created a verification engine based on K [39], which permits
to check SecBPMN2-Q procedural security policies against SecBPMN2-ml
business process models.
K is a logic-based planning language supported by DVLK2, an infer-
ence engine created to generate the set of actions to achieve a goal. In a
K program, actions are defined with inputs, prerequisites and the effects
they have once executed. DVLK generates a sequence of such actions to
achieve a state specified in the goal. For example, in an environment where
an actuator can move bricks three actions may be specified: (i) move the
actuator; (ii) take the brick; (iii) release the brick. In this environment, we
can set the goal of moving the brick from a position to another. DVLK
will generate a plan which may consists in four actions: (i) move the actu-
ator over the brick; (ii) take the brick; (iii) move the actuator in the new
position; (iv) release the brick. This sequence of action will achieve the
2DVLK can be downloaded from http://www.dlvsystem.com/k-planning-system/
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goal.
We encoded business processes as a set of constraints in K so the plans
that can be generated will follow the control flow of the business processes,
i.e., DVLK only generates plans compatible with the business processes.
We encoded the procedural security policies as K goals, that is, a desirable
state of the world to be reached with the execution of a plan. Therefore, if
DVLK generates a plan (a set of activities that follows a business process
model) that achieves a goal (a procedural security policy), the business
process model verifies the security policy.
If a security policy is a pattern, STS-Tool checks if the security policy is
satisfied in all business processes modeled by the business process designer,
if it is an anti-pattern if checks if it is not satisfied in all business processes.
Table 7.1 shows the transformation rules between SecBPMN2 and
K. In particular, any Task of SecBPMN2 is transformed in a predicate
task(<Element name>) with a parameter which is the name of the element.
An Exclusive gateway is transformed into gatewayExclusive(<Element
name>) predicate while all other gateways are transformed into inclusiveG-
ateway (<Element name>) predicate, since parallel, event based and com-
plex gateways behave as inclusive gateways, i.e., is possible to execute more
than one outgoing control flow. The difference between those gateways is
in the semantic assigned by the business process designer to the type of
decision the represent, but it does not affect the possible executions of the
business process.
All Events are transformed to event(<Element name>) predicate. We
do not distinguish between different types of events since all type of events
have the same impact in terms of sequence of elements executed in a busi-
ness process.
Data objects, Data reference, Data input and Data output are transformed
in Data object(<Element name>) predicate, which represents the physical
storage of information. Messages are transformed in the predicate mes-
sage(<Element name>).
Sub-processes and Call activities are not transformed in any predicate.
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Instead, the business processes contained (in case of sub-processes) or re-
ferred to (in case of call activities), are merged to the business process
which executed the call activity or the sub process. Pragmatically, we ig-
nore the call activity, and the start and end event of the called process, and
we integrate the called process by linking the element before the call call
activity to the first element of the called process and the its last element
to the element after the call activity or sub process. Similar operations are
executed for sub-processes.
Global tasks are similar to tasks, but they are use as anchor points for
call activities. In term of execution global tasks can be considered as plain
tasks and, therefore, they are transformed in the same predicate we used
for tasks, i.e., task(<Element name>).
Participants, both lanes and pools are transformed to participant(<Element
name>) predicate.
The Control flow relation is transformed in a predicate controlFlow(<Source>,
<Destination>) where the first parameter is the element source of the con-
trol flow, and the second element the target of the control flow.
The Message flow relation is transformed in the predicate message-
Flow(<Source>,<Destination>,<Message>). Similarly to the control flow
predicate, this predicate has two parameters that specifies the source and
the target of the relation, moreover it requires a third parameter which
specifies which is the message sent with the message flow.
SecBPMN2 uses one Data association relation to specify if a data ob-
ject is used by another element and the direction of the association (in-
coming or outgoing from the element) to specify if the data object is
read or written. We generate two predicates depending if the data ob-
ject is read, readDO(<Data object name>,<Element name>), or written,
WriteDO(<Data object name>,<Element name>). The two predicates use
the same parameters: the name of the data object and the name of the
element which use the data object.
When an element is placed inside the scope of a participant an Owner-
ship relation is specified between the two elements. We generate a similar
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predicate, i.e., owns(<Name pool>,<Element name>), to specify the same
concept in K. The ownership relation is not limited to elements such as
tasks and data objects, but binds together also lanes specified inside pools.
For what concerns the security annotations we generate predicates as
specified in Table 5.1. Such predicates already contain references to the
SecBPMN2 element associated to the security annotation, (specified in
SecBPMN2 with a a security association), therefore, we do not generate a
predicate for such association.
We do not generate predicates for Artifacts, such as group and textual
annotations, since, they are irrelevant for the execution of the business
process.
The predicates we defined in K identify the elements of the business
processes by their names, in other words two elements of the same type and
name cannot be differentiated in K. Therefore, we imposed a constraint
that prevent to create two elements of the same type with the same name
in SecBPMN2 diagrams.
Listing 7.1 shows an example of a K representation of a SecBPMN2
business process model. In K strings that start with an upper case char-
acter are considered variables, while strings that start with a lower case
character are constants. The first one represents any task and the latter
represents specific activities. Lines 1-3 define the message and the control
flow fluents. The control flow fluent requires two activities as parameters
and represents the control flow between two elements. The message flow
fluents require as parameters two activities and a message, and represents
the message flow between two activities. Lines 4-6 represent part of the
business process model in Figure 5.1. In particular, the control flow be-
tween the generate transfer order and send transfer order and the message
flow containing the message transfer order between the latter task and anal-
yse transfer order.
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SecBPMN2 Elements K elements
Task task(<Element name>).
Exclusive gateway gatewayExclusive(<Element name>).
Inclusive gateway
gatewayInclusive(<Element name>).
Parallel gateway
Event Based gateway
Complex gateway
Event event(<Element name>).
Data object
dataObject(<Element name>).
Data reference
Data input
Data output
Message message(<Element name>).
Sub process X
Call activity X
Global tasks task(<Element name>).
Participant participant(<Element name>).
Control flow controlFlow(<Source>,<Destination>).
Message flow messageFlow(<Source>,<Destination>,<Message>).
Data association
readDO(<Data object name>,<Element name>).
WriteDO(<Data object name>,<Element name>).
Ownership owns(<Participant name>,<Element name>).
Security annotations see chapter
Security association X
Artifact X
Table 7.1: List of transformations of SecBPMN2 concepts in K predicates
1 f luents :
2 contro lFlow (T1 ,T2) r e qu i r e s task (T1) , task (T1) .
3 messageFlow (T1 ,T2 ,M) r e qu i r e s task (T1) , task (T2) , message (M) .
4 i n i t i a l l y :
5 contro lFlow ( generate t r a n s f e r order , send t r a n s f e r order ) .
6 messageFlow ( send t r a n s f e r order , ana lyse t r a n s f e r order , t r a n s f e r
order ) .
Listing 7.1: A K representation of part of the process in Figure 5.1
Listing 7.2 shows the K goal generated from the procedural security
policy in Figure 5.1(b). Line 1 specifies that a K goal is defined. Lines 2-3
contain the predicate executed that indicates the task specified in the first
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parameter must be executed by the participant indicated by the second
parameter. For example the predicate Line 2 instructs the planner to find
a plan in which the task analyze transfer order is executed by bank src. Line
4 specifies that the plan must contain a message sent by any task to analyze
transfer order and transmitting the message transfer order. Line 5 instructs
the planner to find a plan where walk1 is executed. walk1 is defined as a set
of constraints (Lines 7-8), where walk1 1 becomes true after analyse transfer
order is executed and walk1 becomes true if accredit value is executed and
walk1 1 is true. Line 6 specifies how many actions the generated plan shall
contain maximum, we set this as the number of all SecBPMN2 elements
in the business process. This parameter does not influence the generated
plans, if it is high enough, i.e., as high as the longest possible execution,
which in the case of this thesis is the number of elements in the business
process.
If DVLK generates at least a plan that respects the constraints defined
in Listing 7.1, which achieves the goal defined in Listing 7.2, then:(i) if
the policy is a pattern, the business process model used to generate the
constrains is verified against the procedural security policy used to generate
the goal; (ii) if the policy is an anti-pattern, the business process model is
not verified against the security policy.
1 goal :
2 executed ( ana lyze t r a n s f e r order , bank s r c ) ,
3 executed ( a c c r e d i t value , bank s r c ) ,
4 sent (X, ana lyze t r a n s f e r order , t r a n s f e r order ) ,
5 walk1
6 ? (10) .
7 caused walk1 1 after exec ( ana lyse t r a n s f e r order ) .
8 caused walk1 after exec ( a c c r e d i t va lue ) , walk1 1 .
Listing 7.2: Example of a K goal generated from Figure 5.1(b)
7.4 Generation of RDL code
STS-Tool takes as inputs a SecBPMN2 model, a repository of business ar-
tifact definitions and, optionally, a set of enforcement rules. Using the gen-
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eration rules described earlier, the prototype generates the RDL implemen-
tation form transformation rules using Freemarker (http://freemarker.
org): a Java template library that permits to parse text files with place-
holders and insert text only by specifying the placeholder to substitute.
Algorithm 1 shows the generation of the RDL implementation. It fol-
lows the generation and enforcement rules described in chapters 5 and 6.
It uses the function Generate that retrieves the Freemarker templates and
instantiate them using the information contained in the SecBPMN2 model.
For each pool of the SecBPMN2 model (line 1), the algorithm creates a
new RDL application (line 2) and it adds, to the application generated,
all roles generated from all lanes contained in the pool (lines 3–5). For
each data object, it creates a RDL type, entity and namespace, and add
them to the application (lines 6–10). After that, for each task in the pool,
it generates the corresponding action and adds it to the entity(ies) that
is(are) generated from the data object that is linked to the task (lines 11–
16). The Retrieve function checks for this link. If no data object is linked
the task, the generated action is added to the application. The last part of
the algorithm is for the enforcement of the security annotations: for each
security annotation in the pool, GenerateSC instantiates the Freemarker
template for the corresponding security mechanism(s) and after that Gen-
erateSP generates the security specifications that are added to the security
specification document.
STS-Tool is currently limited to public and private process models and
collaboration models. We do not foresee any fundamental problem in ex-
tending the prototype to support SecBPMN2 choreography models.
7.5 Architecture
STS-Tool is a stand-alone software written in Java 7, based on Eclipse RCP
Framework3. The software is available for MAC OS, Microsoft Windows
3https://eclipse.org
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for generation of RDL applications
GenerateRiverApplications(SecBPMN2 model)
1 for each pool ∈ model
2 do riverApplication← Generate(pool)
3 for each lane ∈ pool
4 do riverRole← Generate(lane)
5 riverApplication.add(riverRole)
6 for each dataObject ∈ pool
7 do riverType, riverEntity, riverNamespace← Generate(dataObject)
8 riverApplication.add(riverType)
9 riverApplication.add(riverEntity)
10 riverApplication.add(riverNamespace)
11 for each task ∈ pool
12 do riverAction← Generate(task)
13 if LinkedDO(task)
14 then riverEntity← retrieve(DataObject)
15 riverEntity.add(riverAction)
16 else riverApplication.add(riverAction)
17 securitySpecificationDoc← new()
18 for each securityAnnotation ∈ pool
19 do securityMeachanisms← generateSC(securityAnnotation)
20 riverApplication.add(securityMechanisms)
21 securitySpecifications← generateSP(securityAnnotation)
22 securitySpecificationDoc← add(securitySpecification)
(32 and 64 bits), and Linux (32 and 64 bits).
Figure 7.2 shows the main architectural components of STS-Tool with
a layered architectural style diagram. The components we created for
STS-Tool have bold borders, external components we used for the extension
have dashed borders, while components of the previous version of STS-Tool
have thin borders.
STS-Tool is based on OSG Equinox and Eclipse RCP plugin, a well known
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) for Java. BPMN2 modeler is
an Eclipse plugin which permits to model BPMN 2.0 diagrams. We ex-
tended such plugin in order to (i) model secure business processes, with
SecBPMN2-ml editors; (ii) model security policies, with SecBPMN2-Q edi-
tor, (iii) model secure business process transformation rules, with SecBPMN2-
ml transformation rule editor; (iv) model security policy transformation
rules, with SecBPMN2-Q transformation rule editor. The RDL editor per-
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mits to edit RDL files. The Security policy generator creates security poli-
cies using security policy transformation rules. The Transformation module
generates SecBPMN2-ml business processes from STS-ml models, using
SecBPMN2-ml transformation rules, and it generates RDL applications
using SecBPMN2-ml models. SecBPMN2-Q security policies are verified
against SecBPMN2-ml business processes by the Security policy verifier,
which uses the DLV-K plugin.
DLV-K 
engine
OSGI Equinox
Eclipse RCP plugin
DLV-K 
plugin
Security policy veriﬁer
BPMN2 Modeler
STS-ml 
module
SecBPMN2-Q 
editor
SecBPMN2-ml 
transformation 
rule editor
SecBPMN2-ml 
editor
Security policy generator Transformation module
RDL 
editor
SecBPMN2-Q 
transformation 
rule editor
Figure 7.2: STS-Tool components
7.6 Chapter summary
This chapter describes STS-Tool, a software tool provided with SEBE.
STS-Tool meets SC3.3 since it verifies security policies against secure busi-
ness processes in an automated fashion, SC5.2 since it automatically gen-
erates part of the implementation, and SC6.2 because it provide a full
support to the process, integrating the modeling languages and offering a
rich set of functions for each phase of the process.
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Chapter 8
Empirical evaluations
This chapter describes two empirical evaluations we performed to verify
if the success criteria, defined in Chapter 1, are meet. The first empiri-
cal evaluation focuses on SecBPMN while the second one focuses on the
method as a whole.
Empirical evaluations use experiments and observation to collect empir-
ical evidence that can be used to verify or dismiss certain hypotheses [126].
We use an engineeristic approach to reach conclusions as objective as pos-
sible, to collect impression and feedback from a sample of the possible users
of SEBE.
8.1 Evaluation of SecBPMN
We designed and conducted an experiment to test the understandability
and the perceived graphical complexity of SecBPMN-ml and SecBPMN-Q;
we define the latter concept as semiotic clarity [78] and diagrammatic com-
plexity [78]. Our experiment was conducted through an online survey as a
way to maximize the number of subjects.
The experiment was conducted using the first version of SecBPMN.
The differences between SecBPMN2 and SecBPMN are, mainly, on the
possibility of further specify concepts already present in SecBPMN. For
example, in SecBPMN is possible to specify only tasks, while in SecBPMN2
is possible to specify 8 types of tasks such as Manual task, Script task or Send
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task. We believe that the evaluation is still valid for SecBPMN2 because
the latter is an extension of SecBPMN which did not change the nature of
the language. Indeed, we believe that a person trained for SecBPMN does
not need any further training for using SecBPMN2.
8.1.1 Experimental design
The design of our experiment was conducted following Wohlin’s guide-
lines [126]. We used the Goal, Question, Metric (GQM) template [14] to de-
fine the scope and objectives of the survey; in particular, the GQMtemplate
specifies: (i) the focus of the experiment; (ii) the objective of the experi-
ment; (iii) the variables to test; (iv) the subjects; and (v) the context of
the experiment.
Table 8.1 shows the two GQM templates for our experiment. The first
part of the experiment analyzes SecBPMN-ml for evaluating its perceived
graphical complexity and understandability. The experiment targets the
main roles involved in the process provided with SEBE: security experts
and business process designers. The latter category is a prominent sub-
set of business analysts. The evaluation is performed by asking the sub-
ject to read SecBPMN models. The second part of the experiment com-
pares SecBPMN-Q with a formal approach for expressing policies, i.e.,
Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [41] formulas.
Table 8.1: GQM template for our experiments
Analyze SecBPMN-ml
for the purpose of evaluation
with respect to their perceived graphical complexity and understandability
from the point of view of the security experts and business process modelers
in the context of reading SecBPMN models.
Analyze SecBPMN-Q
for the purpose of compare it with CTL formulas
with respect to their perceived graphical complexity and understandability
from the point of view of the security experts and business process modelers
in the context of reading security policies.
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Table 8.2 shows the hypotheses that we tested with the experiments. We
divide hypothesis into two sets, one per experiment: the first set compares
SecBPMN-ml with BPMN models with a textual description of the security
policy (BPMNts); the second set compares SecBPMN-Q with CTL.
We chose BPMNts, instead of BPMN, in order to compare SecBPMN
with a modeling language with the same expressiveness. Other languages,
such as SecureBPMN, can express only a part of the security concepts and,
therefore, the comparison would be unfair. For the same reason we chose
to compare SecBPMN-Q with CTL: they can express the same type of
time patterns.
Table 8.2: Hypotheses of the experiments
Experiment 1: SecBPMN-ml vs. BPMNts
H0-1.1: SecBPMN-ml is more complex than BPMNts
H1-1.1: SecBPMN-ml is less complex than BPMNts
H0-1.2: SecBPMN-ml is less understandable than BPMNts
H1-1.2: SecBPMN-ml is more understandable than BPMNts
H0-1.3: SecBPMN-ml is more complex and less understandable than BPMNts
H1-1.3: SecBPMN-ml is less complex and more understandable than BPMNts
Experiment 2: SecBPMN-Q vs. CTL
H0-2.1: CTL is preferable to SecBPMN-Q for communication with stakeholders
H1-2.1: SecBPMN-Q is preferable to CTL for communication with stakeholders
We opted for convenience sampling as a means to recruit subjects: we
did spread the word about the survey through mailing lists, used by security
experts and business process modelers. We left the survey available on line
for 20 days, and then we analyzed the answers.
To evaluate the perceived complexity and the readability of SecBPMN
and BPMNts, we created three pairs of diagrams, each consisting of a
SecBPMN-ml diagram and BPMNts diagram. To ensure a fair comparison,
both diagrams modeled the same business processes, with the same security
choices. We also use the same layout, except of the message flow that was
colored differently (we discuss the implications in Section 8.1.4).
The survey was structured in different parts (for the details see [114]):
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• General questions concerning the background of the subject;
• An introduction to SecBPMN-ml;
• Questions on a small-size business process (SecBPMN-ml/BPMNts);
• Questions on a slightly bigger business process (SecBPMN-ml/BPMNts);
• Questions on a medium-size business process (SecBPMN-ml/BPMNts);
• An introduction to SecBPMN-Q;
• Questions on security policies (SecBPMN-Q/CTL).
8.1.2 Participants
The survey was completed by 30 subjects; the large majority (96%) were
familiar with at least one business process modeling language, 60 % where
familiar with BPMN standard. The majority of the subjects (60%, N = 18)
declared to have good or wide knowledge of security, while 40% of the
subjects (N = 12) are not security experts (x¯ = 3.13 on a scale from 1 to
5, σ = 1.41).
8.1.3 Experiment results
The original results are publicly available on [114]. Let us review some key
results:
• For small diagrams (respondents N = 30), SecBPMN-ml is largely
considered more understandable and less complex than BPMNts: 80%
preferred it to BPMNts, 13% rated both diagrams understandable, 7%
found none of them understandable, no-one preferred BPMNts.
• For slightly larger diagrams (N = 27), the preference for SecBPMN-ml
is confirmed, even though a smaller percentage (67%); 11% of the re-
spondents opted for BPMNts diagrams, 18% of the respondents found
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both of them understandable, and 4% of the sample found no notation
understandable.
• For medium-size diagrams (N = 25), the majority of the subjects
found SecBPMN-ml more useful to define secure business processes
(80%), 8% preferred BPMNts, 8% of the subjects would choose either,
and 4% of the sample would use none. When asked about which
language would be more effective to communicate with stakeholders,
60% chose SecBPMN-ml, 12% chose BPMNts, 20% chose both of them
and, 8% wouldn’t use neither SecBPMN-ml nor BPMNts.
An interesting result is about the perceived level of security of business
process modeled with SecBPMN-ml, that we tested with the second couple
of diagrams. While both diagrams expressed the same security information,
the majority of the subjects (74%, N = 27) thought that the SecBPMN
diagram represents a more secure business process, 15% chose BPMNts
diagram, and 11% thought that both diagram represent a business process
with the same level of security. This seems to indicate that SecBPMN is
more understandable than BPMNts, in the sense that it is easier to identify
the security choices.
For what concerns the comparison between SecBPMN-Q and CTL, the
former is preferred for communication with customers (88%), none of the
subjects chose the CTL formula, 4% would use either of them, and 8% none
of them. Regarding the use for verifying compliance, a CTL formula was
chosen by the majority of the subjects (54%), 21% would use SecBPMN-Q,
21% would use either of them and 4% would use neither SecBPMN-Q
nor CTL. This result shows that the subjects think that SecBPMN-Q is
not expressive enough for the verification of security policies. However,
SecBPMN-Q is based on temporal logics, and our verification engine fully
supports it. It is probably the case that the respondents’ opinion is due to
the common knowledge about the expressiveness of temporal logic formu-
las, and had no knowledge on the expressiveness of SecBPMN-Q.
The last question investigated the usefulness of highlighting those walks
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in a model that satisfy a given security policy; this is a key feature of
our modeling and verification toolset. We asked whether this could help
security experts to find causes of non-compliance; the respondents (N =
23) rated this feature positively, even though not extremely positively: on
as scale from 1 (not useful at all) to 5 (extremely useful), we obtained
x¯ = 3.78 and σ = 1.00.
With the results collected in the survey is possible to refute H0-1.1,
H0-1.2, and H0-1.3 and hence confirm H1-1.1, H1-1.2, and H1-1.3. For
the set of hypotheses we defined for SecBPMN-Q, it is possible to refute
H0-2.1 and to confirm H1-2.1. In other words, the results of the survey
constitute a preliminary evidence of the fact that SecBPMN-ml is more
understandable and has a lower perceived complexity than BPMNts, and
that SecBPMN-Q is preferred to CTL for communicating security policies
with stakeholders.
8.1.4 Threats to validity
We report the main threats to the validity of our experiment, using Wohlin’s
categorization [126].
Threats to conclusion validity. The relevant threats in this category are the
following: (i) low statistical power, as we cannot determine the size of the
mailing lists and how many respondents in advance; (ii) random irrelevan-
cies in the experimental setting, for we opted for an on line survey, thereby
having no control on external factors which could affect the results of the
experiment; (iii) random heterogeneity of subjects, as we distribute the
survey on line and we were not able to select adequate participants. Look-
ing at the obtained results, the statistical power threat is only partially
addressed: while 30 respondents do not yield strong statistical power, the
number is in the average for PhD studies [73]; concerning the third threat,
most of the participants had knowledge in business process modeling (28
out of 30 had experience in either BPMN, Petri nets, or UML activity
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diagrams), and with the subjects having a knowledge above average in in-
formation security average x¯ = 3.13 (range from 1 to 5), standard deviation
σ = 1.41.
Threats to internal validity. The only relevant threat is mortality. We
mitigated such threat by allowing subjects to interrupt the survey at the
end of each part. 10% of the subjects interrupted the experiment after the
questions about small-size business process, 7%, of the remaining subjects
interrupted it in the following part, and 3% in the part about medium-size
business processes. Overall, we collected results on the small-size processes
from all subjects, on slightly larger models from 90% of the subjects, and
on medium-size models from 80% of the sample.
Threats to construct validity. This type of validity is threatened by the re-
stricted generalizability across constructs. In other words, some constructs
(diagrams) can influence the valuation of other diagrams. In our case, the
danger is that by looking at a diagram in one notation, the user already
gets a sense about its meaning, and is facilitated in understanding the
alternative notation. We mitigated this threat in different ways. First,
since we aimed to assess SecBPMN, we presented our notation first, so
that most of the cognitive effort was put on understanding the process
using our languages. Second, we modeled the same business processes
throughout the survey but with different level of details. For the same
threat, we avoid to influence subjects with factors that are not tested
in the survey using for each part the same layout and the same detail.
Construct validity is also threaten by a difference in the coloring of the
diagrams: while we did our best to keep the layouts as similar as possible
between business processes of the same pairs, the message flows of the
SecBPMN-ml diagrams are colored in blue while the same message flows
in BPMN diagrams are black. Another threat to construct validity is hy-
pothesis guessing, where the subjects can be conditioned by the results they
are providing. We mitigated this threat by carefully formulating questions
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as much impartially as possible, and by clearly stating the purpose of the
questionnaire.
Threats to external validity. External validity is threatened by the interac-
tion of setting and treatment. In our case, this would occur with business
process diagrams that are not an accurate representation of the real pro-
cess. Due to time constraints, the first two proposed business processes
were relatively small; the third one, however, is medium-sized, and consti-
tutes therefore a fair representation of a real-world business process for the
chosen domain.
8.2 Evaluation of SEBE
We evaluated SEBE in two ways. First, we checked the actual interest
practitioners have about such method. This was done through a series
of interviews with industry experts. Second, we evaluated the method
conducting an empirical study with modelers.
8.2.1 Interviews
We interviewed industry experts to evaluate the interest of organizations
about SEBE. The interviews consisted in a description of the method and
10 questions. They were conducted through Voice over IP (VoIP) calls or
telephone calls and lasted between 10 and 20 minutes. We interviewed 11
subjects from 10 different companies such as HP, Tecnalia, ATOS, Euro-
control, and Thales group.
64% of the subjects declared to be security experts and to perform
regularly systematic security analysis, while 36% of them have a superficial
knowledge on security. The subjects interested in a usage of SEBE are 64%,
in particular 86% of the security experts showed high interest, while only
14% of them declared not to be interested. The subjects not interested
in the method are 36% but, interestingly, 75% of them are not security
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experts and only 25% of them are. None of the subjects were aware of
methods similar to SEBE.
This data suggested that there is a good interest about SEBE and,
if we focus on security experts, the appreciation is much higher. The
interviews confirmed the lack in the market of comprehensive methods as
the one proposed in this thesis and that it would be more than welcomed
by security experts.
8.2.2 Empirical evaluation
We designed and conducted an empirical study to evaluate the effectiveness
of the process supporting SEBE, the automated transformations, and the
usability of STS-Tool.
As for the previous empirical evaluation, we used the GQM template [14]
to define the scope and objectives of the survey. Table 8.3 shows a GQM
templates for our empirical evaluation. The evaluation analyzes SEBE for
evaluating its effectiveness and usability. We defined the effectiveness as
how much SEBE helps in enforcing security requirements, while usability
is how easy is to apply SEBE with the aid of the extended STS-Tool. The
experiment targets business process designers, while they are enforcing
security requirement, i.e. while they are using SEBE.
Table 8.3: GQM template for our experiments
Analyze SEBE
for the purpose of evaluation
with respect to effectiveness and usability
from the point of view of business process designers
in the context of enforcing security requirements.
From the GQM template in Table 8.3, we elicited the following Evaluation
Question (EQ):
EQ1: Does the process effectively help business process design-
ers? The criteria taken into account for evaluating the process are: (crite-
ria i) how much its execution helps business process designers in specifying
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security requirements; (criteria ii) how well it adapts with the software en-
gineering process used by the subjects; (criteria iii) how easy it is to follow
the process.
EQ2: Do the automated transformations effectively help business
process designers? We evaluated how much automated transformations
help in: (criteria i) specifying business processes; (criteria ii) specifying and
enforcing security policies; (criteria iii) specifying and enforcing security
policies in large scenarios.
EQ3: Is the software tool usable? We evaluated the following criteria:
(criteria i) how well STS-Tool integrates STS-ml and SecBPMN2; (criteria
ii) how well STS-Tool supports the process proposed in this thesis; (criteria
iii) the usability of STS-Tool. We evaluated the usability with the standard
System Usability Scale (SUS) [110]. The original SUS [110] was used with a
slight adaptation: for each item of the scale, the word system was replaced
with tool, to ease the understanding of the scale. The scale for assessing
the tool consisted of 10 items, like in the original SUS. Apart from the tool
usability, we asked about how well the software tool supports SEBE.
8.2.3 Experimental design
The experiment was divided in three phases, described in the following list.
1. Training phase:
• subjects attended an introduction about the SEBE;
• subjects executed simple exercises on the modeling languages and
transformation between them;
• subjects attended an introduction to the extended STS-Tool.
2. Application:
• subjects performed alone an exercise that requires to follow the
process and using the automated transformations with the help
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of STS-Tool. During the execution of the exercise subjects navi-
gated between social/organizational and business process models,
to generate the latter from the former, and to modify the business
process models;
• at the end of the application phase, subjects delivered a report
with information about the execution of the exercise.
3. Evaluation:
• subjects compiled an on-line questionnaire, they had the choice
to compile it right after the application phase, or in the following
days.
We provided to the subjects with a cheat sheet for each modeling lan-
guage ( STS-ml and SecBPMN2) that consists in a table with images and
descriptions of all the elements of the modeling languages.
8.2.4 Participants
20 subjects participated to the empirical study. Subjects were Ph.D. stu-
dents (40%) and master students (60%), all of them expert modelers. Most
of the subjects (60%) have a good knowledge on goal-based modeling lan-
guages, 35% are experienced goal modelers and only 5% have low knowl-
edge on such modeling languages. For what concerns business process
models, 15% are experienced modelers, 60% have a good knowledge on the
business process and only 5% have a low knowledge on the topic. 33% of
the subjects have an average security knowledge, 27% are security experts,
while 40% have a low or no knowledge on security. The sample contains a
heterogeneous representation of possible users of SEBE.
The exercises in the second part of the empirical study were executed to
assess if the subjects correctly understood the concepts introduced in the
first part. 50% of the subjects executed the exercises without errors, 40%
did 1 error, while 10% did 2 errors. No subjects did more than two errors.
This indicates that the baseline concepts, that was explained in the first
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part of the empirical study, were well understood; a key point to properly
follow the hand-on section, execute the exercise in the fourth section and,
therefore, obtain significant results.
8.2.5 Quantitative data analysis
We collected data on the execution of the exercises performed during the
empirical study, shown in Table 8.4. We measured the number of times
the subjects transformed an STS-ml element in SecBPMN2 diagram (#
Transformations) and the number of time the subjects modified the the
generated business processes (# Changes) in order to check if the subjects
understood the rationale behind the transformations. The higher the num-
ber of transformations and changes, the higher the probability the users
comprehended how the transformation works.
STS-Tool provides to its users some functionalities that ease the transac-
tion between STS-ml and SecBPMN2 diagrams. In particular it provides
a built-in mechanism to easily change perspective (from now on, jump)
between STS-ml ad SecBPMN2 diagrams. We measured the number of
times the subjects used the jump mechanism (# Jumps) to check if they
considered the two modeling language part of the same model.
The mapping of SecBPMN2 task to and-decomposition and the or-
decomposition of STS-ml permits business process designers to replicate
the goal structure in business processes. In other words, a goal that is
decomposed in two or more business processes it corresponds to a business
process with call activities that refer to the business processes mapped to
the subgoals. For example, consider a goal G that is decomposed in two
sub goal Ga and Gb. In this case the replicated hierarchy in business pro-
cess consists in a business process B which contains, among other elements,
two call activities that refer to two business processes Ba and Bb, that are
mapped respectively to Ga and Gb.
We checked how many times subjects replicated the hierarchy of goals
decompositions of the STS-ml models, in business process (# Hierarchy
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usage). We used this metric to check if this, not automated, guideline is
used by the subjects or if they prefer other organization of the business
processes. This metric will confirm if the hierarchy defined in the goal
model is functional to the organization of the business processes.
Transformations, jumps and the usage of the hierarchy are meant to in-
tegrate STS-ml and SecBPMN2 modeling languages. Therefore, the higher
the number of these metrics, the higher the possibility subjects consider
the two modeling languages integrated.
Table 8.4 shows quantitative data of the operations on the models. we
collected such data by directly asking the subjects, before the experiment,
to count the metric we described.
The subjects transformed, on average, 3 (with σ = 1.56) STS-ml el-
ements in SecBPMN2 business processes and they modified, on average,
9 (with σ = 12.4) elements of such business processes. These data sug-
gest the subjects created few fairly complex business processes. We believe
they did not create more business process because of time constraints.
The standard deviation of the number of modifications is high because
three subjects did many modifications (more than 20) to the generated
SecBPMN2 business processes. They put their effort in customizing and
improving the generated models, instead of generating more, less accurate,
business processes.
The subjects, during the experiment, jumped between diagrams 6 times
on average, with σ = 6.62. This indicates the subjects used this mechanism
frequently to ease the transition between diagrams.
The subjects replicated the hierarchy of goal models in business pro-
cesses 3 times on average, with σ = 3.31. This metric shows that subjects
applied the guideline almost on all processes, if we compare it with the
number of transformations. This demonstrates that the hierarchy of goal
model is a valid guideline to organize business processes.
As part of the quantitative analysis we collected data on the usage of the
process and the execution of the empirical experiment, shown in table 8.5.
We checked the number of steps, of the process provided in SEBE executed
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# Transformations # Changes # Jumps # Hierarchy usage
Mean 3 9 6 3
Std. Dev 1,57 12,4 6,62 3,31
Table 8.4: Data about the operations executed by subjects during the modeling
by the subjects during the experiment (# Steps), to check if subjects used
the process.
We checked the number of iterations (# Iterations), i.e. the number of
time the process is executed from the beginning or, in other words, how
many times the gateways are evaluated negatively. We used such metric
to check if the iterative, incremental aspect of the process was exploited
by the subjects.
The Execution time indicates the time the subjects used to complete the
experiments.
We checked how many times the documentation we provided to the
subject was used (# Documentation usage) to check how much the modeling
languages were understand.
Table 8.5 shows data we collected about the usage of the process the
execution time and the usage of the documentation we provided during the
empirical evaluation. The first two columns indicate that the subjects exe-
cuted the process once, on average. While the usage of the documentation
indicates, as expected, that the modeling languages were not completely
learnt in the training phase. The standard deviation of execution time is
high because we fixed a minimum of ten minutes for the last exercise, but
we did not put an upper bound.
# Steps # Iterations Execution time # Documentation usage
Mean 3 1 19 min 3
Std. Dev 0,96 0,83 12,1 min 1,73
Table 8.5: Data about the usage of SEBE
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 show that the subjects used the features of SEBE
we wanted to test in the experiment, therefore, the results reflect the real
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experience of users.
8.2.6 Qualitative data analysis
After finishing the modeling task (fourth activity of the empirical study),
the participants filled in an online questionnaire to evaluate the research
questions we identified. Table 8.6 shows the results of each criteria and
the overall results, for each research question. In the following we describe
how each criteria has been evaluated.
EQ1 For what concerns the help offered by the process, 66% of the subjects
confirmed that the process eases the definition of business processes, 33%
do not have a strong opinion. On the matter, 59% of the subjects believe
the process is useful for enforcing security requirements. These results con-
firm that the process significantly helped subjects during the experiment
(criteria (i)). For what concerns criteria (ii), most of the subjects (65%)
will consider using the process to enforce security requirements in other
projects, 39% do not have any strong opinion and only 5% will not use the
process. We believe this is a clear indication the process is flexible enough
to be used in other contexts and with different software engineering pro-
cess. Results also confirm the process is easy to follow (criteria (iii)): 65%
of the subjects consider the process easy to apply, 35% do not have any
strong feeling, and no one of the subjects consider the process difficult to
apply.
EQ2 The subjects appreciated the automated transformation. In par-
ticular, 78% of them agree on the fact that it helps in modeling and in
enforcing security requirements (criteria i), 16% do not have any opinion,
while 6% disagree. 61% of the subjects believes the automated transfor-
mation helps the definition of SecBPMN2 models (criteria ii), 33% do not
have strong opinion and only 6% believe it does not help in the definition
of SecBPMN2 models. When asked whether the automated transforma-
tions help business process designers in case of large scenarios (criteria iii),
the answers were even more positive: 66% of the subjects agree, 33% do
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not have any opinion, and 0% disagree. This emphasizes that subjects
believe in the usefulness of automated transformation, especially in case of
real-world scenarios, with wide and complex models. Subjects’ comments
confirm such conclusion, but they also highlight that it may be difficult
to properly use the automated transformation, especially for users who do
not have a previous knowledge on STS-ml and SecBPMN2.
EQ3 For what concerns the evaluation of the software tool, 83% of the
subjects believe that it well integrates the modeling languages (criteria i),
11% have no strong feeling, while only 6% of the subjects believe that the
tool does not do a good job in integrating the different modeling languages.
For what concerns the support to the process (criteria ii), 88% of the
subjects believe the software tool facilitates the application of the process,
22% do not have any strong opinion, while no one disagreed. Furthermore,
50% of the subjects believe the tool is sufficiently fast, 22% have no opinion
and 28% of the subjects believe the software is too slow.
As an overall result, the calculated mean SUS score (criteria iii) of the
tool is 64,4 (n=8, σ = 9.7). SUS scores are normalized and range from 0
to 100, with 0 for least usable systems and 100 for best usable systems.
On average, systems achieve approximately a SUS score of 68 [110]. Thus,
the SUS score of the tool is close to this average, indicating that the tool
is neither among the worst systems nor among the best with regard to
usability. When the descriptive adjectives of the study of Bangor, Kortum
and Miller [13] are applied to the SUS score from this evaluation, the tool
can be labeled as between “good” and “ok”. Consequently, the current
usability status of the tool can be considered “acceptable”. However, there
is room for improvement with regard to its usability.
Table 8.6 summarizes the outcomes of the quantitative evaluation for
each criteria of each research question. We consider all criteria of EQ1
satisfied: the large majority of the subjects consider the process proposed
in this thesis helpful and only a strict minority, at most 5%, is against its
adoption. For what concerns EQ2, we consider criteria i and criteria iii
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satisfied, since the large majority of the subjects believe in the automated
transformations are useful for the definition and enforcement of security
policies. We obtained similar results for criteria ii, but the percentage of
subjects that agreed is lower than the order other criteria (61%) and the
subject who disagreed it is higher than most of the other criteria (6%). We
marked this criteria with a yellow tick, because it is the less strong result,
but, still, is positive. We, therefore, consider EQ2 satisfied. We consider
criteria i and criteria ii of EQ3 satisfied since a large part of subjects
consider the STS-Tool a valid help for using SEBE. However, we consider
criteria iii not completely satisfied, marked in yellow, because the result
of the SUS score is “acceptable”. Still we consider EQ3 satisfied, since all
criteria are satisfied.
Research Question Criteria i Criteria ii Criteria iii Result
EQ1
EQ2
EQ3
Table 8.6: Research questions outcomes
8.2.7 Threats to validity
We report the main threats to the validity of our experiment, using Wohlin’s
categorization [126].
Threats to conclusion validity. The relevant threats in this category
are the following: (i) low statistical power, the number of subjects is low,
since we selected only subjects with experience in modeling social/organi-
zational or business process models; (ii) fishing, we performed the train-
ing phase being as neutral as possible, without expressing opinion about
SEBE; (iii) reliability of the measure, we used simple and short sentences
in the questionnaires, most of the answers consisted in a likert scale; (iv)
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reliability of treatment implementation, we provided to the subjects a so-
cial/organizational model partially transformed in business process models,
this minimized the deviations and focused the attention of the subjects on
SEBE, rather on the modeling languages, (v) reliability of irrelevancies in
experimental setting, we created a quiet environment as possible.
Threats to internal validity. (i) maturation, the whole experiment lasted
less than two hours, to avoid having tired subjects; (ii) instrumentation,
we designed the questionnaire to be as simple as possible, we avoided com-
plex sentences and the time requested for the filling-in was less that 15
minutes; (iii) selection, the participation was volunteer-based, therefore
subjects might be enthusiastic, we mitigated this threat being as neutral
as possible about SEBE.
Threats to construct validity. (i) interaction of testing and treatment,
during the experiment we abstained from stressing how much security is
central in socio-technical systems, in order to do not alter the perception
of subjects about security problems; (ii) hypothesis guessing, during the
experiment we suggested the subjects to answer honestly and to avoid to
guess the best answer, since there were no wrong answers; (iii) evaluation
apprehension, during the experiment we underlined that the subjects were
not evaluated and the questionnaires are anonymous.
Threats to external validity. (i) interaction of selection and treatment,
the set of subjects was heterogeneous: it included people with a different
expertise in security, in goal-based modeling language and business process
modeling language; (ii) interaction of setting and treatment, the exercise
in the application phase was based on a real case study about the payment
system.
8.3 Chapter summary
This chapter described two empirical evaluations we used to check if the
SC defined in Chapter 1 are met by SEBE.
In particular, both empirical validations confirmed that SEBE provides
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a modeling language (SecBPMN2) which meets SC1.1, SC1.2 and SC2.1.
In other words SecBPMN2 is an modeling language that can be used to
specify business process with security concepts and security policies, that
is easy to use and can be effectively used in real scenarios.
The second experiment permits also to confirm that SC4 and SC6 are
met by SEBE. For what concerns SC4, SEBE provides a systematic ap-
proach that generates secure business process from social/organizational
models and it permits to enforce security requirements. For what concerns
SC6, the method provides a process that can be easily followed by the
users to use SEBE and it is well supported by STS-Tool, the software tool
provided with the method.
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Chapter 9
Case studies and application
scenarios
This section describes the results of the application of SEBE to three case
studies. Differently from the empirical evaluations, these three applications
permit to observe how SEBE is applied.
9.1 Case study settings
The case studies are part, as pilots, of VisiOn1, an european project in
which the author of this thesis is involved. The objective of VisiOn con-
sists in increasing the citizens awareness on privacy. The final outcome of
the project will be a platform that can be used by public administrations
and companies to design their systems, using privacy as a first class re-
quirements, and to monitor, after the deployment, how they satisfy such
privacy requirements. SEBE is used in VisiOn as the main method for
designing the system of the organization.
The VisiOn platform will be validated with three case studies, conse-
quently, SEBE, as the main design method adopted by the project, is
evaluated as well.
For each case study at least two domain experts, who works in the
companies analyzed, are involved.
1http://www.visioneuproject.eu/
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In order to elicit as more information as possible, we structured the
empirical experiment as it follows:
1. SEBE method is presented to the subjects;
2. the subjects write a document with a general description of the case
study. We prepare a template to guide the experts in describing the
elements needed for the social/organizational ad business process ele-
ments;
3. we analyze the description and we create an initial social/organiza-
tional model. We create the initial models to let the subjects to focus
on the evaluation of SEBE as a whole, instead of evaluating the mod-
eling languages;
4. the subjects, during a workshop of 3 hours, refine the initial social/or-
ganizational models and, once complete, they create the secure busi-
ness process models;
5. the subjects complete the business process models. Conference calls
are used to clarify doubts on the method;
6. we collect feedback of subjects on the application of SEBE;
7. the subjects generate part of the implementation and modify it to
their exigences;
8. we collect feedback of subjects on the generation of the implementa-
tion.
Unfortunately this experiment is not concluded because it is linked with
the VisiOn european project which is still running and it is not yet on the
implementation phase. Therefore, the last two steps are not executed yet.
However we believe the partial results are still valid and can be used for
the evaluation of the success criteria.
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9.2 Ospedale Pediatrico Bambin Gesu’
Ospedale Pediatrico Bambin Gesu’ (OPBG)2 is a pediatric Italian hospital
with more than 2200 employees, among doctors, nurses and technicians,
and 600 beds. It dismisses more than 25000 patients every year and has 7
branches in Italy, the headquarter is located in Rome. OPBG offers web
services to patients and their family through its website, and it manages
information of patients and its employee with internal information systems.
The hospital is connected to other hospitals for tele-consultations, i.e.,
external doctors may visit the patients hosted in OPBG, and for sharing
patients’ information with other organizations.
In such complex system secure business processes are extremely im-
portant because they guide the execution of most of the activities, from
surgical operations, to the negotiation for the data shared between the
ethical committees of the hospital and another organizations. Therefore,
it is central to design and execute secure business processes that assure
that patients, OPBG and external organizations security requirements are
correctly enforced.
OPBG is a socio-technical system because it is composed by humans,
such as the patients, doctors, nurses, technical services such as the infor-
mation systems used to manga data of patients and doctors, and other
organizations such as other hospitals, the catering company, the cleaning
company, etc..
We collaborated with this organization for the creation of a platform
that ensures privacy of patients that need a tele-consultation or need to
move their data from the hospital to an external, accredited, organization.
Specifically two subjects, a doctor and a technician, used SEBE for
engineering secure business processes executed for the management of pa-
tients that are not physically present in the hospital. The two subjects
followed the process proposed in the method, used the modeling languages
and applied the transformation rules by using STS-Tool.
2http://www.ospedalebambinogesu.it
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9.2.1 Outcomes of the case study
Table 9.1 shows the number of elements defined in the case studies, specifi-
cally the second column shows the elements specified by the OPBG subjects
to specify the social/organizational model and business process models of
the part of OPBG system examined for the case study.
For what concerns the STS-ml models 11 actors and 44 goals were de-
fined. Most of the actors, though, are not associated to any goal but they
represent different agents that play the same role. 32 documents were de-
fined and used/exchanged by the actors in the OBG system; they made
tangible 10 pieces of information. The subjects identified 68 security re-
quirements at the social/organizational perspective.
Subjects defined 46 business processes, executed by 11 unique partici-
pants. They defined a total of 80 activities. The average number of activi-
ties per business process is 1,74: some business processes where composed
by only one task, because they are out of scope but still their execution
is important for other processes. For example, the usage of the localiza-
tion service, is not part of OPBG but is need for the tele-consultation.
Therefore, its usage is represented with a SecBPMN2 call activity, which
is linked to a business processes with one task that represents the execution
of the localization service. This permits to consider external services, the
external actors that execute the services and it permits to specify security
constraints, in terms of annotations, on the called external service. The
subjects specified 40 security annotations.
This case study underlined how essential the connection between so-
cial/organization and business process models is. The specification of the
organizational elements helped the subjects to organize their knowledge
and, therefore to be more effective in the specification of the business pro-
cess. Indeed, during the workshop and during the conference calls, the
subjects discovered incoherences in the social/organizational model and in
the business processes that would not have be discovered with a separated
analysis of the models.
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On the other hand the subjects in their feedback underlined the fact
that SEBE modeling languages are complex to master. Only after the
workshop and some hours spent using the modeling languages the experts
had been able to autonomously use SEBE.
9.3 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico
Ministero Italiano Sviluppo Economico (MISE)3 is an Italian ministry in
charge of helping and guiding the economic development of Italy. One of
the main activities of MISE consists in helping the development of Italian
companies, therefore, it is permanently in contact with many Italian firms.
Due to an Italian law on transparency, MISE is obliged to publish details
about its employees and about the organizations it deals with. Business
processes play a central role because they are used to check and publish
data of organizations and employees. Therefore, it is extremely important
to design and execute secure business processes which enforce security re-
quirements of citizens and organizations.
MISE is a socio-technical system because it is composed by human ac-
tors such as the employees, technical services such as the information sys-
tems used to manage organizations data or publish data to citizens, and
other organization such as the organizations helped by the ministry.
We collaborated with MISE for creating a platform which ensures the
enforcement of privacy requirements of organizations and MISE for the
publication of data to fulfill Italian transparency law for ministries. In
particular, four subjects used SEBE for engineering business processes.
They executed the process provided by the method and the collaborated
to define the social/organizational model and the business process models.
3http://www.mise.gov.it
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9.3.1 Outcomes of the case study
The third column of Table 9.1 shows the elements used by MISE subjects.
For what concerns the social/organizational model, the subjects defined 23
actor and 94 goals. They also specified 43 documents and 36 information.
The resulting STS-ml diagram is complex and do not focus only on the part
of the MISE system used for the evaluation. They specified 131 security
requirements.
For what concerns the business process perspective they specified 12
business processes, executed by 3 participants. The number of business
processes is considerably lower, respect of the dimension of the STS-model,
if we compare the OPBG case study, because the subjects used only a part
of the social/organization model they specified to generate the business
processes. This shows a slightly different usage of SEBE: they exploited
the social/organizational model not only for gathering information for the
generation of the business process but for eliciting contextual information.
The subjects specified 3 security annotations. This is due to the fact
that many of the security requirements relevant for the business processes
generated from the social/organizational model were about authorization
constrains and that were enforced with the proper access to data objects.
The subjects confirmed that the SEBE process was easy to execute and
that the transformation rule were easy to apply and that were extremely
useful to generate the business processes and check if the security require-
ments were satisfied by the business processes. In particular the latter
were essential to check if only non sensitive information are published. In
a latter stage of the case study, i.e., after the workshop, the domain ex-
pert underlined the possibility of customizing the transformation rules was
essential to generate ad-hoc security policies.
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9.4 Athens municipality
Athens municipality4 is the main public administration of the city of Athens.
It provides numerous services to the citizens, such as birth registration,
road misconstructions and fees payments. Most of those services are au-
tomated and offered through municipality websites. Dimos Athinaion
Epicheirisi Michanografisis (DAEM)5 was the first greek company to man-
age services for Athens municipality and, currently, is the largest company
in the city which provides the municipality the infrastructure and manages
the services for the citizens of Athens. Security in central for DAEM, since
most of services provided to citizens require the management of sensitive
data and are critical for the citizens and the municipality.
Business processes are central in this system because they are used to
manage data and to specify the steps, most of which are imposed by law,
to provide the Athens services.
Athens municipality is a socio-technical system because is composed
of: (i) humans such as citizens and employees of the municipality; (ii)
autonomous technical component such as services of other public admin-
istration; and organizations such as private company that collaborate, or
interact with the municipality.
For this case study we did not collaborated directly with Athens mu-
nicipality, instead, we collaborated with DAEM to create a socio-technical
system to mange data of citizens and organizations in order to provide ser-
vices as birth registration, road misconstruction report and fees payment.
In particular two subjects, one expert of the PA and one DAEM tech-
nician, used SEBE. They executed the process provided with the method,
specifying the social/organizational model generating and enriching the
business process models.
4https://www.cityofathens.gr
5http://www.daem.gr
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9.4.1 Outcomes of the case study
The fourth column of Table 9.1 shows the elements used by DAEM subjects
to define secure business processes. They specified 8 actors and 23 goals
and, for the data part, they specified 11 documents and 26 information.
The social/organizational model defined by DAEM experts is smaller of
the models created by MISE and OPBG experts. The number of security
requirements, 15, are lower too. This does not mean the case study is
smaller, instead the experts create the social/organizational model at a
higher level of abstraction. It is a choice that was due to multiple factors
such as the effort available and the information available for the analyzed
part of the system.
For what concerns the procedures, 40 business processes were specified,
executed by 8 participants. A total of 63 activities were specified. SEBE
leaded to the creation of small business processes, that are focused on the
achievement of the goals specified in the social/organizational model. In
this case study DAEM experts preferred to focus their effort in the creation
of more business processes, instead of specifying in social/organizational
models, as preferred by MISE subjects. This choice did not influence the
final outcome, since in both cases the subjects specified the secure business
processes needed for the achievement of their core goals.
OPBG MISE Athens municipality
Actors 11 23 8
Goals 44 94 23
Documents 32 43 11
Information 10 36 26
Security requirements 68 131 15
Business processes 46 12 40
Participants 11 3 8
activities 80 15 63
Security annotations 40 3 0
Table 9.1: Elements of STS-ml and SecBPMN2 used to specified the case studies
Subjects appreciated the intuitive generation of business processes from
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social/organizational model and the easiness of generating security policies
from security requirements and the verification of the latter against busi-
ness processes. On the other hand, they underlined the initial difficulties
in learning the STS-ml and SecBPMN2 modeling languages, because of the
richness of their syntaxes.
9.5 Comparison of case study results
The three case studies analyzed in this chapter highlighted different usages
of SEBE. MISE focused on the social/organizational model while OPBG
focused on the design of business processes. We believe this difference
was due to the different nature of the case studies and in the amount of
information available during the modeling phases. Table 9.2 shows the dis-
tinctive characteristics of the case studies reported in this chapter. OPBG
is a private company and, therefore, this may had influenced the focus
of the subjects. On the other hand MISE is public administrations with,
probably, less control on the business process are executed.
Subjects of Athens municipality applied a different approach since they
used a general social/organizational model to specify the business pro-
cesses. The conceptual gap between the social/organizational model and
the business process model in this case was marked, because business pro-
cesses were associated to very generic goals, but this did not prevent the
application of the transformation rules.
In all three case studies it was possible to define business processes that
satisfied all the social/organizational security requirements. This was per-
mitted by the incremental process provided by SEBE, which allowed sub-
jects to modify the the social/organizational and business process models
in order to create secure business processes, i.e., business process models
that satisfies social/organizational security requirements.
In the MISE case study the security requirements, elicited from the part
of the social/organizational model was not used for the generation of the
business processes, were ignored. Indeed, STS-Tool automatically ignores
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Type of
organizations
Type of actors Type of
information
OPBG Private Patients,
services,
organizations
ID info,
health info,
organization info.
MISE Public
administration
Citizens,
services,
organizations
ID info,
Taxation info,
organization info
Athens
municipality
Public
administration
Citizens,
services,
organizations
ID info,
birth info,
building site info
Table 9.2: Case studies comparison
security requirements that refer to elements of STS-ml but that are not
mapped to any SecBPMN2 elements.
9.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes the application of SEBE to three case studies: two
public administrations and a company, which used SEBE to engineer se-
cure business processes in complex, real scenarios, using a socio-technical
approach. In particular the case studies permit to verify that SC3, SC1.1,
SC1.2 and SC2.1.
For what concerns SC3 they confirmed that SEBE can be used to verify
procedural patterns againstSecBPMN2 business processes (SC3.1), verify
security concepts against SecBPMN2 business processes (SC3.2), and that
STS-Tool offers a valid support for the analysis (SC3.3).
These case studies also confirmed that SecBPMN2 is an effective mod-
eling language for business processes with security concepts (SC1.1 and
SC1.2) and for security policies (SC2.1), and that the transformation rules
provided for generating business processes and enforcing security policies
can be effectively used by business process designers in real scenarios.
These SC were already demonstrated in Chapter 8, their validation has
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been crosschecked in this chapter.
As specified before, VisiOn, and consequently the evaluation using the
case studies, is not yet concluded. Therefore, this chapter describes only
partial results of the applications of SEBE. With the partial results we
cannot evaluate how subjects perceive the usefulness of SC5, which requires
a method that provides transformation rules that can be effectively used by
business process designers to generate part of the implementation (SC5.1)
and that these transformation rules are supported by the extended version
of STS-Tool (SC5.2). However, from preliminary results and discussions
with security and domain experts we believe that this part of the method
will be more than welcomed, since it support business process designers
in the last phase of the engineering of secure business processes, i.e, their
implementation.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and future work
This thesis proposes SEBE: a method for engineering secure business pro-
cesses that considers socio-technical aspects of organizations.
Table 10.1 shows a map of the thesis, with the Research Questions
(RQs), the corresponding Success Criteria (SC), the chapters in which are
described the parts of SEBE that meets the SC, and the methods/contri-
butions used to evaluate the SC, namely, empirical evaluations, the formal
definition of the abstract syntax and applications to case studies.
The rest of the chapter describes how SEBE meets the SC, conclusions
and limitations of this thesis, ongoing research works and future lines of
research.
10.1 Fulfillment of success criteria
10.1.1 Success Criteria 1
SC1 requires a modeling approach that can be used for: representing busi-
ness processes (SC1.1), representing security concepts (SC1.2) and for for-
malizing business processes with security concepts (SC1.3).
To achieve these requests, SEBE provides SecBPMN2: a modeling lan-
guage we designed for modeling secure business processes and security poli-
cies. SecBPMN2 is composed of two parts: SecBPMN2-ml and SecBPMN2-
Q. In particular SecBPMN2-ml extends BPMN 2.0 with a rich set of secu-
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RQ SC Chapters Empirical eval. Formal syntax Case studies
RQ1
SC 1.1
5
X X
SC 1.2 X X
SC 1.3 X
RQ2
SC 2.1
5
X X
SC 2.2 X
RQ3
SC 3.1
5
X
SC 3.2 X
SC 3.3 7 X
RQ4
SC 4.1 6 X X
SC 4.2 5/6 X X
RQ5
SC 5.1 6 ?
SC 5.2 7 ?
RQ6
SC 6.1 4 X
SC 6.2 7 X
Table 10.1: Thesis map
rity concepts. It meets SC1.1, since it permits to specify business processes,
while it achieves SC1.2 because it allows to specify security concepts and
to associate them to business process elements..
SecBPMN2-ml is provided with a formal specification of its abstract
syntax that meets SC1.3, since it permits to avoid incoherences and ambi-
guities and it allows business process designers to specify business processes
diagrams with a formally specified abstract syntax.
The fulfillment of SC1.1 and SC1.2 is verified with empirical evaluations
and with applications of SEBE to case studies. In particular the empirical
evaluation described in Section 8.1 confirms the fulfillment of SC1.1, since
the subjects underlined the the usefulness of the modeling language and
they preferred it instead to other, less expressive and/or more complex,
modeling languages. The applications to case studies, presented in Chap-
ter 9, confirm that SecBPMN2 is an effective language for modeling secure
business processes. The formalization of SecBPMN2-ml satisfies SC1.3.
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10.1.2 Success Criteria 2
SC2 requires a modeling approach that permits to specify (SC2.1) and to
formalize (SC2.2) security policies.
SEBE provides SecBPMN2-Q, a graphical query language, with an ab-
stract syntax formally specified, that extends SecBPMN2-ml and allows to
specify security policies. The language permits to define patterns, i.e. con-
straints on the sequence of activities of the business processes that must or
must not be executed. It also permits to specify constraints on the security
concepts.
SecBPMN2-Q fulfills SC2.1, since it permits to specify security policies,
while its formal abstract syntax satisfies SC2.1.
Empirical evaluations, described in Chapter 8, and applications of SEBE
to case studies, presented in Chapter 9, confirmed the utility of SecBPMN2-Q
in defining security policies. In particular, in the empirical experiment de-
scribed in Section 8.1 subjects preferred SecBPMN2-Q instead of other
languages for defining security policies. While, for the the applications of
the method to case studies, subjects confirmed the utility of SecBPMN2-Q
and the easiness of usage with large, real scenarios.
10.1.3 Success Criteria 3
SC3 requires an automated approach (SC3.3) that permits to verify pro-
cedural patterns (SC3.1) and security constraints (SC3.2) against business
processes.
SC3.1 and SC3.2 are fulfilled respectively by the formalization of
SecBPMN2-ml and SecBPMN2-Q, and by the formal specification of how
the security policies are satisfied by secure business processes, described in
Chapter 5. SC3.3 is achieved thanks to the implementation of the verifi-
cation of security policies in STS-Tool.
The fulfillment of SC3 is verified with the applications of SEBE to case
studies. In particular, the feedback from the subjects who applied the
method confirmed that SC3.1 and SC3.2 are achieved since the verification
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outputs matched the expectations of the subjects. While SC3.3 is achieved
because the subjects, during the experiments, used the implementation of
the verification numerous times and they underlined, with positive feed-
backs, the usefulness of the functionality.
10.1.4 Success Criteria 4
SC4 asks for a systematic approach that supports the derivation of business
processes from a social/organizational models (SC4.1) and the verification
of the enforcement of social/organizational security requirements against
secure business processes (SC4.2).
SC4.1 is fulfilled with the transformation rules described in Chapter 6
while SC4.2 is achieved thanks to the same transformation rules and the
verification rules described in Chapter 5. In particular, the transformation
rules permits to transform security requirements in security policies, while
the verification rules permit to verify if security policies are satisfied against
business processes.
The fulfillment of SC4 is checked with the empirical evaluations and the
applications of SEBE to case studies. The results of empirical evaluations
described in Section8.2 confirm that the users of SEBE find the genera-
tion of business process and the verification of security policies relevant
and useful functionalities for engineering secure business processes. These
results are confirmed by the feedback of the subjects who applied SEBE
to case studies.
10.1.5 Success Criteria 5
SC5 requires a systematic approach that permits to generate part of the im-
plementation of secure business processes (SC5.1) in an automated fashion
(SC5.2).
SC5.1 is fulfilled by the transformation rules provided in Section 6.2,
since they specify how to generate RDL code from SecBPMN2 business
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processes, while SC5.2 is achieved thanks to the implementation of such
rules in STS-Tool.
Our internal tests confirm that the generation algorithm and imple-
mentation work as expected and, therefore, the fulfillment of SC5.1. The
verification of the utility of the implementation is an objective of the eval-
uation using the application of SEBE to case studies. Unfortunately the
evaluation is not finished because it is part of a two year european project,
VisiOn1, which has not yet reached the development phase and, therefore,
it is not possible to fully evaluate SC5.2. However, from preliminary discus-
sions with the subjects, we believe that this feature is more than welcomed
and it will be appreciated.
10.1.6 Success Criteria 6
SC6 asks for a process that guides business process designers, during the
engineering of secure business processes (SC6.1), that is supported by a
software tool (SC6.2).
SC6.1 is achieved thanks to the process described in Chapter 4 while
SC6.2 is fulfilled with the extension of STS-Tool we provided with SEBE.
The fulfillment of SC6 is verified with the empirical evaluation described
in Section 8.2, which confirms that users of SEBE find the process easy to
follow and helpful, especially when they use the method for the first times.
The same evaluation confirmed that STS-Tool provided a valid support for
the process, allowing a natural execution of all its phases.
10.2 Conclusion and limitations
Dealing with security is an extremely important activity for today’s orga-
nizations. Security breaches impact on the activities and on the business
processes of such organizations causing millions of dollars of losses, as de-
scribed in PWC reports of last years [1, 2].
1www.visioneuproject.eu
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The same documents report that, nowadays, more and more security
breaches occurs because of insiders, which uses the organizational structure
and social aspects to harm organizations. Therefore, the design of business
processes should enforce both social and organizational security aspects.
Still the mere design of business processes does not guarantee to avoid
security issues. Business processes have to be implemented and executed
correctly. Their implementation should employ security controls that en-
force security aspects defined in secure business processes.
This thesis proposes SEBE a method for engineering secure business
processes using a socio-technical approach, namely, it supports business
process designers in designing secure business processes using social/orga-
nizational security aspects, and in generating part of the implementation
that enforces security aspects defined in secure business processes.
In the following we summarize the contribution made by this thesis.
A process for secure business process engineering. SEBE is pro-
vided with a process which supports business process engineers in designing
secure business processes and generating implementation from such busi-
ness processes. The process can be described in three macro steps: (i) the
definition of a social/organizational models that define social/organiza-
tional security requirements; (ii) the definition of secure business processes
that enforce social/organizational security requirements; (iii) the genera-
tion of the implementation that follows what is specified in the business
processes.
The process is iterative and incremental and it permits a continuos
refinement of the social/organizational models the business process models
and the implementation.
SecBPMN2 modeling language. SecBPMN2 is an expressive, graphi-
cal modeling language that extends BPMN 2.0 with a rich set of security
annotations and a set of relations that permits to specify secure business
processes and security policies. The formalization of the abstract syntax
of the language resolves many ambiguities of BPMN 2.0 and specifies how
security policies are satisfied in secure business processes.
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Transformation rules. SEBE is provided with a set of transformation
rules which integrate social/organizational models with business process
models with the implementations. The method provides a meta-language
to change such transformation rules in order to customize them for specific
contexts.
STS-Tool. SEBE is fully supported by STS-Tool, a software which helps
business process designers in applying the method. The software supports
the execution of the process in all its steps, with functionalities that imple-
ments the transformation rules, the verifications rules and that integrate
the modeling languages.
Evaluation of SEBE. We evaluate SEBE with two empirical evaluations
and with applications two three case studies. The results of the evaluations
confirms that the method achieved all the success criteria.
10.2.1 Limitations
During the empirical evaluations and the applications of SEBE to case
studies, we observed some limitations of the method.
Users underlined that the STS-ml and SecBPMN2 are expressive mod-
eling languages but with a complex syntax that is not easy to learn and
it takes hours to be mastered. STS-ml uses concepts new to many busi-
ness process designers and, consequently, they have to learn how to model
the social/organizational aspects of organization. SecBPMN2, on the other
hands, is based on the intuitive idea of processes, but it builds on BPMN 2.0
which is an expressive and complex language with many concepts and re-
lations to be learned and understood.
Some users, highlighted the lack of security concepts in SecBPMN2,
for example anonymity and undetectability. Even if the set of security
concepts in SecBPMN2 is rich and derivates from a reference model on
security, in some specific context peculiar security concepts, that are not
considered by SecBPMN2, may be needed.
Another limitation of the method regards the implementation language
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we chose, RDL, for the generation of the implementation of secure business
processes. We chose RDL because is a new programming language for busi-
ness artifacts and their business logic that is built on top of a well-known
and vastly used framework: HANA2. Still, the choice of an implementation
language inevitably reduces the scope of the applications of SEBE, how-
ever we defined the generation of RDL applications using templates that
can be modified to adopt a similar language such as Advanced Business
Application Programming (ABAP)3 or Oracle PeopleCode.
10.3 Ongoing works
While SEBE is a mature method, we still work to eliminate or reduce its
limitations.
Evaluation of the applications to case studies. The applications to
case studies will permit to check if users in real scenarios find the gen-
eration of the implementation useful to their purposes. Our preliminary
evaluations and discussions with security experts confirm the usefulness of
this feature of SEBE, we believe that the generated RDL applications will
be of a great help to developers.
Security concepts in SecBPMN2. One of the limitations of SEBE
regards the limited set of security concepts that can be used in SecBPMN2
diagrams. Even if the set is reach and it comprehends the most known
security concepts, it will never have a full coverage. We, therefore, are
working on another direction: instead of enriching the set, we will permit
the users to define their security concepts and add them to the set.
Implementation consistency check. Currently SEBE has no control
on the implementation, once it is generated. Therefore, developers may
inject malicious code or remove security controls to create security vulner-
abilities. To minimize this possibility we are extending SEBE in order to
allow business process designers to verify the implementation code, after
2https://hana.sap.com
3http://scn.sap.com/community/abap
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it is modified by the developers. This verification will check if the imple-
mentation code modified by developers enforces the security requirements
that were enforced by the original implementation code. This check is
composed by two parts. One part verifies if the security controls were
modified, if it is true we will not guarantee the enforcement of the security
requirements. The second part will allow to propagate security constraints
through business artifacts data, i.e., business artifacts will transmit their
security constraints to all the business artifacts that store their informa-
tion. The second part of the consistency check will follow the information
flow and it will check if a business artifacts declared by the developers,
which contains protected information, is protected by the security control.
Improvement of STS-Tool. STS-Tool is a stable, complete software tool
already released for the public. However, we plan to modify the graphical
appearance of the tool to further facilitate the usage of SEBE. Moreover,
we will extend the software to support the verification of the code as de-
scribe in the previous point.
10.4 Future research work
This thesis opens a number research lines, that are described in the rest of
the section.
Beyond security. SEBE is a method that offers support for security
during business process engineering. We focused on security because is
an extremely relevant aspect for organizations, but it is not the only one.
Other aspects can heavily influence an organization and they are, therefore,
central to consider when developing business processes. For example, pri-
vacy, information quality and the next release problem [12]. These aspects
cross the technological or social/organizational boundaries and, therefore,
have to be analyzed using a SEBE-based approach.
Adaptive security. Another research line consists in using the method
to create agent-based systems with adaptive security. Nowadays security
is static, once security controls are implemented in a system, they are
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rarely substituted/upgraded if not necessary because of security breaches.
Adaptive security systems consist in autonomous components (agents) that
react immediately to security breaches deploying the best security solution.
SEBE can be used for designing and implementing these systems, since
it permits to specify the social/organizational security goals, the plans
executed by the agents that enforce the security requirements (i.e., the
business processes) and then the implementation of such plans.
Open data. Open data is the idea that some data should be freely avail-
able to everyone to use and republish as they wish, without restrictions
from copyright, patents or other mechanisms of control [8]. In this context
the european commission requests companies and public administrations
to be more and more transparent allowing users and citizens to access the
data of the organizations4.
Still, sensitive data cannot be published, therefore, organizations’ data
have to execute processes to sanitize them. But such sanitization depends
on the type of information and the requirements of the customers. A
method based on SEBE can be used to define the privacy requirements
and what are the sensitive information, define the business process used to
sanitize data and check if they are applied in business process of organiza-
tions, and generate if their implementation that safely published sanitized
data.
Business process re-engineering. SEBE opens the possibility of re-
engineer secure business processes for complex socio-technical systems.
The transformation and verification rules can be extended to derive secure
business processes from the implementation of socio-technical systems of
organizations, check if they are compliant with socio/organizational secu-
rity requirements, modify them and re-implement them.
4https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/open-data
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Appendix A
Transformation rules for STS-ml
elements
This appendix shows the complete list of default transformation rules pro-
vided in SEBE which permits to generate SecBPMN2-ml business processes
from STS-ml elements. Table A.1 shows transformation rules for actors,
Table A.2 shows transformation rules for goal and relations between goals
and documents, while Table A.3 shows transformation rules for relations
between actors.
Name STS-ml elements SecBPMN2-ml
business processes
Mapping
Agent Agent : Pool
Role Role : Pool
Table A.1: Default transformation rules provided in SEBE to transform STS-ml into
SecBPMN2-ml models
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Name STS-ml elements SecBPMN2-ml
business processes
Mapping
Goal
Actor : Pool,
Goal : Process
Read
Actor : Pool,
Read Rel.: Process,
Document:
Data object
Modify
Actor : Pool,
Modify Rel.:
Process,
Document:
Data object
Produce
Actor : Pool,
Produce Rel.:
Process,
Document:
Data object
Table A.2: Default transformation rules provided in SEBE to transform STS-ml actors
into SecBPMN2-ml models
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Name STS-ml elements SecBPMN2-ml
business processes
Mapping
Transmission
Actor A:
Participant ${A},
Actor B:
Participant ${B},
Document:
Message,
Transmission :
Processes
Delegation
Actor A:
Participant ${A},
Actor B:
Participant ${B},
Delegation :
Process
Table A.3: Default transformation rules provided in SEBE to transform STS-ml goals
and relation between goals and documents into SecBPMN2-ml models
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Appendix B
Transformation rules for security
requirements
This appendix shows the transformation rules provided in SEBE to gener-
ate security policies from STS-ml security requirements. Table B.1 shows
the transformation rules provided in SEBE for security requirements that
can be specified on delegation of goals. Table B.2 shows the template for
the four type of redundancy that can be defined in STS-ml. Table B.3
defines the template for security requirements that can be specified on
transmission of documents. Table B.4 shows the template of security re-
quirements that can be specified using authorizations in STS-ml. In this
table is not shown the information perspective of the STS-ml models, which
is common to all of them, and link the information I with the document
D trough a Made tangible by relation. Table B.5 shows the template for
compatible and incompatible security requirements.
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Security requirement SecBPMN2-Q template Mapping
Availability
A B
G
Ava Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
non-delegation
A B
G
No-del Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
Trustworthiness
A B
G
Tru Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
non-repudiation
A B
G
No-Rep Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
Table B.1: Default transformation rules for security requirements on delegations
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Security requirement SecBPMN2-Q template Mapping
Redundancy fallback-
multi
A B
G
Red Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
redundancy-fallback-
single
A B
G
Red Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
redundancy-true-multi
A B
G
Red Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
redundancy-true-single
A B
G
Red Agent/Role : Pool
Goal: Call activity
Table B.2: Default transformation rules for redundancy security requirements
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Security requirement SecBPMN2-Q template Mapping
Authentication
A B
D
Auth Agent/Role : Pool
Document : Message
Availability
A B
D
Ava Agent/Role : Pool
Document: Message
Confidentiality
A B
D
Con Agent/Role : Pool
Document: Message
Integrity
A B
D
Int Agent/Role : Pool
Document: Message
Table B.3: Default transformation rules for security requirements on transmissions
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Security requirement SecBPMN2-Q template Mapping
non-disclosure
A B
R M P T
I
IOwn
Agent/Role : Pool
Document: Message
non-modification
A B
R M P T
I
IOwn
Agent/Role : Pool
Document:
Data object
non-production
A B
R M P T
I
IOwn
Agent/Role : Pool
Document:
Data object
non-reading
A B
R M P T
I
IOwn
Agent/Role : Pool
Document:
Data object
Table B.4: Default transformation rules for authorizations
187
APPENDIX B. TRANSFORMATION RULES FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Security requirement SecBPMN2-Q template Mapping
Compatible
A B
Agent/Role : Pool
Incompatible
A B
Agent/Role : Pool
Table B.5: Default transformation rules for compatible and incompatible requirements
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